Werder:
The Influence of Werder’s Lectures and Logik on Kierkegaard’s Thought
Jon Stewart

The story has often been told of Kierkegaard’s trip to Berlin in the fall of 1841. His stay in the Prussian capital lasted from 25 October 1841 to 6 March 1842. It has traditionally been assumed that the trip was motivated by his desire to attend the lectures of Schelling (1775–1854). By that time near the end of a long and distinguished academic career, Schelling had been appointed to the University of Berlin in 1841 by King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia (1795–1861) for the express purpose of extinguishing the dangerous spark of Hegelianism before it caught fire and spread.1 In the letter to Schelling offering him a prestigious professorship at the university, the King’s representative Karl Freiherr von Bunsen (1791–1860) makes reference to the King’s desire to marshall Schelling’s intellectual power and reputation into service against “the dragon seed of Hegelian pantheism.”2 Since Schelling’s lectures were highly critical of Hegel, it is often claimed that one of Kierkegaard’s main motivations for attending them was to obtain new weapons for his anti-Hegelian arsenal3 and that

3 For example, Kaufmann: “Kierkegaard’s attacks were not based on his own reading of Hegel and were usually as wide of the mark as his remarks about Goethe. His image of Hegel was derived from the lectures of the old Schelling who had developed a profound resentment when Hegel’s fame eclipsed his own.” Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1978, pp. 288–9. “Through Kierkegaard legions of twentieth-century readers who barely know Schelling’s name have come to take for granted as historically accurate his spiteful caricature of Hegel” (ibid., p. 290). See also Tom Rockmore, Before and After Hegel. A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought, Berkeley: University of California Press 1993, p. 146. Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press 1938, p. 234f. See also Reidar Thomte, “Historical Introduction.” in his translation of CA, p. vii.
they were of great significance for Kierkegaard’s later authorship despite his well-known disappointment with them.4

But this claim ignores the fact that, in addition to Schelling’s lectures, Kierkegaard at the same time also attended the less celebrated lectures of the Hegelian theologian, Philipp Marheineke (1780–1846) and the Hegelian logician, Karl Werder (1806–93). Kierkegaard’s notes to Marheineke’s lectures are quite extensive, and their detail suggests that he was profoundly interested in the content.5 Although his notes from Werder’s lectures are less copious, these lectures were also, I wish to argue, important for him.6 In addition, Kierkegaard owned a copy of Werder’s Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik,7 upon which the lectures were apparently in large part based. In any case, the fact that he was so anxious to learn from these two Hegelians clearly undermines the claim that his primary goal in Berlin was to find new critical tools with which to criticize Hegel.

Most readers of Kierkegaard are familiar with his, at times almost formulaic, criticisms of Hegel’s speculative logic.8 He criticizes, for example, the principle of mediation,9 the idea of movement in logic,10 the presuppositionless beginning,11

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7 Karl Werder, Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Erste Abtheilung, Berlin: Verlag von Veit und Comp 1841 (ASKB 867). (Hereafter Logik). This work has been photomechanically reprinted (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg 1977). This is the only work by Werder that appears in Kierkegaard’s library.


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dialectical transitions from category to category,\textsuperscript{12} the pretension of Absolute
Knowing,\textsuperscript{13} the unity of being and thought,\textsuperscript{14} and the speculative critique of the
Aristotelian laws of contradiction and excluded middle.\textsuperscript{15} Given this apparently
unambiguous negative assessment of Hegel's logic, it seems somewhat odd that,
when in Berlin, Kierkegaard would be interested in attending lectures on Hegel's
logic by a Hegelian logician. Niels Thulstrup suggests that Kierkegaard's notes from
Werder's lectures are critical in nature and thus evidence an anti-Hegelianism.\textsuperscript{16}
Thulstrup's view seems to be that while Kierkegaard had not yet fully developed
his objections to Hegelian logic at this point, they are nonetheless already present
implicitly in his lecture notes to Werder's course. But neither the tone nor the content
of the actual notes supports Thulstrup's position. In this article I will argue, contrary
to Thulstrup, that Kierkegaard's comments concerning Werder's logic are generally
uncritical and offer no evidence to support the position that Kierkegaard was an
anti-Hegelian at the time of their writing. Further, there are at least a couple of quite
startling and surprising points of influence of the relatively unknown Werder on
Kierkegaard.

I. Werder and the German Hegelians

Karl Friedrich Werder was born in Berlin on 13 December 1806.\textsuperscript{17} He studied
philosophy under Hegel in the late 1820s during the period of Hegel's greatest
influence. He was presumably in attendance at one or more of the lecture courses on
logic that Hegel gave every Summer Semester in Berlin from 1819 to 1831.\textsuperscript{18} In 1834,
that is, three years after Hegel's death, Werder completed his Habilitationsschrift with

\textsuperscript{12} For example, SKS 4, 384 / CA, 81.
\textsuperscript{13} For example, Pap. IV B 1, pp. 121-6 / JC, 138-43.
\textsuperscript{14} For example, SKS 18, 13, EE:22 / JP 1, 195. SKS 7, 173-82 / CUP1, 189-99. SKS 7,
300-306 / CUP1, 329-35.
\textsuperscript{15} For example, SKS 4, 285n / PF, 86n. SKS 7, 277-82 / CUP1, 304-10. SKS 7, 363-84
/ CUP1, 399-422.
\textsuperscript{16} Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, trans. by George L. Stengren,
speculative developments of the Concept in Werder.... The familiar objections of Kierkegaard
against Hegel's logic in the Postscript and elsewhere, that he developed after he had studied
Trendelenburg and Aristotle, he did not yet set forth in detail; but the tendency in the entries
noted here is the same as later.”
\textsuperscript{17} For Werder's life and career see the following: Albert Köster, “Karl Friedrich
Werder,” in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, vols. 1-56, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot
der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, op. cit., vol. 2.1, p. 484f. Paul
Schlenther, “Am Grabe des alten Werder,” Das Magazin für Litteratur, vol. 62, no. 16, 1893,
pp. 249–53.
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Berliner Zeit,” Hegel-Studien, vol. 26, p. 33. See also
“Übersicht über Hegels Berliner Vorlesungen,” in Hegel, Berliner Schriften, ed. by Johannes
the title *De Platonis Parmenide.* After that he held the position of Privatdocent at the University of Berlin, and in 1838 he became außerordentlicher Professor. He was never to attain the position of ordinarius due to unfavorable political conditions.

Perhaps in part because he had no chance of advancing his career, Werder did not restrict his efforts to a narrow field of academic specialization. In addition to being a philosopher, he was also a dramatist and a critic. He wrote tragedies which never enjoyed more than moderate success. By contrast, he gave a series of highly popular lectures on the dramatic works of Shakespeare, Schiller and Lessing among others. A volume of lyric poems was published posthumously. Werder lived a long life and ultimately died in his home city on 3 April 1893.

He enjoyed a modest reputation among the German Hegelians but was by no means one of the leading figures. This can probably be explained by the varied nature of his output and the limited role that philosophy played in it, taken as a whole. His early work on Plato's *Parmenides* and his *Logik* were his only published works of philosophy. In histories of Hegelianism, Werder is usually summarily treated with a single line. He is mentioned briefly by, for example, Franz Anton Staudenmaier

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20 The Prussian minister of education, Karl Freiherr Stein zum Altenstein (1770–1840), had been well disposed towards Hegel’s students and helped to advance their careers. However, his successor, the reactionary Johann Albrecht Friedrich Eichhorn (1799–1856) regarded Hegel’s philosophy as a dangerous form of free-thinking. With Eichhorn’s appointment, Werder’s chances for advancement in the field of philosophy in effect disappeared. See Max Lenz, *Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin*, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 8ff.


From these accounts it seems that Werder amounts to little more than a footnote not just in the history of philosophy but even in the history of Hegelianism. His philosophical efforts seem to have been regarded with great reservation by at least some of his contemporaries involved in the debates surrounding Hegel’s philosophy. This again evokes the question of what it was about Werder’s lectures that interested Kierkegaard.

II. Werder’s Logik and Hegel’s Works on Logic

To appreciate the significance and scope of Werder’s Logik, it will be necessary to say a few words about Hegel’s works on logic and their reception. Hegel’s main statement on logic is of course his massive Wissenschaft der Logik, which was published in three successive volumes in 1812, 1813 and 1816. Each volume contains one “book” or main section: “The Doctrine of Being,” “The Doctrine of Essence” and “The Doctrine of the Concept.” A second edition was planned, but Hegel managed to revise only “The Doctrine of Being” before his death on 14 November 1831. This


27 Johann Eduard Erdmann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Zweiter und Letzter Band, Philosophie der Neuzeit, Vierte Auflage bearbeitete von Benno Erdmann, Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz 1896, § 344.8, p. 738f.: “K. Werder’s (geboren 1806) Logik, die sich als Kommentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Logik ankündigt (Berlin 1841), hat es bei der Lehre von der Qualität bewenden lassen, d.h. nur den neunten Teil der Logik gegeben.” See also § 346.15, p. 819: “Interessant ist es zu sehen, wie die Hegelsche Philosophie modifizirt wird, wo sie, namentlich durch die akademischen Vorträge Werders und Michelets, zur Kenntnis denkender Polen kommt, in denen damals, mehr oder weniger, panslavistische Ideen sich zu regen begannen.” (Erdmann refers to Cieszkowski and Trentowski in this context.)


