Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries
Tome II: Theology

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ASHGATE
Eggert Christopher Tryde:
A Mediator of Christianity and a Representative of the Official Christendom

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Eggert Christopher Tryde (1781–1860) is not a well-known figure to Kierkegaard scholars. He certainly cannot compare to figures of the stature of Mynster, Martensen or Grundtvig with respect to the quality of his authorship. Nonetheless he did play a significant role in the theological and scholarly discussions of the day. Kierkegaard knew Tryde personally and was clearly exercised by him. In Kierkegaard circles, Tryde’s lone claim to fame is usually thought to be the fact that he officiated at Kierkegaard’s funeral in his capacity as pastor at the Church of Our Lady in Copenhagen. However, there is much more to be said about the significance of Tryde for Kierkegaard’s universe.

I. Tryde’s Life and Works

Tryde was born on December 8, 1781 into a family of pastors. His father was Holger Tryde (1740–1800), parish pastor for Fensmark and Rislov Congregations in Zealand and later for Birkerød in Jutland. As a boy, Tryde attended the Borgerdyd School in Copenhagen beginning in 1799. He quickly and successfully went through the usual course of studies. He passed his qualifying examination in theology in 1804. Thereafter he worked as an instructor at Christianis Institute, also in Copenhagen, until 1807 when he received the parish of Fensmark and Rislov that had previously been assigned to his father. This was followed by a series of positions as pastor in different parishes throughout the country. Also in 1807 Tryde married Christine Dorothea Kongslev (1780–1839), the daughter of a professor at the Sore Academy.

In 1838 he received the prestigious position of pastor of the Church of our Lady in Copenhagen. The move to the capital opened a number of opportunities for him, which led to a string of different positions. For instance, in 1839 he was made co-director of the Danish Bible Society. In 1841 he was also appointed as co-director of the Pastoral Seminary, where he taught practical theology to the up-and-coming pastors.

Tryde participated in various committees and commissions that discussed key issues regarding the reform of the Danish Church. Beginning in 1839, in the midst of a highly charged controversy about the dissolution of parish ties and the freedom
of the clergy, Tryde was involved in an official committee to evaluate Bishop Jakob Peter Mynster’s (1775–1854) proposal for a new church ritual and altar book. In 1843, together with Hans Lassen Martensen (1808–84) and N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783–1872), he served on a committee appointed by Copenhagen’s Clerical Conference to explore the suggestions for modifying or replacing the official hymn book, which at the time was also a matter mired in controversy.

He was also involved in the numerous controversies between the Danish State Church and the various free church movements and other forces of reform in the late 1830s and 1840s. For example, Tryde took part in the Church’s conflict with the Baptists, where he played the role of mediator. According to the policy backed by Mynster, these children were to be brought to the church by the police, if necessary, and forcibly baptized, against the protests of their parents. Tryde argued that the children of the Baptists should be allowed to go unbaptized until they reached the age of confirmation, and he himself refused to baptize them by force or coercion.

In the discussions surrounding the introduction of the Danish Constitution, Tryde became engaged politically in reforming the Church to make it more in accord with the new order of things. In this context he published a pamphlet with numbered paragraphs entitled Some Propositions for Closer Examination about the Reciprocal Relation of the Church and the State, with Some Accompanying Remarks. Moreover, he was a member of a number of official committees, including the Church Commission, which shaped the nature of the Danish church for years to come.

Tryde was promoted to Royal Confessor and bishop in 1854. On Sunday, November 18, 1855 he was, as noted, the official pastor at Kierkegaard’s funeral ceremony, a delicate and unenviable task. After the initial service in the Church of Our Lady, where Kierkegaard’s elder brother Peter Christian Kierkegaard (1805–88) gave the eulogy, the service was continued at the graveside in Assistens Cemetery. There Kierkegaard’s nephew Henrik Lund (1825–89) interrupted the proceedings and, despite Tryde’s protests, declared his solidarity with the deceased, rebuking what he regarded as an absurdity, namely, that the official state church, which Kierkegaard had been so zealous to criticize, was giving him a funeral under its auspices. This outspoken protest created a sensation and was the subject of much discussion both in private and in the newspapers in the days that followed. Tryde, in
his capacity as officiating pastor, was thus in a sense singled out as a spokesman for the "official Christendom."

After the episode of Kierkegaard's funeral, Tryde's life was fairly uneventful. In 1857 he was awarded an honorary doctoral degree from the Faculty of Theology of the University of Copenhagen. He died in 1860.

By all accounts Tryde's influence was due to his personal qualities rather than his scholarly works. As an administrator, an instructor, and a pastor, he touched the lives of many of the best-known figures of Golden Age Denmark. Perhaps most significant is that Tryde cannot be readily classified with regard to the one theological camp or the other: he was neither a Grundtvigian, although he sympathized with some of Grundtvig's views, nor a rationalist, nor a Hegelian, nor a Kierkegaardian. He took part in many of the contemporary debates in a nonpartisan way. His contributions to these debates do not evidence any ideological agenda but rather a straightforward, thoughtful consideration of the matter at hand.

The body of material that constitutes Tryde's corpus is respectable: however, most of it is not scholarly in the strict sense. He penned a handful of shorter pamphlets and monographs, a large number of articles in all of the major theological journals, and some reviews. In addition, he followed the contemporary practice of publishing several of his speeches and sermons. Many of his writings concern key issues of ecclesial politics and can be seen as outgrowths of his work in the church administration.