31 That is, “Die Lehre vom Begriff,” Jub., vol. 5.
revised text was included in the second edition, which was published in 1832.\textsuperscript{32} This second edition was the text that was used when the \textit{Wissenschaft der Logik} was republished as a part of Hegel’s \textit{Werke}.\textsuperscript{33} This text was edited by Leopold von Henning (1791–1866) and appeared in three volumes from 1834–35.\textsuperscript{34} This was the text of Hegel’s \textit{Logik} that Kierkegaard owned. Hegel’s other principal statement on logic is the first volume of his \textit{Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften}, which was originally published in Heidelberg in 1817.\textsuperscript{35} A final work worthy of mention is Hegel’s \textit{Philosophical Propaedeutic}, sometimes referred to as the \textit{Nürnberg Propaedeutic}. This work is a series of lecture notes discovered by Karl Rosenkranz (1805–79) who edited and published them for the first time in 1840 as a part of Hegel’s \textit{Werke}.\textsuperscript{36} Some of the material overlaps significantly with that of the \textit{Wissenschaft der Logik}. This text is not of great significance in Hegel’s corpus when compared to the \textit{Wissenschaft der Logik} or the first volume of the \textit{Encyclopädie}, but it is worthy of note for our purposes since Kierkegaard owned a copy of Rosenkranz’s edition of it, which he alludes to in \textit{Notebook 13}.\textsuperscript{37}

Werder’s \textit{Logik. Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik} was probably published shortly before Kierkegaard attended the lectures that were based on it.\textsuperscript{38} The first book of Hegel’s \textit{Wissenschaft der Logik}, “The Doctrine of Being,” is divided into three main sections: “Quality,” “Quantity,” and “Measure.” Werder’s \textit{Logik} covers only the first section, that is, “Quality,” and thus deals with only one third of the first book. It ends with the transition to “Quantity.” That Werder originally planned on continuing the work is evident from the fact that on the title page the book is designated as “Erste Abtheilung.” This first part, however, turned out also to be the last, for no continuation was ever published.

Werder’s interest in and work on Hegel’s logic was by no means exceptional. At the time there were a number of other German scholars who wrote extended works explicitly on or in the spirit of Hegel’s logic. The most notable are Christian Hermann


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., pp. 30ff.


\textsuperscript{37} See SKS 19, 406. Not13.41.

\textsuperscript{38} The date of publication for the work is 1841, but it is not known when in 1841 it appeared. Werder’s lectures began sometime after 17 October of that year.
Weisse (1801–66),\(^{39}\) Georg Andreas Gabler (1786–1853),\(^{40}\) and Erdmann.\(^{41}\) Hegel’s conception of logic as speculative was extremely controversial, especially for its criticism of the laws of Aristotelian logic. These scholars did their best to defend this new view against its critics, including Schelling.\(^{42}\) Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802–72),\(^{43}\) Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841),\(^{44}\) and Immanuel Hermann, “the younger,” Fichte (1797–1879).\(^{45}\)

Hegel’s logic also drew considerable scholarly attention in Denmark. Johan Ludvig Heiberg’s (1791–1860) *Outline of the Philosophy of Philosophy or Speculative Logic*, was, like Hegel’s *Encyclopädie*, a textbook used by its author as the basis for his lectures (given originally in 1831–32).\(^{46}\) This work, the first of its kind in the Danish language, is a more or less complete paraphrase of Hegel’s *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Also worthy of note is Heiberg’s shorter work, “The System of Logic,” which appeared as an essay in the second number of his journal *Perseus*


\(^{44}\) Johann Friedrich Herbart, *De principio logicó exclusú medií inter contradictóriá non negligendo commentató, qua ad audiendam orationem...invitát*, Göttingen : Dieterich 1833.


in August of 1838. Heiberg’s great philosophical critic, Frederik Christian Sibbern (1785–1872) gave extensive critical discussions of Hegel’s logic in his Remarks and Investigations Primarily Concerning Hegel’s Philosophy, with Regard to our Age. Also significant for the Danish reception is Adolph Peter Adler’s (1812–69) highly readable work, Popular Lectures on Hegel’s Objective Logic (1842), which covers the material corresponding to “The Doctrine of Being” and “The Doctrine of Essence” from Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. This work was published after Adler lectured on this topic at the University of Copenhagen in Winter Semester of 1840. The Professor of Philosophy, Rasmus Nielsen (1809–84), published two works on speculative logic. The first was his Speculative Logic in its Essentials, which appeared in four installments from 1841–44. This work was presumably the butt of Kierkegaard’s ongoing ridicule of an incomplete system, for the last installment stops in mid-sentence in the middle of “The Doctrine of Essence.” But this criticism is not entirely fair given that Nielsen’s Propaedeutic Logic, published in 1845, overlaps significantly with Hegel’s “The Doctrine of the Concept,” the same


50. For an account of this work see Carl Henrik Koch, En Flue på Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag 1990, pp. 86–108.


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Werder’s Logik itself appeared in a Danish translation just one year after its original publication in German. This translation, under the title, Logik. Som Kommentar og Supplement til Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik,” was the work of an undistinguished rural dean by the name of Vilhelm Johan Jacob Boethe (1811–78). Boethe’s translation was reviewed twice in Danish journals. The first review appeared on 26 March 1842 in the journal Fædrelandet and was signed with the simple pseudonym “B.” A second anonymous review appeared in the Nye Intelligensblade on 12 June 1842. In both of these reviews, the work is warmly recommended to the public and regarded as an important contribution to Danish philosophical literature.

Kierkegaard had an unmistakable interest in Hegel’s speculative logic. He owned copies of all three of Hegel’s main works on the subject: the Wissenschaft der Logik, the Encyclopädie, and the Philosophische Propädeutik. In addition to Werder’s book he also owned a copy of Erdmann’s Hegelian logic, as well as Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus’ (1796–1862), Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel and Staudenmaier’s Darstellung und Kritik des Hegelschen Systems, both of which treat Hegel’s logic extensively. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when he acquired each of these works, and thus it is not easy to say whether his interest in Hegel’s logic antedates Werder’s lectures or whether it arose later, perhaps as a result of them in the mid-1840s. At any rate, these works were published and available prior to or at the time of Werder’s lectures. Later Kierkegaard developed an interest in Trendelenburg and acquired his Logische Untersuchungen and Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System. Zwei Streitschriften. He also owned the works of the Hegel critic Immanuel Hermann.

57 Respectively, ASKB 552–554, ASKB 561–563, ASKB 560.
58 ASKB 483.
61 ASKB 843 and 846.
Fichte and most of the Danish works on Hegel’s logic mentioned above. Thus, his interest in Werder’s logic seems to be consistent with his continuing interest in the discussions surrounding Hegel’s logic that were taking place in the 1830s and 1840s.

III. Werder’s Lectures

The catalogue of courses at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin for Winter Semester 1841–42 (which began on 17 October 1841) lists two offerings by Werder. The one Kierkegaard attended was entitled, “Logik und Metaphysik mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die bedeutendsten älteren und neuen Systeme,” the title of which recalls the courses on “Logik und Metaphysik” regularly offered by Hegel. Werder’s course was given on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays from 11:00–12:00. Marheineke’s course was offered five days a week from 10:00–11:00, that is, an hour earlier than Werder’s. This explains why the most extensive part of Kierkegaard’s notes to Werder’s lectures appears in the same notebook (that is, Notebook 9) in which he took notes to Marheineke’s lectures. Since Kierkegaard apparently went first to Marheineke’s lecture and then to Werder’s, it was convenient to use the same notebook to take notes for both courses. Werder’s course is listed in the catalogue as “privatim” (a variant of the usual privatissime), meaning that it was not a large public lecture which was in principle open to anyone who wanted to come but rather was intended for a smaller, more select or advanced group, who presumably had to obtain Werder’s consent and pay a small fee in order to attend.

Although Werder’s lectures seem to be based primarily on his Logik, there are some significant differences. As noted, Werder’s book covers only the first third of the first book of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik. Kierkegaard’s lecture notes, however, include an outline of the categories that covers all of Book One and most

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62 ASKB 507 and 508.
63 See ASKB 383, 569, 699, 778.
64 Verzeichniss der Vorlesungen, welche an der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin im Winterhalbjahr 1841–42 von 17. October an gehalten werden, University Archive of the Humboldt University, Berlin. The course which Kierkegaard chose not to attend had the cumbersome title, “Geschichte der neueren Philosophie von Cartesius an als Quellenstudium behandelt, mit besonders ausführlicher Darlegung des Schellingschen Systems und einer einheitlichen Übersicht der gesamten Geschichte der Philosophie.” The course was given in the afternoon every Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday from 5:00–6:00.
66 Taylor confuses Werder’s book with the lectures, taking the two to be completely synonymous. Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley: University of California Press 1980, p. 163: Kierkegaard’s “sketchy knowledge of the fundamentals of Hegelian logic, acquired largely from the writings of Heiberg and Martensen, deepened considerably when he heard Karl Werder’s lectures, Logik: Als Commentar und Ergänzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, during his stay in Berlin (1841–42).”
of Book Two. Kierkegaard’s notes contain individual reflections on some of the categories from the outline, which go beyond the material covered in Werder’s book. The final entry in Kierkegaard’s notes before that with the outline of categories treats the fact in itself [die Sache an sich] and condition [Bedingung]; these categories come from the last part of the chapter on “Ground” in Book Two of the Wissenschaft der Logik. Werder’s lectures thus advanced much further into the Hegelian system than did his book. Kierkegaard’s notes on the categories, which are introduced in the second half of Hegel’s logic, are at best fragmentary and suggest that Werder ended his lectures in Winter Semester at that point. A continuation of the course was announced in the catalogue for the subsequent Summer Semester, but by then Kierkegaard had returned to Copenhagen. The scope of Werder’s book and the lectures which Kierkegaard attended thus compare to Hegel’s logic as a whole as follows:

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<td>Dritter Abschnitt: Die Wirklichkeit</td>
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<td>Drittes Buch: Der Begriff</td>
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<td>Erster Abschnitt: Die Subjektivität</td>
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<td>Zweiter Abschnitt: Die Objektivität</td>
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<td>Dritter Abschnitt: Die Idee</td>
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68 For example, Kierkegaard has notes on the categories of quantum (SKS 19, 278f., Not9:5), measure (SKS 19, 279, Not9:6), identity and difference (SKS 19, 279, Not9:7), and the fact in itself [die Sache an sich] and condition [Bedingung] (SKS 19, 279, Not9:8), none of which are treated in Werder’s book.
69 SKS 19, 279, Not9:8.
Given the fact that Werder stopped at almost the exact midpoint of the material from the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, it is likely that he originally conceived these lectures as a two-semester course.