Although none of Tryde's books was found in Kierkegaard's private library at his death, nonetheless the latter subscribed to Jens Møller's (1779–1833) Nyt theologisk Bibliothek, which contains some articles by Tryde. Moreover, a sales receipt shows that Kierkegaard bought Tryde's Five Sermons on Some of Our Age's Disputed Dogmas on September 25, 1846.

Somewhat surprisingly it seems not to have been Tryde's sermons or religious treatises that made the most profound impact on Kierkegaard. Rather it was two book reviews, one of a philosophical text and one of a literary text, that arguably were the most significant. In addition to these texts, it seems to have been Tryde's person and specifically his engagement in church politics that attracted Kierkegaard's attention. Kierkegaard was reportedly seen on one of his famed dialogical walks with Tryde, and through their conversations, Kierkegaard gained some insight into Tryde's work in the church, and this was then subject to critical scrutiny in his private journals.

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The question is whether Kierkegaard regarded Tryde as a representative of the official, that is, corrupt, Christendom, as he regarded, for example, Martensen or Mynster, or if he had a more sympathetic disposition towards Tryde despite his high-ranking position in the Danish Church. I wish to argue that, while Tryde did not represent the same kind of threat that Kierkegaard perceived in Mynster and Martensen, he was nonetheless the object of Kierkegaard’s disdain. For right or wrong, Kierkegaard regarded him as corrupt and hypocritical, the advocate of an accommodated conception of Christianity that is wholly at odds with the difficult demands set by what Kierkegaard calls New Testament Christianity. In his official capacity, Tryde was a good mediator of conflicts, but in Kierkegaard’s eyes this was not a positive quality; on the contrary, Tryde’s disposition led, in his view, to a compromised and watered down version of Christianity.

II. Tryde’s Review of Heiberg’s “On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age”

Tryde reviewed a couple of Johan Ludvig Heiberg’s (1791–1860) most important works. Heiberg, although primarily known as a theater poet, also played a profoundly influential role in introducing Hegel’s philosophy into Denmark in the 1830s and 1840s. Tryde was a close associate of the celebrated Heiberg family, which can perhaps best be seen in Johanne Luise Heiberg’s (1812–90) moving words about him in her memoirs:

It is up to weightier voices than mine to judge what Tryde was as a pastor for the many years he was in office. But the main thing in the exercise of his calling was that he had an unspeakable wealth of love. He attracted the young people, and he always had them in his house and home, where he received them like a friend and a father. Humble in disposition, he liked to listen to the young people’s conversation, and when he thought he sensed some intellectual gift, he was always ready with advice and assistance. Many people found him all too accepting towards everything. But there are enough people who have not accepted anything.

This relation of friendship plays an important role in Tryde’s reviews, which appeared in the context of a larger discussion about Heiberg’s controversial works. While the tone of the debates was often rather acrimonious, Tryde’s reviews are, by contrast, respectful and thoughtful, without necessarily being in agreement with Heiberg’s positions.

In the spring of 1833 Heiberg published his “On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age,” which was ostensibly an invitation to a series of lectures on

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philosophy and aesthetics. Not enough people signed up for the course for Heiberg to carry it though, but there was no shortage of critical responses to it. In addition to reviews by Frederik Ludvig Zeuthen (1805–74) and Mynster, Tryde responded to Heiberg’s work with an extended essay.

Heiberg’s treatise was highly provocative. He argues that the present age is in a state of crisis due to the fact that people have become alienated from their own cultural points of orientation: art, religion, and philosophy. The result of this alienation is that people have ceased to believe in beauty, God, or the truth. What is needed now, he claims, is something that will restore these beliefs to their proper place and thus help the age out of its current crisis into a new period of happiness and stability. Heiberg claims that Hegel’s speculative philosophy is what will perform this function for the directionless age. Many theologians, including Mynster and Tryde, were offended by Heiberg’s suggestion that Hegel’s philosophy was necessary to help religion back onto a stable footing. While most of Heiberg’s critics were willing to grant that a crisis existed, they were unanimous in disagreeing with the means by which he proposed to remedy it.

Tryde’s article, although published anonymously, is not straightforwardly polemical. On the contrary, he puts himself in a mediating role between Heiberg as author and the offended readers. He thus attempts to present each side to the other, so they can understand and appreciate each other’s positions better. The most interesting aspect of this review is Tryde’s objections to Heiberg’s Hegelianism. Unlike some of Heiberg’s other critics, Tryde is not straightforwardly dismissive. On the contrary, within certain limits, he is sympathetic towards Hegel’s philosophy and Heiberg’s efforts on its behalf:

We should even appreciate the fact that Prof. Heiberg has wholly affiliated himself with Hegel and his school; for under the aforementioned conditions, he can become an exceptional mouthpiece for this philosophy among us in Denmark, and he is the only one of our few philosophical writers who has tried to create an inroad for it here. But regardless of whether one anticipates the further development of Hegelian philosophy and its constantly expanding influence on scholarship with hope or fear, it will obviously no longer do to ignore it.
Tryde is thus willing to recognize the importance of Hegel’s philosophy, acknowledging that it is an obligation for any educated person to have some familiarity with it.

Moreover, Tryde believes that Heiberg has his finger on a real problem. The crisis of religion that Heiberg draws attention to in his treatise is a genuine sign of the times:

Let us then just admit it: the sublime peace, the firm, calm rest in faith—the ordered central point for all thought and feeling moving in the soul—the force to edify in the good, to struggle against evil, which former generations found in their religious conviction, all this the present generation does not know, when we speak in general.16

Tryde thus generally agrees with Heiberg that there is a crisis in religion that needs to be addressed. He grants that the faith of previous ages no longer has the same force as it once did.