Werder apparently enjoyed some celebrity. In Winter Semester 1845, some four years after Kierkegaard’s visit, his fellow Dane Peter Michael Stilling (1812–69) attended Werder’s lectures, apparently on the same subject. The philologist and linguist Caspar Wilhelm Smith (1811–81), who was in Berlin at the same time as Kierkegaard in fall 1841 and even mentions him in his letters, was also in attendance at Werder’s lectures. Further useful information and interesting impressions come from Hans Brochmer (1820–75), who attended Werder’s lectures on logic in 1846. All of these students praise Werder’s skill as a lecturer.

IV. Kierkegaard’s Statements about Werder

Kierkegaard’s explicit statements about Werder all come from the *Nachlass* and can be divided into four groups: (A) letters, (B) reflections on Werder’s lectures in Notebook 8, (C) actual notes to Werder’s lectures in Notebook 9, and (D) two further brief comments, one in Notebook 13 and one on a loose paper.

A. Letters

In Berlin, far from friends and family, Kierkegaard wrote a number of letters which describe, often in some detail, his experiences at the University. These include three which discuss Werder. The first is dated 18 November 1841, that is, some three weeks after his arrival in Berlin and addressed to Peter Johannes Spang (1796–1846), priest at the Church of the Holy Ghost. Kierkegaard describes the atmosphere of Schelling’s crowded first lecture and notes, “I happened to sit between notable

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71 Stilling, often the target of Kierkegaard’s criticism, was the author of the following “Hegelian” works: *Philosophiske Betragtninger over den speculative Logiks Betydning for Videnskaben*, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1842; *Den moderne Atheisme eller den saa kaldte Neohegelianismes Consequenser af den Hegelske Philosophie*, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1844 (ASKB 801). See also his *Om den indbildte Forsoning af Tro og Viden med saa lidt Hensyn til Prof. Martensens Dogmatik*, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1850 (ASKB 802).


74 Ibid., p. 111, p. 112.


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people—Prof. Werder and Dr. Gruppe. It is understandable that Werder and other faculty members would have attended these lectures since Schelling's course was a major event. Schelling had not published anything for years, and the academic world was bristling with excitement to learn what philosophical standpoint he had arrived at. Schelling's inaugural lecture course, *Philosophie der Offenbarung*, which Kierkegaard attended, was much awaited and extremely popular. Moreover, during that same semester Werder himself was teaching a course "mit besonders ausführlicher Darlegung des Schellingschen Systems." Werder's course was by necessity confined to treating Schelling's early work, but he would presumably also have been interested in Schelling's more recent philosophical views.

The second letter is dated about a month later on 15 December 1841. Kierkegaard writes to Sibbern, his old dissertation advisor, of his enthusiasm for Werder's lectures:

> So here I am in Berlin going to lectures. I am attending lectures by Marheineke, Werder and Schelling.... Werder is a virtuoso; that is all one can say about him. I suspect that he must be a Jew, for baptized Jews always distinguish themselves by their virtuosity and of course do participate in all fields nowadays. Like a juggler, he can play and frolic with the most abstract categories and with never so much as a slip of the tongue even though he talks as fast as a horse can run. He is a scholastic in the old sense; he has found in Hegel what they found in Thomas Aquinas, not just the *summa* and the *summa summae* but the *summa summarum*. In this respect he is almost a psychological phenomenon for me. His life, his thought, the richness of the outside world almost seem meaningful to him only when they have reference to Hegel's *Logik*. It is, however, very advantageous for the young people studying at the University to have such a man.

Here Werder seems to be praised primarily for his rhetorical abilities, that is, for his mastery of the technical jargon of Hegel's philosophy and for his ability to employ it without hesitation or flaw in his analysis of the categories. The observation that Werder "talks as fast as a horse can run" may explain why Kierkegaard's notes to his lectures are not particularly detailed. It would have been difficult for him to note much more than fleeting observations and general headings, given that, in addition to the intrinsic difficulty of the subject matter itself, Werder was speaking so quickly in a language that was not Kierkegaard's own. This letter also evidences a slight ambivalence towards Werder. Although Werder seems to be "almost a psychological

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79 The other person mentioned by Kierkegaard is Otto Friederich Gruppe (1804–76), from 1844 Professor of Philosophy in Berlin and from 1863 the Secretary of the Academy of Arts. Why he is considered one of the "notable people" here in 1841 is unclear. See Max Lenz, *Geschichte der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin*, op. cit., vol. 2, 2, p. 138ff.
phenomenon" due to his obsession with Hegel’s logic and his tendency to interpret everything through its prism, his teaching is nonetheless lauded as “very advantageous for the young people studying at the University.” Thus, Werder is by no means made the object of Kierkegaard’s scorn as a blind Hegelian parrot as, for example, Heiberg and Martensen are later.

The third and final letter is again addressed to P.J. Spang and dated 8 January 1842. There Kierkegaard writes at the end of the letter,

Werder juggles with the categories as the strong man in Dyrehavn juggles with balls weighing twenty, thirty, forty pounds. It is terrifying to watch, and as in Dyrehavn one is sometimes tempted to believe that they are paper balls. He is not only a philosopher but a poet as well. He has written a monstrously long play called Christopher Columbus, which lasts from 5:30 to 10 p.m. despite the censor’s having deleted some 600 lines. Yet, in another sense it lasts even longer, for it spans fourteen years, and that being so, one should praise his brevity. It was performed for the first time last night, but it was impossible to get a ticket. My time is up, and I have Werder’s example warning me to strive for brevity.

In the first part of this passage Kierkegaard repeats more or less what he said to Sibbern a month earlier, comparing Werder with a juggler. What is new is the second half. Here Kierkegaard alludes to an entirely different aspect of Werder’s activity, namely his drama Christopher Columbus. Here there is a tone of satire regarding the length of the piece, but Kierkegaard seems rather restrained in his critique. Moreover, this satire has nothing to do with Hegel’s logic.

B. Notebook 8

Werder is mentioned twice in Notebook 8 in a section with the heading, “Notanda ad philosophiam pertinentia.” The sense that this is intended as an independent section is reinforced by the fact that, in addition to bearing this title, these entries are written in the notebook from the back. The other entries also included under this heading concern Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, which Kierkegaard was apparently reading at the same time.

83 This was the work with which Werder hoped to establish himself as a major dramatist in the German language. It was performed for the first time here in 1842, with subsequent performances in 1847 at the Charlottenburg Schloßtheater, in 1882 in Mannheim, and finally again in Berlin in 1892. Unfortunately, this work never attained the critical acclaim that Werder had hoped for. See Albert Köster, “Karl Friedrich Werder,” in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, op. cit., vol. 44, pp. 482–3.

84 SKS 19, 243, Not8:49.
85 See Leon Jaurnow and Jette Knudsen, “Tekstredegørelse” to Notesbog 8 in SKS K19, p. 306.
The first entry that concerns Werder is dated 1 December [1841]. It can be broken down into three parts, which are separated in the text by dashes. (A) The first part begins as follows: “In what Werder has covered so far, there are two points which I believe are important for any understanding in dogmatics.” This indicates Kierkegaard’s primarily theological interest in the metaphysical categories that Werder was discussing. He seems not interested in the categories for their own sake or for that of Werder’s or Hegel’s speculative logic, but rather for their possible application to Christian dogmatics.

The two points that he notes concern two different transitions in the categorial movements. Kierkegaard describes these in a very compact fashion as follows:

The one is the transition from Werden to Daseyn; the other is the transition from changeableness to unchangeableness, finitude to infinitude. Entstehen (Nichts in Seyn) and Vergehen (Seyn in Nichts) are in each other: this expressed as rest, as product, is consequently not werden but was geworden ist, i.e., Daseyn.\(^8^9\)

The first transition mentioned, that is, that from Werden to Daseyn corresponds to the section “Auflösung des Werdens” in Werder’s Logik.\(^9^0\) The first triad of Hegel’s logic consists of the categories being, nothing and becoming. The transition in question is that between this initial triad and the second one, which consists of determinate being [Daseyn], finitude and infinity. In this transition the category of becoming is conceived as having two aspects or “moments”: coming-to-be [Entstehen] and ceasing-to-be [Vergehen]. Each of these expresses the concept of becoming in its own direction or with its own vector, so to speak. Coming-to-be is becoming directed towards being, while ceasing-to-be is becoming directed towards nothing. Their unity leads to the next category, determinate being. This is what is expressed in the passage with the otherwise cryptic statement: “Entstehen (Nichts in Seyn) and Vergehen (Seyn in Nichts) are in each other.”\(^9^1\)
The second aspect of this transition is when these two moments of the category becoming, that is, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, are considered to be at rest. This is when determinate being arises. All determinate beings are mutable, that is, they are always in a process of change somewhere in the movement of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. But these movements often take place over long periods of time and are not always clearly discernable. Thus, when a thing is considered in this way, that is, as being at rest in this process, it is determinate. It has come into being without yet having ceased to be. Kierkegaard notes this in the passage thus: “this expressed as rest, as product, is consequently not werden but was geworden ist, i.e., Daseyn.” This wordplay appears at this transition in Werder’s text and in Hegel’s Encyclopädie, albeit in the student additions.

Kierkegaard’s comment on this first part of the entry is as follows: “This sounds good enough, but it involves sheer play with the concept of time, which is not given and which I think cannot be given in logic anyway.” The reference to “sheer play” seems to be to the last part of the passage just quoted. Kierkegaard seems to object to the wordplay involved in the verbal forms “werden” and “geworden ist,” which, as noted above, also figures prominently in Werder’s book. The claim that the concept is ceasing-to-be” (SL, p. 106; Jub., vol. 4, p. 119). See also Hegel, SL, p. 106; Jub., vol. 4, p. 119: “...becoming is the vanishing of being in nothing and of nothing in being...” The intended contrast here is clearly with the previous category of being, which is unchanging and eternal. Pure being does not come-to-be or cease-to-be. It is. It exists eternally.


Later in The Concept of Anxiety he objects to a similar wordplay from Hegelian logic with the words “Wesen” and “gewesen”: SKS 4, 320n / CA, 12n: “Wesen ist was ist gewesen; ist gewesen is a tempus praeteritum of Seyn, ergo, Wesen ist das aufgehobene Seyn, the Seyn that has been. This is a logical movement! If anyone would take the trouble to collect and put together all the strange pixies and goblins who like busy clerks bring about movement in Hegelian logic (such as this is in itself and as it has been improved by the school), a later age would perhaps be surprised to see that what are regarded as discarded witticisms once played an important role in logic.” See SKS K4, p. 363. For this wordplay in Hegel see EL, § 112, Addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 263: “As for the further significance and use of the category of essence, we can recall first at this point how the term ‘Wesen’ is employed to designate the past for the German auxiliary verb ‘sein’; for we designate the being that is past as ‘gewesen’.” See also PhS, p. 63; Jub., vol. 2, p. 88: “The Now, as it is pointed out to us, is Now that has
of time cannot be captured in logic seems to anticipate what might be called the existential aspect of Kierkegaard’s later thinking, that is, his belief that the scholarly fields of “objective thinking” cannot in principle capture the existential aspects of the life of the individual.

To return to Kierkegaard’s original comment about the possible significance of these categories for dogmatics, his concern appears to be with the dogma of the incarnation, which will become so important later in works such as *Philosophical Fragments*. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that in the other entry where Werder appears in this notebook (discussed just below), he is mentioned in connection with Marheineke’s lectures of dogmatics. There Kierkegaard names the doctrine of the incarnation explicitly. The connection seems to be something like the following: the idea that a transcendent God can become incarnated and appear in time corresponds to the movement from the category of being to that of determinate being. The category of being is, like the divine, eternal. By becoming incarnate, God becomes temporal, just like determinate being. To put it in purely speculative terms, the incarnation would be the coming-to-be and the crucifixion the ceasing-to-be, that is, in time. Kierkegaard has his pseudonym Johannes Climacus treat this in some detail in the *Fragments*, where he objects to claims for the purported dialectical necessity of such transitions. Thus, his claim that the concept of time cannot be captured in logic seems to anticipate, among other things, his later doctrine of the paradox.

(B) There follows a dash to indicate a break after which Werder treats two further categories: something (*Etwas*) and other (*Anderes*). Kierkegaard writes the following:

*Etwas* and *Anderes* are not merely in each other, but *Etwas* is only insofar as it is *Anderes*, and *Anderes* only insofar as it is *Etwas*; they fashion each other. The movement is a redoubling. On one side *Etwas*. As *ansich* it is *Etwas*; as being for another it is *Anderes*— *Anderes* is *ansich Anderes*; as a being for another it is *Etwas*. But thereby *Etwas* consequently is—through *Anderes*; and consequently *Etwas* is not only *Anderes* but *nur Anderes*, and this is expressed by *Anderes seyn*, but this expressed as unity is change.  

In contrast to the first part of this entry just treated, this passage after the dash has much more the look of an actual note written during the lecture itself. The passage refers to the way in which the categories of something (*Etwas*) and other (*Anderes*) are related to one another dialectically in Hegel’s logic. The point is quite simply that any something implies an opposite, that is, something else, and, conversely, for something else to exist implies that it is compared with a previous something which was the original point of departure. The two concepts thus mutually determine and

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96 SKS 19, 246, Not8:52 / JP 3, 3285.
97 SKS 19, 245, Not8:50 / JP 1, 257.
imply each other. The last part of this passage about change being the expression of their unity is also found in Werder’s book.

(C) There is a third point at the end of this entry that Kierkegaard also notes: “Finitude is what am Ende ist; consequently the finite is was gewesen ist. But infinitude? It is finitude which is not itself (nonfinitude—both); consequently it is infinitude; was nicht gewesen ist.” This too has the look of an actual lecture note. What is at issue here is the dialectical relation that exists between finitude and infinity in Hegel’s logic. Hegel constantly polemicizes against what he refers to as “the bad infinity” (sometimes translated as “the spurious infinity”). This understanding of the concept is the common sense conception of adding or repeating a term endlessly in the way that we tend to think that numbers are infinite since we can always add one more. Hegel disapproves of this notion since it is not dialectical. Thus, it leads nowhere and causes the dialectical movement to come to a halt, only to be replaced with a mechanical repetition. The true conception of infinity is one whereby infinity is conceived in its determinate opposition to finitude. In other words, the finite could not exist without the infinite and vice versa. This is expressed in the passage where Kierkegaard writes, “It is finitude which is not itself (nonfinitude—both); consequently it is infinitude.” The rest of the passage can be explained as follows.


100 SKS 19, 245, Not8:50 / JP 1, 257.


103 Compare this to the way it is phrased in Werder’s Logik, p. 153: “So kann man sagen: Das Endliche selbst ist das Unendliche — und man sagt so, wenn man weiß, was man sagt. Das Endliche ‘selbst’ bedeutet: Das Endliche nicht — sondern das Vollendete. Denn das Endliche ist nicht selbst, da es als Endliches nicht ist, da sein Seyn das Nichtsseyn ist, und es von Ewigkeit, noch bevor es anzufangen vermag als nur Endliches, schon vergangen als solches.
A finite series of numbers is one which is complete or at an end, or as is written in the passage, “Finitude is what am Ende ist.” By contrast, an infinite series of numbers is one which has not yet been completed or “was nicht gewesen ist.”

Kierkegaard’s critical comment on this is as follows: “Insofar as this is to be the expression for the significance of finitude, it manifestly has not received its due.” He seems to be dissatisfied with the conception of finitude as being merely the opposite of the infinite. His dissatisfaction perhaps stems from the fact that such an account of finitude fails to consider sin, which he clearly regards as essential in the conception of finite human beings.

(2) The other entry about Werder from this notebook refers to some of the categories mentioned in the previous one and thus serves to shed light on the previous discussion. Here Kierkegaard writes,

The doctrine of revelation as presented by Marheineke in his Dogmatik serves to illuminate the philosophic volatilization of Christian doctrinal concepts—the logical proposition that the finite is the infinite, together with the explanation Werder gives, that the stress is on the last word. All this must be gone through meticulously in order, if possible, to bring clarity into the confusion. The doctrine of the image of God according to Marheineke’s lecture is also such a volatilization.

Here he refers to the final part of the previous entry concerning the dialectical relation of infinity and finitude. Kierkegaard’s objection to both Werder and Marheineke is to their dialectical conception of infinity, which makes it in a sense dependent upon finitude. This undermines it as an absolute other since it always stands in relation to the finite, as its opposite. Thus, it is easy to understand Kierkegaard’s objection to the paradoxical formulation that “the finite is the infinite.” In Werder (and Hegel) this formulation is simply meant to capture the dialectical interrelatedness of the two categories. But to formulate it in this way is, for Kierkegaard, to risk the danger of understanding it literally, which would mean that there is no difference between the two. This would of course have catastrophic consequences for dogmatics, which, for Kierkegaard, requires an “absolute difference” between God (infinity) and human beings (finitude) or God and the created world.

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104 SKS 19, 245, Not8:50 / JP 1, 257.
105 SKS 19, 246, Not8:52 / JP 3, 3285.
106 See SKS 7, 374f. / CUP I, 412: “But between God and a human being (let speculative thought just keep humankind to perform tricks with) there is an absolute difference; therefore a person’s absolute relationship with God must specifically express the absolute difference.
The two entries in this notebook manifest clearly Kierkegaard’s agenda. Although they appear in a section entitled, “Notanda. ad philosophiam pertinencia,” these notes on Werder’s analyses of the logical categories are to be understood primarily in terms of their relevance for theology. This could also explain why Kierkegaard’s notes are not more extensive than they are. He only bothered to take notes for the categories which seemed to have some relevance for dogmatics. The other ones were simply not relevant or interesting for him.

C. Notebook 9

The actual notes that Kierkegaard took at Werder’s lectures appear in Notebook 9, which also includes his notes to Marheineke’s lectures107 (which are continued in Notebook 10).108 Like the entries on Werder in Notebook 8, these seem to be regarded as an independent section, although there is no distinct title or heading to introduce them. This is reinforced by the fact that the notes to Marheineke’s lectures were written from the front of the notebook, while those to Werder’s lectures were written from the back.109 There are in all only eight entries from Werder’s lectures.110 The last of these is a fragmentary overview of the categories.111 Kierkegaard seems not to have made any attempt to take systematic notes to Werder’s lectures in the way he did for those of Marheineke and Schelling. His notes follow the same general sequence as both Werder’s book and Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik, but there are a number of intermediary categories missing for which he took no notes.

These notes are too complex to be treated exhaustively here, and so I will confine myself to examining just two of them which are of particular importance. The one entry is rather cryptic and runs as follows: “‘Identity ist der mit sich identische Unterschied—Unterschied ist der von sich unterschied[e]n identity.”112 Here one can see Kierkegaard’s fondness for paradoxical formulations. What is at issue here is Hegel’s critique of the law of identity as nonsensical.113 Statements such as, “The plant is the plant,” ultimately say nothing. The first part of the statement, “The plant is...” seems to promise a meaningful predicate which will provide new information, but the completion of the proposition disappoints this expectation. Hegel thus claims a new conception of identity is needed. He argues that the concept of identity is inherent in the propositional form itself, for example, “The plant is green.” Here, he claims, an assertion of identity is made by simply attributing the predicate to the

and the direct likeness becomes impudence, conceited pretense, presumption, and the like.”