Although he acknowledges the importance of Hegel’s thought, Tryde is skeptical of Heiberg’s claim that it can resolve the current religious crisis. He is particularly critical of Heiberg’s argument that philosophy is the highest form of knowing and that it is thus philosophy that is needed to save art and religion from falling into disuse and contempt:

But the author ascribes to philosophy a distinct superiority over religion, art and poetry, all three of which he places parallel to one another. He does not assume that the former has proceeded from the latter or has them as presupposition, but vice versa. Therefore, the regeneration after a condition of ferment or dissolution cannot begin from religion, poetry or art, but must begin from philosophy.17

According to Tryde, the present age needs religion, not philosophy, in order to resolve the crisis. He thus argues that religion will ground philosophy and not the other way around. His main argument to justify this claim is that religion works with a higher faculty of knowing than philosophy:

But by thinking about the doctrines of religion, we should allow the religious ideas which emerge in these to become conscious for us, and realize that they are by no means incompatible with the rest of human knowledge, as they so often are alleged to be, but rather that the entire speculative knowledge of life and existence is in the most beautiful way absorbed in the theological knowledge of what is even higher.18

The key here is that Tryde believes religious knowing is continuous with other forms of knowing, and on this point he is fully in agreement with Heiberg and the Hegelians. However, he refers to this as “theological knowledge of what is even higher,” which seems to imply that this special religious faculty occupies the apex of the tree of knowing. He claims that religion must resist the advances of philosophy and protect its place at the top of the hierarchy.

16 Ibid., no. 42, p. 688. (OSP, p. 182.)
17 Ibid., no. 41, p. 655. (OSP, p. 173.)
18 Ibid., no. 42, p. 692. (OSP, p. 185.)
Eggert Christopher Tryde: A Mediator of Christianity

Tryde then anticipates the obvious objection: if religious knowledge is continuous with philosophical knowledge, then how can he ultimately distinguish his position from Hegel? How can he justify the claim that religious knowing is higher than philosophical knowing? Hegel makes just the opposite claim by appealing to the distinction between representation (religion) and concept (philosophy). What is Tryde’s argument for the inversion of this order? Tryde writes:

The reviewer is quite aware that, to Professor Heiberg and every true Hegelian, this last statement will appear absurd and seem to disclose a misunderstanding of the entire basic idea of philosophy. So long as they hold to the standpoint of this thought, it must strike them as mad to want to use thought to raise oneself beyond the world of thought itself, beyond the Absolute into what, for them, seems absolutely empty and lacking in content. Indeed we know very well the difficulty in which the theologians find themselves when they would like to raise religious life beyond feeling and into thought, i.e., not to fall so completely into the speculative logic which was so profoundly set forth by Hegel that religious thinking is completely taken captive by it and falls prey to the absolute Idea’s own web which is interwoven throughout.¹⁹

On the one hand, there is the conception of religious faith based on feeling, which was advocated most famously by Schleiermacher and later by Mynster in his response to Heiberg’s treatise. By contrast, there is Hegel’s and Heiberg’s position, according to which faith is a matter of representation that reflects a deeper philosophical knowing based on necessary reason. Tryde seems to want to locate his position somewhere between these two extremes. Faith and knowing are not radically distinct, but by the same token they are not identical.

Religion contains something that cannot be reduced to philosophical understanding. Heiberg, Tryde argues, “is incorrect in demanding that we seek what gives the soul its peace and its rest...in the knowledge of its true essence, which philosophy provides. He is incorrect in not recognizing religion as more than a subordinate, more mediated form.”²⁰ Thus religion must resist being incorporated into philosophy as something secondary. It is, on the contrary, a different, higher form of cognition than philosophy. Tryde finds Heiberg’s statements about the status of religion ambiguous: does it contain the truth or is its truth somehow inferior to philosophical truth? He calls on Heiberg to explain this point.

Heiberg wrote a brief article in which he tried to respond to the objections in Tryde’s review and clarify his own position.²¹ The main issue is whether philosophy or religion should be given the highest place in the hierarchy of knowledge. Historically, this question was conceived as a dispute between knowledge and faith. However, Tryde contends religion is also a matter of knowledge, thus collapsing the traditional dichotomy. Heiberg responds with a Hegelianian argument for the

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¹⁹ Ibid., no. 43, pp. 697–8. (OSP, p. 185.)
²⁰ Ibid., no. 43, p. 701. (OSP, p. 188.)
all-encompassing nature of thought. By acknowledging that religion is a form of knowing continuous with the other forms of knowing, Tryde had admitted that it is also continuous with philosophy. Heiberg argues:

Immediate and mediated knowledge indeed come into agreement in the fact that both are knowledge. Thought, cognition, and knowledge must develop to their own essence, i.e., themselves. There is thus no higher sphere than that of philosophy, and it can only be by an arbitrary use of words or, so to speak, by a kind of slip of the tongue that the reviewer, in contradiction to all the rest of his system, places theology above philosophy. For what he calls “theology”—knowledge of higher things—is so wholly philosophy itself that the latter separated from the former would be only knowledge of what is finite and thus not philosophy.22

Heiberg thus takes Tryde to be making a case for the priority of immediate knowing. His argument is simply that what lies in this immediate knowing merely needs to be developed further to its speculative truth. But in so far as both are forms or different stages of knowing, there is ultimately no fundamental difference. However, philosophy must be regarded as higher since it is conceptual and grasps the very form of necessary, speculative truth, in contrast to immediate knowing which relies on the contingencies of the senses. To Heiberg’s mind, it is thus a contradiction for Tryde to claim, on the one hand, that religion treats the highest things and, on the other hand, that it operates with immediate knowing. The highest things are concerned with the highest necessary truths and not the changing realm of sense experience.

Heiberg’s defense of philosophical knowing is somewhat reconciliatory. He tries to argue that philosophy can grasp the truths of religion in its own conceptual way without denying them. He then raises the question of what the religious believers find in religious faith that is “lacking in the speculative Idea.”23 He tries to make the case that the Idea contains everything, including religious feeling and sentiment. These are, however, not regarded as individual feelings or sentiments, but pure concepts. By means of this transformation these feelings and sentiments are given a higher, enduring value. For this reason, he reaffirms, philosophy is higher than religion, while at the same time containing religious truths within itself.

Tryde responded to this with a brief article, which proved to be the last in the debate.24 Tryde takes up Heiberg’s question about what religious believers find missing in the speculative Idea. Here he formulates a new description of the faculty of religion, which he believes to be higher than philosophy, namely, “the religious sense.”25 This is a faculty of thought or cognition and is continuous with other forms of cognition; it acts “in conjunction both with philosophical thinking...and with all

22 Ibid., p. 770. (OSP, pp. 196–7.)
23 Ibid., p. 778. (OSP, p. 202.)
25 Ibid., p. 821. (OSP, p. 207.)
the other activities of the soul." Despite this continuity, philosophical thinking and religious cognition must be kept separate by the individual believer. Tryde’s main attack is focused on the question of content and form. While the speculative Idea is purely formal, the key religious truths contain determinate content. Along these lines, Tryde gives a long list of key religious terms with their own content, which, he claims, are not present in the speculative Idea: redemption, reconciliation, eternal life, and the like.

Kierkegaard owned a copy of Heiberg’s *On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age,* and it seems quite probable that he also followed the debate surrounding the treatise. Although there is no documented evidence that he read Tryde’s review, one can imagine that the young Kierkegaard, if he did read it, found in it an instructive piece about the most effective ways not to battle the pernicious influence of Hegelianism in religion. It is possible that he saw in both Mynster’s and Tryde’s treatises an ill-considered attempt to defend religion in a way that in effect gave away the game before it ever got started. By claiming that religion was still a matter of knowing—for Mynster, empirical knowing and for Tryde, an indeterminate higher faculty—these thinkers played into the hands of the Hegelians. Hegel’s (and Heiberg’s) original claim was that art, religion and philosophy are all part of the same continuum of knowing. Trydes grant this premise, but then nonetheless tries to argue for the fundamental difference of religion by appealing to some special faculty that is distinct from the forms of knowing in the other fields. This is not satisfying for Heiberg since the Hegelian system is supposed to be all-encompassing; thus, it includes all forms of knowing. The result is that the discussion is ultimately about where to place art and religion in the system, which, in the big picture, is a fairly small matter since the Hegelians have won the larger debate.

One can imagine that this discussion was instructive for Kierkegaard since it showed him that if religion, or specifically Christianity, was to be defended, then more radical measures were needed. He would have to argue for the absolute difference between Christianity and all forms of knowing. He would have to insist on Christianity as something paradoxical and unutterable in order to keep it from being usurped by philosophy. When commentators today are struck by the radicality of Kierkegaard’s conception of Christianity, one must keep in mind discussions like this one, which preceded it. Kierkegaard did not reach his radical positions overnight. He was drawn to them by witnessing the ineffective defenses of Christianity by others, like Tryde, who failed to take such a course. The failures of attempts like these pushed him gradually toward an extreme and uncompromising form of Christianity radically distinct from philosophy, science, and all forms of knowing.

**III. Tryde’s Review of Heiberg’s New Poems**

This was not, however, Tryde’s last brush with Heiberg’s Hegelian philosophy. In 1841 he published a book review of Heiberg’s *New Poems* in the *Tidsskrift for*  

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26 Ibid., pp. 821–2 (*OSP*, p. 207.)  
27 See *ASKB* 568.
This famous collection of four works was highly successful due primarily to the fourth and final poem, “A Soul after Death.” Here there can be no speculation about the importance of this critical discussion for Kierkegaard since we know that he owned a copy of Heiberg’s work, and, moreover, it can be documented that he also read Tryde’s review.

In his piece Tryde is generally quite positively disposed towards Heiberg’s effort; in fact, it is a glowing review. Although he is reviewing a poem rather than a philosophical treatise on philosophy and religion, many of the same issues are present in the new work. Kierkegaard must have been particularly irritated by Tryde’s positive assessment of the religious dimension of Heiberg’s poems. In the debate surrounding On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age there was universal disapprobation and even outrage among theologians and clergy, but now Tryde, a high-ranking member of the Danish Church, was praising precisely this aspect of Heiberg’s recent poetic effort:

It is not without significance that this collection of poems, although a great humoristic poem (“A Soul after Death”) constitutes its most important part, nevertheless begins and ends with poems (“Divine Service” and “Protestantism [in Nature]”) of a purely serious and religious content....The poet portrays the religious life which is fermenting in the present generation, and also tries to define the overflowing and exuberant feeling on its own, and to give it a firm foothold by designating the goal towards which everything in the grand development strives; the religious life for many people in our days has lost this foothold due to the fact that they have broken through the older forms in which people lived a kind of static life in the most recent previous generations.