See also PF, pp. 44–5; SKS 4, p. 249.  
108 SKS 19, 288–301, Not10:8–9.  
110 SKS 19, 278–82, Not9:2–9. In the Papir edition these were presented as a single entry (Pap. II C 29, in Pap. XIII, pp. 330–3). These notes have never been translated into English.  
112 SKS 19, 279, Not9:7.  
subject. Thus, "The plant is green," is a statement of identity, but one which contains a difference within itself since the plant also has other properties and is not, as such, identical with the color green. This is the meaning of the first half of the statement: "Identity ist der mit sich identische Unterschied." The speculative concept of identity contains the concept of difference.

The second half of the statement concerns the category of difference, which is central for Hegel's famous criticism of the law of contradiction. Parallel to his discussion of identity, Hegel argues that the concept of difference contained in the classical notion of contradiction is ultimately empty. When one says, "The rose is not red," one has not said anything determinate since the rose could be any number of other colors. The correct speculative understanding of difference is that of opposites or contraries (Gegensätze), whereby a given thing is not its opposite, that is, north is not south, and being is not nothing. But in these complementary pairs, one can easily see a higher dialectical unity; the one is the mirror image of the other, and the one necessarily determines the other. This provides an aspect of identity to the concept of difference, that is, north is not south, but it is identical with south when considered as longitudinal direction. This is what is meant with the second half of Kierkegaard's note, "Unterschied ist der von sich unterschied[e] identity." The speculative concept of difference is thus one that contains the concept of identity.

The final entry is an elaborate table of categories. I have attempted to reconstruct this table with some slight modifications in order to make clear the relation between this table itself, Werder's Logik and Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. The words that appear in bold are the ones that appear in Kierkegaard's entry. For the sake of simplicity I have changed Kierkegaard's Danish spellings of the German words to the standard German orthography of the day. Moreover, for the few times where Kierkegaard has written the categories in Danish, I have taken the liberty of changing them to the German as they appear in Werder and Hegel. I have added in square brackets the missing chapter headings or categories, following Werder's Logik (until the point where it ends) and then Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. These appear in normal script. This arrangement makes it easy to see what fails to appear in Kierkegaard's notes. On the right I have referenced the corresponding sections in Werder's Logik (until it ends) and then Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik.

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115 It has, of course, rightly been pointed out that this is not an accurate statement of the Aristotelian law of contradiction, which states it is not possible for a given thing to both have and not have the same property (at the same time and in the same respect). Thus, it is not possible for a given rose to be both red and not red. See Aristotle, Metaphysics. Book IV. Chapters 3–6; Book XI, Chapters 5–6.
117 The references to Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik are all to vol. 4 in Juh.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Erstes Buch: Seyn</th>
<th>Werder's Logik</th>
<th>Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik</th>
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<td>[Erster Abschnitt: Qualität]</td>
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<td>Seyn</td>
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<td>Zweiter Abschnitt: Quantität</td>
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<td>[1. Kapitel:] Quantität</td>
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<td>[C. Begrenzung der Quantität]</td>
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<td>[2. Kapitel:] Quantum</td>
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<td>[A. Die Zahl]</td>
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<td>[C.] quantitative Unendlichkeit [=] Sollen</td>
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<td>[1. Kapitel: Der Schein]</td>
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<td>[2. Kapitel: Die Wesenheiten oder die Reflexionsbestimmungen]</td>
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Werder: The Influence of Werder's Lectures and Logik

[A. Die] Identität [508–515]

[B. Der] Unterschied [515–534]

[1. Der absolute Unterschied] [515–517]


Gleichheit, Ungleichheit [517–525]


Zweiter Abschnitt: Die Erscheinung


[2. Kapitel: Die Erscheinung] [622–639]


[B. Die erscheinende und die an-sich-seyende Welt] [631–636]

[C. Auflösung der Erscheinung] [636–639]


Die Theile er i den Grad das Ganze, at enhver Theil er det Hele.

Der Theil ist eo ipso die Theile.


[C. Verhältnis des Aeußern und Innern] [655–661]

[Dritter Abschnitt: Die Wirklichkeit]

[1. Kapitel: Das Absolute] [663–677]


[A.] Zufälligkeit [oder formelle Wirklichkeit,] Möglichkeit [680–685]

[und Nothwendigkeit]

[B. Relative Nothwendigkeit oder reale Wirklichkeit, Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit] [685–691]

[C. Absolute Nothwendigkeit] [691–696]

[3. Kapitel: Das absolute Verhältniß] [696–721]
This chart covers two-thirds of Hegel’s *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Only the final third, “The Doctrine of the Concept” is missing. Note that the chart is very fragmentary towards the end. Only a few of the main headings are mentioned from the final section of “The Doctrine of Essence.”

It is useful to compare this overview with the entries on the individual categories. First, such a comparison makes it evident that Kierkegaard’s individual entries do in fact follow the sequence of categories set forth here (albeit with some gaps). The place where Kierkegaard’s notes stop, that is, in the chapter on “Grund,” corresponds to almost the exact midpoint of the work as a whole. This suggests that the material was divided into two equal halves which Werder treated over two semesters.

### D. Further Allusions to Werder

The *Nachlass* contains only two further references to Werder. The first appears in *Notebook 13*, which Kierkegaard names “Philosophica.”118 As the title indicates, this is where he collected his reflections on philosophy along with the notes that he took while reading philosophical texts. The complete entry is as follows:

In the doctrine of being everything is which does not change. (This is something which even Werder admitted. See the small books.)  
In the doctrine of essence there is *Beziehung*. —The irregularities in Hegel’s logic. Essentially this segment is only dichotomies—cause-effect—ground-consequent—  
Reciprocal effect is a problem, perhaps belongs somewhere else.  
The concept is a trichotomy.  
Being does not belong to logic at all.  
It ought to begin with dichotomy.119

By “the small books” Kierkegaard is presumably referring to *Notebook 8 and 9*. The claim attributed to Werder seems to be limited to the first sentence and presumably does not include the rest of the entry. This original claim that “In the doctrine of being everything is which does not change,” refers to Hegel’s contrast between the categories in “The Doctrine of Being” and those of “The Doctrine of Essence.”120 The former are considered alone in their immediacy; they simply exist. By contrast, the so-called categories of reflection are characterized not by the verb “to be” but rather “to have” since they have reciprocal parts. For example, an effect has a cause; a thing has properties. It is odd that Kierkegaard says that this is something that Werder “admitted” given the fact that Hegel states it himself more or less explicitly. Perhaps the meaning of this is to be found in Kierkegaard’s critical remarks in this entry. He makes a couple of critical comments about this organization of the categories, for example, that reciprocal effect (*Vexelvirkning*) does not belong to “The Doctrine of Essence,” that “Being does not belong to logic at all,” and that

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logic “ought to begin with dichotomy.” Thus, to say that Werder “admitted” the point about the categories in “The Doctrine of Being” is a way of saying that Werder is in agreement with this general way of organizing and understanding the categories and thus that he too is open to these criticisms.

The second direct allusion to Werder, which is no less cryptic than the first, appears on an undated loose paper. There, based on a point in Hegel’s logic, Kierkegaard compares the works on logic of Adler, Werder and Heiberg. He writes:

Hegel in the logic at the transition from the doctrine of measure.
Adler says: when the quantitative determination is indifferent, then a new quality appears—when?
Werder is more correct.
Heiberg’s Perseus cf. a pencil mark in the margin to the first §§ of the logic.¹²¹

This entry, though undated, must have been written during or after 1842 since Adler’s Popular Lectures on Hegel’s Objective Logic¹²² did not appear until that year. Moreover, the entry’s context suggests it was written in connection with the discussion of the leap that appears in The Concept of Anxiety, which of course appeared in 1844.¹²³

The first sentence fragment refers to Hegel’s discussion of the doctrine of measure, which constitutes the transition from quantity to quality. This transition was important for Kierkegaard as a source for his celebrated doctrine of the leap. For Hegel, measure involves the quantitative increase or decrease in certain properties or aspects of a thing. These quantitative changes have, however, a natural limit. There can only be quantitative changes up to a certain point, after which there is a radical qualitative shift. In the Encyclopädie Hegel uses as an example the increase or decrease in the temperature of water:

the temperature of water is, up to a point, indifferent in relation to its liquid state; but there comes a point in the increasing or decreasing of the temperature of liquid water where this state of cohesion changes qualitatively, and the water is transformed into steam, on the one hand, and ice, on the other.¹²⁴

Hegel then designates the radical shift from one quality to another in terms of a leap. In the Wissenschaft der Logik, he writes: “On the qualitative side, therefore, the gradual, merely quantitative progress which is not in itself a limit, is absolutely interrupted:

¹²⁴ Hegel, EL, § 108, Addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 255. Here Hegel defines the “leap” as follows: “‘Leap’ here means qualitative distinction and qualitative alteration, which appear to take place without mediation, whilst, on the contrary, what is (quantitatively) gradual presents itself as something mediated.” Hegel, EL, § 35, Addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 110.
the new quality in its merely quantitative relationship is, relatively to the vanishing quality, an indifferent, indeterminate other, and the transition is therefore a leap."\(^{125}\)

A journal entry shows Kierkegaard was familiar with this example from Hegel.\(^{126}\)

When one sees how this issue is related to the idea of a leap, then it immediately becomes clear why Kierkegaard is so interested in this logical transition.

The meaning of the reference to Werder in this context is unclear. Kierkegaard’s comments on Werder’s view of quantity and quality are limited to an entry from Notebook 9 which makes no reference to the leap.\(^{127}\)

The category of measure is not treated in Werder’s book, and Kierkegaard offers no further information. What he thought Werder was right about and his reasons for his belief thus remain a mystery.