In what follows Tryde even refers to Heiberg as “a representative of our age’s religiousness in general.” Later in the review, he describes “A Soul after Death” as a profound account of “the Christian religious consciousness” that is presented with “the entire life and strength of poetic genius.” The tone is thus entirely different from that of his previous review.

While Tryde had previously agreed generally with Heiberg’s assessment of the religious crisis, now he seems wholeheartedly to have embraced it and, indeed, even to have adopted Heiberg’s own formulations in his description of it. Moreover, Tryde now seems to be much more amenable to Heiberg’s proposed solution to the crisis, while this was his main critical objection in his previous review. This apparent shift of position earned him Kierkegaard’s disdain, since in later journal entries Kierkegaard counts him, despite his earlier criticism of Hegelianism, among its proponents. Moreover, this change in Tryde’s view can be interpreted as a natural and inevitable
result of the fruitlessness of his former attempt to insist on a fundamental distinction between philosophy and religion, while at the same time granting the claim that both are forms of knowledge on a smooth continuum.

In the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* Kierkegaard has his pseudonymous author refer to Tryde’s review. The context is a discussion of the notion of immortality. Johannes Climacus refers to the then current debates in the Hegelian schools about whether or not a concept of immortality can be found in Hegel’s philosophy. This was of course the object of Poul Martin Møller’s (1794–1838) famous treatise from 1837, “Thoughts on the Possibility of Proofs of Human Immortality, with Reference to the Latest Literature on the Subject.” Climacus points out that the attempts to find an argument for immortality in Hegel’s conception of the eternity of spirit are misconceived since such a conception is not the immortality of the individual that is sought in inquiries of this kind. It is in this context that reference is made to Heiberg’s poem and Tryde’s review of it:

I have read Professor Heiberg’s “A Soul after Death”—indeed, I have read it with Dean Tryde’s commentary. I wish I had not done so, because a poetic work gives aesthetic delight and does not require the ultimate dialectical exactitude commensurate with a learner who wants to organize his life according to such guidance. If a commentator forces me to look for something of that kind in the poem, he has not helped the poem. From the commentator I perhaps could hope to learn what I did not learn by reading the commentary—if Dean Tryde, in catechizing, would have mercy on me and show how a life-view is constructed from his profound paraphrasing presentation. All honor to Dean Tryde! From this little piece of his it is possible to find a diversity of life-views—but I cannot make one out of it. Alas, that is just the trouble; I need a single life-view, not more, since I am not well educated.

Climacus seems in a sense to acknowledge the merits of “A Soul after Death” as a work of poetry. The weight of his criticism falls instead on Tryde’s review, which does indeed treat “A Soul after Death” at some length.

Climacus seems to think that Tryde is too positive in his assessment of the piece. In particular, he wants to criticize Tryde for claiming that one can find in the poem a “life-view” that can be used as a concrete model for one’s own life. This refers to a statement that Tryde makes at the beginning of his review:

What brings us joy and moves us [sc. with Heiberg’s poems] is not individual beautiful thoughts, individual profound, heartfelt feelings the likes of which we also could find in other poets; it is not over any single side of life that the poet lets an elucidating light fall; but it is the higher, truer consciousness of all life and human existence, which is about to awaken in the present generation, that the poet here touches and awakens with his characteristic, steady and appropriate tact. Every reader of these poems goes away from them with a more developed consciousness and a clearer view of the entirety of life.

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34 *SKS* 7, 159 / *CUPJ*, 171–2. (Translation modified.)
surrounding him. Indeed, the author understands how to do this with such a light hand that it is certain that many people hardly notice how the most inward point in their self-consciousness has been touched, from which an entirely new life-view arises, and that a source for many queries and doubts has opened in their inner being, which will not so easily be lost in the desert of thoughtlessness.35

Here Tryde ascribes a profound influence to Heiberg’s poems in the new collection. They are the source of an entirely new “life-view,” which questions traditional bourgeois values. Indeed, this statement was almost certainly in line with Heiberg’s own intentions with “A Soul after Death” since he clearly intended to satirize, among other things, what he regarded as the typical bourgeois residents of Copenhagen with their philistine lack of appreciation for art and culture. The point of this satire was to show people that the hell that they believed to be located somewhere else in space and time is in fact the life that they themselves are living every day since they live in ignorance of truth and beauty.

Nonetheless, from Kierkegaard’s perspective, the claim that Heiberg’s work touches “the most inward point” of people’s minds and thus gives “a clearer view of the entirety of life” seems hopelessly exaggerated. In this section of the Postscript Climacus provides numerous examples of how an academic approach renders simple things difficult. Climacus seems to complain that Tryde does not help to simplify what it means to be immortal but obscures it by means of a scholarly treatment. Many of Kierkegaard’s efforts as an author are dedicated to pointing out a sphere of religion, which is, as he sees it, deeply and necessarily individual and which he believes has been lost or forgotten. Clearly Heiberg’s poems have nothing to say about this. They do nothing to help uncover this, so to speak, lost Christianity. Since this is the goal of much of Kierkegaard’s authorship, it is not surprising that this passage in Tryde’s review attracted Kierkegaard’s attention for its claims about the influence and importance of Heiberg’s work.

Kierkegaard refers to Tryde again in a deleted draft to the Postscript in connection with Professor of Philosophy, Rasmus Nielsen (1809–84). In the text, Kierkegaard has Johannes Climacus critically discuss the concept of the world-historical. After this passage he originally intended to add the following footnote, which he later deleted:

Thus without a doubt Prof. Rasmus Nielsen, in the role of a systematic Per Degn and Imprimatur, would find a place for Dean Tryde, who also is indeed said to know his business systematically and equally well both by reading and by rote, who is said to have the merit of bringing the system into families, and finally has the remarkable peculiarity

36 SKS7, 143–4 / CUP1, 154: “If the world-historical is to amount to something and not to be an utterly vague category in which, despite the great amount one comes to know about China and Monomotapa, the boundary between the individual and the world-historical nevertheless ultimately remains undecided...whether there is any boundary (or whether it speculatively runs together so that all are included and world history is the history of individuals), whether the boundary is accidental (relative merely to what one knows), whether the boundary perhaps is dialectically arbitrary, relative only to what the honored systematizing professor has read most recently or must include because of his literary in-law affinities—consequently, if the world-historical is to amount to something, it must be the history of the human race.”
by which he differs from actual Hegelians in assuming that world history has had its amusement park season extended so that it does not end before Prof. Rasmus Nielsen. I do not say this to arrogate to myself the credit for having pointed out that the dean must be included in the world-historical process, but it appears to me that Tryde as a systematician has for a long time been qualified to be mentioned with praise.  

Although this is a difficult passage to interpret, the reference to Tryde as different "from actual Hegelians" is interesting since it seems to imply that in Kierkegaard's eyes, although Tryde was not a Hegelian in the strict sense, he was nonetheless close to their position. This is apparently one of the conclusions that he drew from the positive review of New Poems. The tone of this passage seems to suggest that it is based not on a specific text but rather on anecdotal personal information that Kierkegaard had heard about Tryde.

III. Tryde in Journal Entries Surrounding Practice in Christianity

There are a couple of journal entries that refer to Tryde in connection with Kierkegaard's work Practice in Christianity, which appeared on September 25, 1850. In one entry presumably from the same year, Kierkegaard recounts an encounter with Tryde. There he writes in the Journal NB21: "Today I talked with Tryde. He told me that it was too strong to say that Christianity had been abolished through 'observation.' He himself had stressed the subjective, and that was true also of all the more competent preachers." This refers to section VI of Part III of Practice in Christianity, where Kierkegaard has Anti-Climacus allude critically to Mynster's Observations on the Christian Dogmas. The upshot of the criticism is that to be a true Christian involves imitating Christ. This does not mean observation, that is, regarding something objectively from the outside; on the contrary, it involves a personal, subjective appropriation and action.

Tryde seems to have pointed out to Kierkegaard that he agreed with him on this point and that it was exaggerated to claim that the mistaken emphasis on the objective or on observation had "destroyed" Christianity. Kierkegaard continues in the same entry:

O my God, how I have had to put up with this, that I was purely subjective, not objective, etc.—and now the same people claim that they also emphasize the subjective.

Moreover, the point is that in defining the concept "preaching," the sermon, one never gets further than a speech, talking about something; consequently one does not pay attention to existence at all. An officeholder—shackled in seventeen ways to infinitude and objectivity—achieves nothing, no matter how subjective he makes his talk. A nobody who preaches gratis on the street—even if he makes observations that are

39 SKS 12, 227ff. / PC, 233ff.
40 Jakob Peter Mynster, Betragtninger over de christelige Troeslærdomme, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1837 (ASKB 254–255).
ever so objective—remains a subjective and vivifying person; and one who is ever so subjective but is trapped by his position and the like in all possible secular considerations, his preaching remains essentially nothing but observation, for it is easy to see that he has made it impossible for himself to actualize even moderately that which he preaches about.

But I have to say one thing about Tryde, something splendid about him: that he said, that he did not deny, that he had been predisposed to be objective.41

This is one of many passages that can be found where Kierkegaard is critical of preaching. Kierkegaard thus seems anxious to point out a misunderstanding in the interpretation of his notion of the objective approach to Christianity. Here he clarifies further what he said via his pseudonym in the aforementioned passage from *Practice in Christianity*. Finally, on the one hand, Kierkegaard seems implicitly to criticize Tryde for hypocrisy since the latter has an official position and yet claims to have pointed out the importance of the subjective side; on the other hand, Tryde seems to be lauded for his honesty in acknowledging that he has “been predisposed to be objective.” This journal entry seems clearly to be based solely on a conversation that the two men had and not on any text from Tryde’s hand.

Also in connection with *Practice in Christianity*, there is a draft, dated December 18, 1850, of an unpublished article in Kierkegaard’s journals and papers. In response to a review of the work, Kierkegaard explains different ways of reading his text: “It would be dear to me if somebody were to read this book in such a way that it helped him understand how wrong he was before God, and it would be doubly dear to me if many individuals would read it thus.”42 Then he comes to mention Tryde as follows:

If by contrast it would occur to anyone to read this book in order to be vindicated against Prof. Martensen, or perhaps in order to be vindicated against the man whom I have always admired and not least of all in these more recent times, Zealand’s Right Reverend Bishop, or against the Archdeacon Tryde, or against Prof. Nielsen, or against Pastor Markmann, or, or...—indeed, just so I do not forget anyone—in order to be vindicated against me, for my existence proves that I, in the understanding of the ideal, am no true Christian; for one can just as well read this book in this way; indeed, I myself have read it thus, then he is in every respect mistaken and demonstrates a sorrowfully small degree of thoughtfulness and a thought-evoking large degree of thoughtlessness or mental absence.43

While Tryde is mentioned along with some of Kierkegaard’s other usual targets of critique, it is difficult to see this as a passage critical of Tryde. The point is precisely not to use *Practice in Christianity* as a polemical support for one’s position against the figures named; instead, the point is for one to use it for reflection in the quiet of one’s own mind about what it means to be a true Christian and to be sinful.