Given the analyses of the individual lecture notes and references to Werder, we can now return to the original question of Kierkegaard’s general assessment of Werder. As noted in the introduction, Thulstrup and others have regarded Kierkegaard as being highly critical of Werder, *qua* Hegelian logician. But this assessment does not square with the passages discussed here. The times when Werder is mentioned in his letters, Kierkegaard is generally quite positive. There is a slightly ironical tone regarding Werder, but despite this he is still lauded. In the actual lecture notes themselves in Notebook 9, there is no criticism whatsoever, either positive or negative. Further, regarding the two allusions to Werder in the passages just examined, the first is too cryptic for one to say with certainty whether it contains a criticism. In the second Werder’s account of the transition of quantity to quality is praised in comparison to that of Hegel and Adler.\(^{128}\)

Although the reference is too cryptic to allow an interpretation of why Kierkegaard thinks that his account “is more correct,” nonetheless there can be no doubt that this is a positive criticism. Given this, it seems that only in the two comments on Werder’s lectures in Notebook 8 do there appear negative critical remarks. In any case, it seems that Thulstrup’s claim is highly oversimplified. While Kierkegaard is critical of some individual aspects of Werder’s logic, he is by no means overly critical or dismissive. On the contrary, there is considerable evidence for his appreciation of Werder’s work and abilities.


\(^{126}\) *Pap.* V C 1 / JP 3, 2345: “How does a new quality emerge from a continuous quantitative determination?. . . . A leap. . . . Thus, every quality emerges with a leap. Are these leaps then entirely homogeneous. The leap by which water turns to ice, the leap by which I understand an author, and the leap which is the transition from good to evil. More sudden, Lessing’s Faust, the evil spirit, who is as hasty as the transition from good to evil.” Translation slightly modified.

\(^{127}\) SKS 19, Not9:6, p. 279: “Measure is quantitatively determined qualitative, and a qualitatively determined quantitative, it is to this extent qualitative as it is quantitative and vice versa. Here is determinacy.”

Kierkegaard’s published authorship contains no direct references to Werder or his *Logik*. Thus, in contrast to the documentation just explored about Werder’s lectures, any discussion of the importance of Werder’s book for Kierkegaard must remain in large part guesswork. However, given that Werder may be presumed to have used the book in his lectures and that Kierkegaard is known to have owned it, it is reasonable to assume that Kierkegaard was familiar with the book as well as the lectures. This assumption is supported by various points of contact between Werder’s *Logik* and Kierkegaard’s works which seem to suggest a significant influence.

A. Either/Or

It was during his stay in Berlin that Kierkegaard began work on *Either/Or*, which he ultimately completed upon his return to Copenhagen.\(^{129}\) The title of this famous work was inspired by the ongoing debates about Hegel’s logic and specifically by Hegel’s criticism of the Aristotelian law of excluded middle.\(^{130}\) However, Werder’s use of this formulation seems also to be in the background for Kierkegaard.

In a letter from Berlin dated 6 February 1842, when he was presumably still attending Werder’s lectures, Kierkegaard wrote to his friend Emil Boesen (1812–79) about the title of the book that he was currently working on: “‘Either/Or’ is indeed an excellent title. It is piquant and at the same time also has a speculative meaning.”\(^{131}\) By this Kierkegaard seems to refer to the implicit criticism of speculative mediation contained in this expression. The work presents two opposed positions, that of the aesthete and that of Judge Wilhelm. These positions are presented as being in fundamental opposition to one another such that no mediation or compromise between them is possible. The reader must presumably opt for *either* the aesthete or Judge Wilhelm. The pseudonymous editor of the work, Victor Eremite, writes the following in his preface: “A’s papers contain a multiplicity of approaches to an aesthetic view of life...B’s papers contain an ethical view of life. As I allowed my soul to be influenced by this thought, it became clear to me that I could let it guide me in determining the title. The title I have chosen expresses precisely this.”\(^{132}\) The contrasting views cannot be reconciled or sublated into a single higher position by means of Hegelian mediation. The work ends in a kind of *aporeia*, and no resolution ever comes about.\(^{133}\) The organization of *Either/Or*, captured so succinctly with the

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\(^{130}\) For a more detailed examination of this see Jon Stewart, *Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered*, New York: Cambridge University Press 2003, pp. 184–95.

\(^{131}\) *B&A*, vol. 1, 107 / *LD*, 68. Cf. also *SKS* 7, 229 / *CUP*, 252: “Either/Or. the title of which is in itself indicative, has the existence-relation between the aesthetic and the ethical materialize into existence in the existing individuality. This to me is the book’s indirect polemic against speculative thought which is indifferent to existence.”

\(^{132}\) *SKS* 2, 21 / *EOI*, 13.

\(^{133}\) *SKS* 2, 21 / *EOI*, 14: “these papers come to no conclusion.” See *SKS* 2, 21 / *EOI*, 14; *SKS* 2: “When the book is read, A and B are forgotten; only the points of view confront each
title, can be seen as a part of a polemical dialogue with Hegel’s criticism of the laws of classical logic and his doctrine of speculative mediation.

The formulation “either/or” had long been used as a kind of shorthand for the law of excluded middle before Hegel. He often employs the term in a critical context. He argues that thinking characterized by the “either/or” is one-dimensional and fails to see that opposites are necessarily dialectically related to one another. Instead, it insists on one-sided dichotomies: one is either free or determined, the world is either finite or infinite, and so on. The very goal of Hegel’s speculative method is to grasp the whole of the world’s conceptual structure through an awareness of the necessary connections between opposing concepts of this kind. In the *Encyclopädie*, Hegel denigrates “either/or” thinking as “dogmatism,” which distorts the true meaning of concepts by isolating them. He writes,

But in the narrower sense dogmatism consists in adhering to one-sided determinations of the understanding whilst excluding their opposites. This is just the strict “either-or,” according to which (for instance) the world is either finite or infinite, but not both. On the contrary, what is genuine and speculative is precisely what does not have any such one-sided determination in it and is therefore not exhausted by it; on the contrary, being a totality, it contains the determinations that dogmatism holds to be fixed and true in a state of separation from one another united within itself.

other and expect no final decision in the particular personalities.” See SKS 7, 229 / CUP 252: “That there is no conclusion, and no final decision is an indirect expression for truth as inwardness and in this way perhaps a polemic against truth as knowledge.”

See for example, Kant: “In logic the ‘either-or’ always denotes a disjunctive judgment; for if one member is true, the other must be false. For instance, a body is either moved or not moved, i.e., at rest; for one speaks there simply of the relation of the cognition to the object.” Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, trans. by James W. Ellington, in *Philosophy of Material Nature*, Indianapolis: Hackett 1985, p. 126n.

Hegel, *EL*, § 32, Addition; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 106. See also *EL*, p. 8 fn; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 13: “One would always do better not to talk about philosophy at all as long as, in spite of one’s depth of feeling, one is still so deeply entangled in the one-sidedness of the understanding that one knows nothing better than the *either-or*.” *EL*, § 80, Addition; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 189: “But again it is usually said also that the understanding must not go too far. This contains the valid point that the understanding cannot have the last word. On the contrary it is finite, and, more precisely, it is such that when it is pushed to an extreme it overturns into its opposite. It is the way of youth to toss about in abstractions, whereas the man of experience does not get caught up in the abstract *either-or*, but holds onto the concrete.” *EL*, § 65; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 171: “This standpoint is not content when it has shown that *mediate* knowing, taken *in isolation*, is inadequate for the [cognition of] truth; its particularity is that *immediate* knowing can only have the truth as its content when it is taken *in isolation*, to the exclusion of mediation. — Exclusions of this kind betray that this standpoint is a relapse into the metaphysical understanding, with its *either-or*.” *EL*, § 119, Addition 2; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 280: “Instead of speaking in accordance with the law of excluded middle (which is a law of the abstract understanding), it would be better to say, ‘Everything stands in opposition.’ There is in fact nothing, either in heaven or on earth, either in the spiritual or the natural world, that exhibits the abstract *‘either-or’* as it is maintained by the understanding. Everything that exists at all is concrete and hence is inwardly distinguished and self-opposed.” Translation slightly modified. (My italics.) See also *Jub.*, vol. 1, p. 410.
According to Hegel, dogmatism fastens on to the one or the other side of such opposite determinations and declares it to be the final truth. By contrast, speculative philosophy grasps the higher truth of such opposites by realizing their conceptual relation. It thus returns these concepts to their original dialectical context and restores them to their proper relation.

Prior to Werder’s lectures, the formulation “either/or” was known to Kierkegaard if not from Hegel’s primary texts, then certainly from the Danish debate about mediation that took place primarily in 1838 and 1839,136 in which participants on both sides of the issue employed the expression. The Hegel critics, Frederik Christian Sibbern137 and Jakob Peter Mynster (1775–1854),138 used the Latin version of the expression aut aut against Hegel, while Heiberg used it in Hegel’s defense.139 Hegel’s other champion, Hans Lassen Martensen (1808–84) used not only the Latin but also the Danish expression which became Kierkegaard’s title.140

Through this debate Kierkegaard was doubtless familiar with this expression and its meaning as a slogan critical of Hegel’s doctrine of mediation. While the

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formulation itself is absent, the idea is clearly present in an entry from the Journal EE in 1838. Moreover, the Latin formulation, albeit not in any polemical context, appears in his dissertation The Concept of Irony, which was of course completed immediately before his trip to Berlin. It is thus clear that Kierkegaard was familiar with this slogan and its meaning before he attended Werder’s lectures. Yet it was not until his stay in Berlin that he formulated and began work on Either/Or, and for this reason it seems that Werder must be privileged, if not as the original source, then as the proximate source for Kierkegaard’s use of it. Although Werder’s book does not reach the section in Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik where the laws of classical logic are criticized, he uses the formulation “either/or” in a polemical manner in other contexts.