41 SKS 24, 57–8, NB21:88 / JP 6, 6687.
43 Pap. X–5 B 111, p. 304.
There is another reference to Tryde in a long journal entry from 1850 concerned primarily with Martensen’s *Dogmatic Elucidations*, which was a response to criticisms raised against his *Christian Dogmatics*. This work provides an occasion for Kierkegaard to look back on the reception of Hegel’s philosophy (referred to as “the system”) in Denmark over the previous two decades. Here he refers to Tryde as follows:

“The system” in Denmark and the pseudonyms essentially belong together. Do you recall...it was “the system.” Yes, there was a matchless movement and excitement over the system then, and Prof. M.[artensen], the profound genius, who praised it, and Professor Heiberg, who also praised it, and Stilling and Nielsen and Tryde and God knows who else—yes, there was hardly anyone in the whole kingdom, or at least in the whole capital, who in one way or another was not related to the system in suspenseful expectation. It was the system. If anyone desires a true picture of the situation at that time, pictures from life, then read one or two of the pseudonyms, who have preserved this for history. As stated: it was the system.

Once again Tryde is associated with the Hegelians. This is presumably a reference to Tryde’s positive review of *New Poems*. It seems that Tryde has made a long migration in Kierkegaard’s eyes from being a critic of Heiberg and the Hegelians in his first review, and then to becoming somewhat close to their position but not belonging to “actual Hegelians,” and now finally he is placed alongside the Hegelians on equal footing.

### IV. Journal Entries Referring to Tryde’s Work in the Church

There are a handful of journal entries from the years 1849–51 where Tryde makes an appearance. Some of these are fairly trivial. For example, in an entry from 1849 Kierkegaard recounts his encounters with the Danish King Christian VIII. On one such occasion the Queen entered, and Kierkegaard recounts, “The Queen said that she recognized me, for she once had seen me on the embankment (where I ran off and left Tryde high and dry).” This presumably refers to one of Kierkegaard’s philosophical walks along the city ramparts. On this occasion Tryde seems to have been his interlocutor, but not much more information can be gleaned from this somewhat cryptic aside.

In another entry from 1849, Kierkegaard mentions a somewhat more substantial anecdote in which Tryde plays a role. In the *Journal NB12*, he writes:

Just take that inoffensive fellow: Tryde. He ordains Kofoed-Hansen and, touched, declares that in these times the Lord’s servants must especially consider that it is a

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47 "Pap. VI B 98.34 / CUP2, 42–3. (Quoted in full above.)
question of one's life. Yes, indeed, I say thank-you....It is notorious that Kofoed-Hansen had submitted an application to be allowed to resign, and why? Because the position was a few hundred thalers less than he thought. And Tryde knows this. I raise no objection against Kofoed-Hansen; he is not the one who is speaking in such loud tones, but Tryde. How can this not help but demoralize the entire communion.49

Here reference is made to Hans Peter Kofoed-Hansen (1813–93) who was pastor at the Savior’s Church from 1849 to 1850. The point of the story is clearly to highlight what Kierkegaard perceives as the hypocrisy of Tryde, namely, that Tryde’s soft, diplomatic and sentimental talk about the importance of serving as a pastor is at odds with the truth that he also knows about Kofoed-Hansen: that is, that he resigned because the pay was bad.

In a journal entry from 1851 Kierkegaard refers to Tryde’s work in the various committees regarding the political reform of the Danish Church in the wake of the new Danish Constitution. He writes in the Journal NB22:

But religiousness disappeared. The newspapers and public life in general did everything to sweep everyone into political interests—and the clergy never thought of forming or were able to form an opposition, not in the manner of Tryde, by flirting with politics and taking part in discussions, no, but by developing the interest of the religious, which is political indifference.50

This passage is often taken as an expression of Kierkegaard’s lack of interest in politics. He is clearly critical of Tryde’s “flirting” with politics, which is presumably a reference to Tryde’s role in the political reforms that were being discussed at all different levels of the government and the ecclesial authorities. Kierkegaard’s position is that politics and Christianity should be clearly and cleanly separated. Any overlap or approach of the two would clearly amount to a corruption of Christianity. When one engages in politics in the way Tryde has done, then religiousness or Christianity disappears.

In a journal entry from 1851 Kierkegaard refers in passing to Tryde in the context of a renewed criticism of those who make Christianity into an objective doctrine. However, Tryde is not the object of this criticism. Kierkegaard writes:

Suppose now (Archdeacon Tryde told me of just such an instance of a criminal out in the country) that a criminal has stood and told and out-and-out lie, and the interrogator knows very well that it is a lie and says to him: “Now tell the truth.” He answers: “I have told the truth.” “Will you shake hands on your having spoken the truth?” “No, that I will not.” Curious! The criminal makes a clear distinction between the personal and the impersonal, the objective, this, so to speak, “in my official capacity.” If the interrogator were to say to him: “Do you dare swear to that?” he would no doubt answer: “Yes.” If the interrogator were to say, “Do you dare shake hands on that?”—“No, that I will not do.” For to the criminal this is a personal act.51

Here Tryde seems to have suggested a new example for Kierkegaard to use to illustrate the distinction between the subjective and the objective. This is anecdotal information clearly based on a discussion between the two men. It might well be that this was a part of the aforementioned discussion about *Practice in Christianity*, where Kierkegaard, disturbed by Tryde’s misunderstanding, felt obliged to clarify the distinction once again.

### V. Tryde and the Attack on the Church

Tryde was also implicated, albeit in a very minor way, in Kierkegaard’s attack on the Church. In an article that appeared in *Fædrelandet* on January 29, 1855, entitled “Two New Truth-Witnesses,” Kierkegaard returns to his criticism of the formulation of “witness to the truth” that began the controversy when Martensen used this epithet to describe his predecessor Mynster. Kierkegaard was angered by Martensen’s continued use of this term, despite his protests: “It was the language usage, to call witnesses, truth-witnesses what we understand by pastors, deans and bishops—it was the language usage I protested against because it is blasphemous, sacrilegious, but Bishop Martensen obstinately persists in it, as is evident in his ordination address, which he incessantly interlards with ‘witnessing, being a witness, truth-witness,’ etc.”

A footnote criticizes Tryde for his perceived complicity: “The addresses given on this occasion have now been published: Diocesan Dean Tryde’s introduction, a mere nothing, distinguishes itself by a footnote, as if it were something: ‘The author is prompted to explain that nothing has been left out—nothing changed.’”

This refers to the publication, in the form of a 33-page pamphlet, of Martensen’s address on occasion of the consecration of Jørgen Hjorth Lautrup (1798–1856) and Hardenach Otto Conrad Laub (1805–82) as bishops. The ceremony took place in the Church of Our Lady on December 26, 1854. Kierkegaard’s anger was provoked by the fact that Martensen used as his text Acts 1:8, where Jesus refers to his disciples as “witnesses.” This is clearly the main object of Kierkegaard’s criticism for the reasons noted.

The critical allusion to Tryde refers to his five-page introduction to the publication. On the intermediate title page for Tryde’s text, as a kind of footnote, there appear the words that Kierkegaard quotes, where Tryde declares that he has neither modified nor omitted anything from his speech. Here Tryde is referred to rather disdainfully and regarded as making himself complicit in Martensen’s guilt. Kierkegaard clearly perceived Martensen’s renewed remarks as witnesses to Christianity as a provocation. In his eyes, Tryde seems to have demonstrated a lack of character by remaining silent on this in his introduction since he must have known that Martensen’s words were controversial in the then current environment. Tryde did, however, ultimately

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54 *SV I* XIV, 32, note / *M*, 25, note.
escape Kierkegaard’s further wrath and is not mentioned in the attacks that appeared in *The Moment*.

When one returns to the scandalous episode caused by Henrik Lund at Kierkegaard’s grave, it seems that the spirit of his protest was in fact true to Kierkegaard’s own views of official Christendom, at least at the end. It is a secondary question whether it was fair that Tryde had to bear the brunt of this personally. From the odd references and journal entries discussed here, it seems fair to conclude that while Tryde was by no means the main object of Kierkegaard’s attacks, he was in his eyes part and parcel of the general problem of the State Church pretending to represent Christian faith. However, this was a view that Kierkegaard arrived at after some time. Just as Kierkegaard’s views of many people, for example, Heiberg, Martensen, and Mynster, began with some enthusiasm and ended with bitterness and conflict, so also his relation to Tryde seems to have followed much the same pattern, without, however, reaching the limits of either emotional extreme.

It will be recalled that in her memoirs, Johanne Luise Heiberg recounts “Many people found [Tryde] all too accepting towards everything.”\(^{56}\) This was doubtless a quality that made Tryde a good administrator and a good intermediary in the many controversies that faced the Danish Church in the 1830s and 1840s. Unlike others, for example Mynster, he was not so ideologically invested in his own views and, further, was able to understand and appreciate the views of those he disagreed with. This quality is clearly visible in his book review of Heiberg’s *On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age*, where he explicitly takes on the role of a negotiator or intermediary, who can help each side to understand the position of the other better. However, precisely this quality that was a virtue in one context is a vice in another. Kierkegaard regarded Tryde as someone who was too willing to compromise on what were in the end the absolute demands of Christianity. He thus came to look upon him as a hypocrite and a spokesman for a watered down version of Christian faith. Tryde’s attempts to negotiate reforms in the Danish Church at a time of great social and political change are dismissed as “flirting” with politics and are regarded by Kierkegaard as in effect destroying Christianity.

Kierkegaard learned from Tryde that it is useless to attempt to formulate some middle-of-the-road view when it comes to Christianity. He saw that Tryde’s attempt to use this strategy to resist the forces of Hegelianism had failed utterly since his middle-of-the-road position was simply usurped into the Hegelian system. If Christianity was to be defended from these encroachments and threats by science, philosophy or objective thinking, radical measures were needed. Thus, Kierkegaard developed his radical positions in order to articulate what he regarded as a genuine picture of Christianity. In his view, anything less was doomed to failure. Thus, Tryde can be seen as a figure who helped to make Kierkegaard the radical, even at times shocking, thinker that he was, and this radicality is a dimension of his thought that we can ill afford to forget.

\(^{56}\) Johanne Luise Heiberg, *Et liv genoplevet i erindringen*, vol. 2, p. 15. (Quoted in full above.)
I. Tryde’s Works in The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library


Fem Prædikener over nogle af de i vor Tid anfægtede Troeslærdomme, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1846 (ASKB U 106).

The Minutes of speeches made by E.C. Tryde:

—— “Roskilde Convent. (Mødet den 12te October 1848),” Dansk Kirketidende, vol. 4, no. 170, 1848 [for the minutes of E.C. Tryde’s speech], see columns 246–7.


II. Works in The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Tryde


III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Tryde