It will be recalled that Werder wrote his Habilitation on Plato’s Parmenides, a dialogue which Hegel had hailed as a masterpiece of dialectical argumentation. In one passage from his Logik, Werder quotes a rather large section of the dialogue. A part of this quotation reads as follows: “But there is no time during which a thing

141 SKS 18, 34f., EE:93 / JP 2, 1578: “All relative contrasts can be mediated; we do not really need Hegel for this, inasmuch as the ancients point out that they can be distinguished. Personality will for all eternity protest against the idea that absolute contrasts can be mediated (and this protest is incommensurable with the assertion of mediation); for all eternity it will repeat its immortal dilemma: to be or not to be—that is the question (Hamlet).”

142 SKS 1, 139 / CI, 81: “On the front of the stage, then is Socrates—not as someone who rashly brushes away the thought of death and clings anxiously to life, not as someone who eagerly goes toward death and magnanimously sacrifices his life; not as someone who takes delight in the alteration of light and shadow found in the syllogistic aut/aut when it almost simultaneously manifests broad daylight and pitch darkness, manifests the infinitely real and the infinitely nothing.” SKS 1, 140 / CI, 82f.: “At the end of the Apology, however, an attempt is made to show that to die is a good. But this observation is once again an aut/aut, and since the view that death is nothing whatever emerges in conjunction with the one aut, the extent to which one can share the joy that encircles both these continents like the ocean becomes somewhat doubtful.”

143 That is, the second chapter of the first section of “The Doctrine of Essence.” Hegel, SL, pp. 408–43; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 504–51. See also EL, §§ 115–20; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 267–81.

144 Hegel, Hist. of Phil., vol. 1, p. 250; Jub., vol. 17, p. 308: “Plato, in one of his dialogues, likewise accords the chief part to Parmenides, and puts in his mouth the most lofty dialectic that was ever given...” See also Hegel, SL, p. 55f.; Jub., vol. 4, p. 53: “That which enables the Notion to advance itself is the already mentioned negative which it possesses within itself; it is this which constitutes the genuine dialectical element. Dialectic in this way acquires an entirely different significance from what it had when it was considered as a separate part of logic and when its aim and standpoint were, one may say, completely misunderstood. Even the Platonic dialectic, in the Parmenides itself and elsewhere more directly, on the one hand, aims only at abolishing and refuting limited assertions through themselves, and, on the other hand, has for result simply nothingness.” (Hist. of Phil. I–III = Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vols. 1–3, trans. by E.S. Haldane, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press 1995.)

can be at once neither in motion nor at rest."\(^{146}\) This is a typical formulation of the law of excluded middle, which states that a thing must have either the predicate \(P\) or not-\(P\), but not both. Thus, a given rose must be either red or not red. In a footnote to this quotation, Werder writes, "The fixed either or the fixed or is the character of finitude."\(^{147}\) By this he seems to mean, with Hegel, that the kind of thinking characterized by this kind of "either/or" constitutes the finite understanding; speculative thought, by contrast, is infinite since it forms a circle of concepts, without stopping at any particular one.

On the next page Werder, still quoting Plato, speaks not only of the "either/or" but also of the "neither/nor." Here he cites the following from the *Parmenides*: "it [sc. the moment] occupies no time in making it [sc. the transition from a state of rest to a state of motion] and at that moment it cannot be either in motion or at rest."\(^{148}\) Werder’s comment on this is the following: "This neither/nor is the absolute either/or, the middle of the concept, the eternal limit."\(^{149}\) Here the formulation "neither/nor" is applied to the Platonic concept of the moment, which is neither in motion nor at rest. The moment itself is not in motion when it is taken as an isolated entity; however, a series of moments is clearly in motion. It might be argued that these formulations have a relatively minor significance since they appear as footnotes, which Werder uses to comment on quoted material from Plato. However, these formulations appear again later in different contexts.

Werder continues this proliferation of odd formulations by introducing the "neither/nor" and "both/and" later in the work. Discussing the concepts of something and other, he writes:

But here it is necessary to forget what kind of a stamp something and another and neither/nor and both/and have received also in interaction with sensuousness; it depends on becoming conscious of their memory. The change as the neither/nor of the only something and of the only another is its both/and, is the unity of both.\(^{150}\)

The point here is much the same as before. The problem is how to explain change. First, a given thing must display some new aspect or property for change to have been said to take place at all. The assertion that a thing always remains itself appears to rule out the possibility of change. However, when a given thing changes, it does not simply become something else since then it would not be the same thing that changed. Thus, change is likewise not simply the introduction of something else. Change thus requires a thing to be "both" itself "and" the thing it changes into. Everything that changes has first an aspect of self-identity, that is, it must be the


\(^{147}\) Werder, *Logik*, p. 94n.


\(^{149}\) Werder, *Logik*, p. 95n: "Hier aber galt es zu vergessen, welch ein Gepräge Etwas und Anderes und Weder-Noch und Sowo[h][l]-Als auch im Verkehr der Sinnlichkeit empfangen haben; darauf kam es an, um ihrer Erinnerung bewußt zu werden. Die Veränderung als das Weder-Noch des nur Etwas und des nur Andern ist ihr Sowo[h][l]-Als auch, ist die Einheit beider."

\(^{150}\) Werder, *Logik*, p. 156.
same thing that experiences change, and then an aspect of difference, that is, it must
display some new aspect in order for change to be said to have taken place. The
both/and is the unity of these two aspects.

Werder avails himself of the same formulations a few pages later in his discussion
of finitude and infinity. There he writes,

The revelation of the infinite is the revelation of the finite, and only this double explanation
[Erklärung] is what we call a transfiguration [Verklärung]. Explanation is transfiguration.
Both are only the concrete expression for that absolute both/and, which we have already
encountered in a negative manner in the dissolution of change and which solely as neither/
nor is the self-affirming affirmation, the eternal unity of the living unchangeable or of the
apparent infinite.¹⁵¹

This is a difficult passage, full of wordplays. The point seems to be that it is a mistake to
think of finite things just as finite things. They are instead the incarnation or revelation
of the infinite since the infinite expresses itself concretely in finite things. One must
be attentive enough to recognize the infinite in the finite. In this way a given thing
is “both/and,” that is, both finite and infinite. In the background of the discussion
is clearly the Christian Revelation as evidenced by the theological language of the
wordplay that Erklärung (explanation) is Verklärung (transfiguration). Thus, Christ
is both finite, that is, a human being, and infinite, the divine. Needless to say, this is
a highly significant issue for Kierkegaard in a number of different texts. It is obvious
that he would be highly attentive to it here given that he was explicitly looking for
things from Werder’s logic which he could use in a dogmatics.¹⁵²

Here one can see Werder’s love for catchy formulations such as either/or, both/
and, and neither/nor. While Hegel uses formulations of this sort occasionally, he does
not do so with such frequency and certainly not with precisely these formulations.
Only the expression “either/or” is used by Hegel with any frequency, and its meaning
is considerably more limited than in Werder’s discussion. Thus, it is highly probable
that Werder’s playful use of these formulations helped to inspire Kierkegaard in
selecting the title for the work that he himself designates as the beginning of his
authorship.¹⁵³

B. The Moment

The “moment,” sometimes translated as “the instant,” is a key concept in
Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. Many commentators have assumed that he adopted it directly

Unendlichen, und nur diese gedoppelte Erklärung ist es, die wir die Verklärung nennen.
Offenbarung ist Verklärung. Beides ist nur der concrete Ausdruck für jenes absolute Sowo[h]l-
Als auch, das wir in negativer Weise bei der Auflösung der Veränderung schon kennen gelernt
haben und das einzig und allein als Weder-Noch die sich affirmirende Affirmation ist, die
ewlige Einheit des lebendig-Unveränderlichen oder des offenbar-Unendlichen.”

¹⁵² SKS 19, 245, Not8:50 / JP 1, 257.

¹⁵³ SVI XIII, 521 / PV, 10.
from the *Parmenides* where it was introduced and discussed by Plato.\(^{154}\) Yet Werder, whose *Habilitation* had been on that very dialogue, shared Kierkegaard’s interest in Plato, and it is reasonable to assume that Kierkegaard, who had just completed his master’s thesis on Socratic irony, would have been attentive to Werder’s views on the subject. While there is no reason to doubt that Kierkegaard was familiar with this concept in Plato’s dialogue, it may have been Werder who first brought its full philosophical and theological implications to his attention.\(^{155}\)

In the passage mentioned in the previous subsection, Werder quotes from the *Parmenides* at length.\(^{156}\) There he quotes the following discussion of the moment from Plato:

> The word “moment” appears to mean something such that from it a thing passes to one or other of the two conditions [sc. being at motion or at rest]. There is no transition from a state of rest so long as the thing is still at rest, nor from motion so long as it is still in motion, but this queer thing, the moment, is situated between the motion and the rest; it occupies no time at all, and the transition of the moving thing to the state of rest, or of the stationary thing to being in motion, takes place to and from the instant.\(^{157}\)

A few pages later, Werder refers to the concept of the moment again in a discussion of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, the constituent parts of the category of becoming. He writes,

> If we are to grasp the matter in its profundity, it must happen in the following manner: becoming is coming-into-being [*Entstehen*] and ceasing-to-be [*Vergehen*]—for it is being through itself, that is coming-into-being, coming-into-being grasped as infinite as all coming-into-being, as logical spirit of coming-into-being as it must be grasped here. And it is ceasing-to-be, for it is nothing other than *transition* [*Übergehn*] (Plato’s “Moment”).\(^{158}\)

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\(^{155}\) The claim that Werder is one of the sources for Kierkegaard’s concept of the moment has been made briefly by Klaus Schäfer, *Hermeneutische Ontologie in den Climacus-Schriften Sören Kierkegaards*, Munich: Kösel-Verlag 1968, p. 295, note 202. See also p. 259, note 130, and pp. 142–4.


Here one finds the wordplay between ceasing-to-be (Vergehen) and transition (Übergehen). This is significant since Kierkegaard notes just this transition and just this wordplay. Most importantly, the understanding of the moment as transition is precisely the point that Kierkegaard makes about this concept. Later, in The Concept of Anxiety he writes explicitly, “the moment becomes the category of transition.”

As a part of the same analysis, Werder continues his wordplays, this time with the German word for “the moment.” He writes,

> Only as the eternal eye of becoming looks out from nothingness—and this is true only for finite spirit, the learning spirit—may nothingness be called nothing else; but with nothing else one means only nothing else as being, only being, only becoming. Thus one says much sooner and only: Nothing as becoming—that is, ceasing-to-exist. To change, to change in itself, that means to cease to exist—that means to come-into-existence, that means becoming, the essence of change, the eternal change, the transition.

Here Werder makes more or less the same point, again referring to the moment as a transition (Übergehen). However, in the first sentence, instead of writing the German word for “the moment,” that is, “Augenblick,” he uses a somewhat poetic verbal construction, which recalls the etymology of the word as “a twinkling of an eye”:

> Nur ehe des Werdens ewiges Aug' blickt aus dem Nichts—

It is clear that Kierkegaard would have been attentive to this kind of a formulation.

In another passage towards the end of his analysis, Werder speaks for the first time of “moments” in the plural form. Here he makes a point about the nature of dialectical opposites, indicating one sense of the German word “Moment.” He writes,

> By contrast, if one takes “moments” in the sense of moments of creations, of moments, in which the totality, the infinite sees itself—for only the totality exists or each and everything exist only as totality, as infinity—then the expression is certainly the one which actually designates the opposite, that is, the totality in its life process.

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159 SKS 19, 245.4–9, Not8:50 / JP 1, 257.
160 SKS 19, 278.1–4, Not9:2.
161 SKS 4, 386n–387n / CA, 83n.
163 Werder, Logik, p. 107: “Nimmt man hingegen Momente in der Bedeutung von Schöpfungsmomente, von Augenblicken, in denen die Totalität, das Unendliche—denn nur die Totalität ist oder Alles und Jedes ist nur als Totalität, als Unendlichkeit—sich erblickt, so ist der Ausdruck allerdings—der eigentlich bezeichnende für Entgegengesetzte, d.h. für die Totalität in ihrem Lebensprozesse.”
Here Werder emphasizes the word “Augenblicken” to indicate that he is using it in the technical sense as before. He contrasts the notion of dialectical “moments” (Momente) or contradictory aspects of a thing with “moments” (Augenblicke) in the temporal or Platonic sense, a distinction which unfortunately cannot be rendered adequately in English. In any case, there can be no doubt that this is a key concept for Werder which he has carried over from his work on the Parmenides.

While Kierkegaard alludes to the Parmenides in The Concept of Irony,164 that is, prior to attending Werder’s lectures, there is no mention of the concept of the moment until after them. In fact, the first mention of this concept appears in Either/Or, which he wrote in large part while attending the lectures. In Either/Or in the context of a discussion about the moment of choice,165 he has Judge Wilhelm write, “This is the moment of deliberation, but, like the Platonic moment, it actually is not at all, and least of all in the abstract sense in which you wish to hold onto it; and the longer one stares at it, the smaller it is.” Plato’s concept is thus used and emphasized by Kierkegaard exactly as it had been used and emphasized by Werder. Later in the same work the moment is brought into the discussion of speculative mediation,167 where it continued to play a central role in later works. Later, in Repetition, Kierkegaard writes, “The Greek explanation of the theory of being and nothing, the explanation of ‘the moment,’ ‘non-being,’ etc. trumps Hegel.” The passage appears in a discussion of change, the same context in which both Plato and Werder treat this concept. However, as in Either/Or, Kierkegaard again juxtaposes the concept to Hegelian mediation, a move which again implies Werder’s influence.169

Kierkegaard’s main discussion of this concept comes in The Concept of Anxiety,170 in which his pseudonymous author polemicizes against the Hegelian concepts of transition, negation and mediation, which are, of course, of central importance for Hegel’s conception of speculative logic. It will be recalled that Werder frequently uses the term “transition” (Übergehen) in the passages quoted above in his description of the dialectical relation to the categories. Kierkegaard then has Vigilius Haufniensis juxtapose these concepts to Plato’s notion of “the moment”:

164 SKS 1, 174 / CI, 123. SKS 1, 177 / CI, 126. SKS 1, 305 / CI, 268. See also the reference in Notebook 13: SKS 19, 406.32–4, Not13:41 / JP 3, 3324.
166 SKS 3, 160 / EO2, 163.
167 SKS 3, 169 / EO2, 173.
169 Another detailed treatment of this concept appears in the Philosophical Fragments. Here the moment is treated as the moment of the incarnation when the god became man, the eternal became temporal. For example, SKS 4, 222–30 / PF, 13–22. SKS 4, 232 / PF, 25. SKS 4, 235 / PF, 28. SKS 4, 237 / PF, 30f. SKS 4, 306 / PF, 111. Here the moment is associated with the paradox: SKS 4, 255–6 / PF, 51f. SKS 4, 258 / PF, 55. SKS 4, 260f. / PF, 58f. SKS 4, 264–6 / PF, 62–4.
171 For a more detailed examination, see Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, op. cit., pp. 405–11.
The term "transition" is and remains a clever turn in logic. Transition belongs in the sphere of historical freedom, for transition is a state and is actual. Plato fully recognized the difficulty of placing transition in the realm of the purely metaphysical, and for that reason the category of the moment cost him so much effort. To ignore the difficulty certainty is not to "go further" than Plato.172

This reference to "the moment" is supplemented by a long footnote with a detailed discussion of this concept in the Parmenides. In this footnote it becomes clear why Kierkegaard places so much emphasis on this concept. He has his pseudonym write: "This category [sc. the moment] is of utmost importance in maintaining the distinction between Christianity and pagan philosophy, as well as the equally pagan speculation in Christianity."173 It will be recalled that much of Kierkegaard's polemical rhetoric against philosophy concerns the untoward encroachment of philosophical thinking into areas of religion. The footnote goes on to explain why he thinks the concept of the moment can perform this function: "Here again the importance of the moment becomes apparent, because only with this category is it possible to give eternity its proper significance, for eternity and the moment become the extreme opposites, whereas dialectical sorcery, on the other hand, makes eternity and the moment signify the same thing."174 The idea seems to be that the concept of the moment maintains the essential opposition of eternity and temporality. How this opposition is overcome in the incarnation is simply a paradox which cannot be understood. Kierkegaard opposes speculative philosophy's claim that the eternal and the temporal, or the eternal and the single moment are simply dialectical opposites which display a conceptual unity. This seems to be what Kierkegaard most violently objects to. He finds dialectical mediation of the two opposites inappropriate because it confuses the essential distinction between Christianity and secular philosophy. Needless to say this is far removed from the original context of this concept in Plato or later in Werder.

It has been noted that Hegel lauds the Parmenides for its dialectical argumentation. It is also in this sense that Werder makes use of it, that is, to illustrate the speculative nature of logic. Specifically the paradoxical nature of the moment as being both in motion and at rest is intended to demonstrate the limitations of traditional logic and the need for speculative logic. It is thus curious to observe that when Kierkegaard uses this concept, it is not to support speculative logic but instead to criticize it. As was noted above, he favorably compares this concept to the notion of mediation or transition in Hegel's speculative logic. Kierkegaard thus uses the Platonic concept not as an indication of the need for a speculative logic but rather as designation of the limit of reason per se. This indicates a fundamental disagreement between Hegel and Kierkegaard. For Hegel, the paradox of the moment is a call for a new conception of logic as speculative, whereas for Kierkegaard it indicates that all attempts to grasp such a concept with reason must fail. He is thus critical of speculative logic which he regards as a failed attempt to solve with reason what in principle cannot be resolved. This is why he seems in some passages to regard speculative logic straightforwardly

172 SKS 4, 385f. / CA, 82f.
173 SKS 4, 387n / CA, 84n.
174 SKS 4, 387n–388n / CA, 84n.
as sleight of hand. In this way Kierkegaard can regard himself as being genuinely Socratic in the sense of claiming to know nothing and ending in *aporia*, in contrast to Hegelian philosophy which takes up the challenge generated by the paradoxical concept and attempts to work out a logic more suited to it than classical logic.

Given the chronology of Kierkegaard’s references to this concept, it seems to have been Werder who first made him aware of it in Plato. Kierkegaard himself then went on to develop it and use it in his own way in the mature authorship. The original concept in Plato is clearly philosophical and, for obvious reasons, has nothing to do with Christian dogmatics. Likewise, Werder uses this concept in order to illustrate the categories of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be and in order to highlight the methodology of speculative logic in general. While Kierkegaard is of course sensitive to these original contexts, he invariably makes use of the concept in a profoundly theological context. This is clear in, for example, the passages discussed from *The Concept of Anxiety*, where Hauflhniensis begins with a discussion of the moment specifically in Plato’s *Parmenides* and ends with the claim (one quite foreign to Plato) that the moment “is of utmost importance in maintaining the distinction between Christianity and pagan philosophy.” Thus, Kierkegaard’s interest in Werder’s lectures appears to have been stimulated, at least in part, by a search for ideas he could apply in furthering his own agenda in the context of a dogmatics.

The difficulty of Kierkegaard’s notes to Werder’s lectures and the other entries in which he is mentioned have discouraged research into this relation. However, a simple prejudice about Kierkegaard’s presumed negative relation to any Hegelian has doubtless also played a role. Given the general view of Thulstrup, that is, that Kierkegaard was in a constant polemic with Hegel and Hegelians and that he wholeheartedly rejected anything having to do with Hegel’s philosophy, one could hardly have any great motivation to explore the entries on Werder examined here. To be sure, in Kierkegaard’s universe of thought Karl Werder was only a minor constellation in comparison with, for example, Hegel or Schelling. Despite this, there are at least hints of a more lasting influence of Werder on Kierkegaard. Moreover, that influence seems to be far more positive than Thulstrup would like to admit.

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175  *SKS* 4, 387n / *CA*, 84n.