Carl (or sometimes, Karl) Daub (1765–1836) is known today as little more than a footnote in the development of the right-Hegelian school. In this context he is often mentioned together with figures such as Philipp Marheineke (1780–1846), Karl Rosenkranz (1805–79) and Carl Friedrich Göschel (1784–1861). He was, however, a profoundly influential theologian in his own right and was recognized as such in his age. Indeed, in one account he is ranked together with Goethe (1749–1832), Hegel (1770–1831), Fichte (1762–1814) and Schleiermacher (1768–1834). Daub authored a number of books which were significant for both the philosophical and the theological discussions of the day.

While it has long been apparent to some Kierkegaard scholars that Daub played an important role in the development of the young Kierkegaard’s thought, very few studies have been devoted to exploring this connection. In particular, while it is clear that Kierkegaard read some of Daub’s works as a young student, it remains an open question whether that reading left any enduring mark on his thought. The present article hopes to establish the importance of Daub as a source for Kierkegaard’s thought and to problematize this relationship in a way that points out possible directions for future research.

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2 In fact, the only studies to date to treat it directly are Emanuel Hirsch’s “Die Einführung in die Frage Glaube und Geschichte durch Karl Daub,” in his Kierkegaard-Studien, vols. 1–2, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 1933, vol. 2, pp. 93–105 [pp. 539–51] (reprinted, Vaduz, Liechtenstein: Toposverlag 1978. First published in Studien des apologetischen Seminars in Wernigerode, nos. 29, 31, 32, 36, 1930–33. The reprint retains the pagination of the first publication, giving the page numbers of the 1933 edition in square brackets. This convention will be followed here); and Niels Thulstrup’s “Daub,” in Kierkegaard’s Teachers, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1982 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10), pp. 208–11.
Daub was born in humble circumstances in the German town of Cassel on 20 March 1765. Apparently destined for the priesthood, he studied Hebrew from an early age. He attended the university at Marburg from 1786, where his main fields of study included theology and philosophy. This dual interest would characterize his intellectual activity throughout his life.

In 1791 he became instructor in Marburg, where he lectured on the fields of philosophy, philology and theology. During this time, he fell under the influence of Kant, who was his first philosophical passion. Inspired by the critical philosophy, he published in 1794 his *Predigten: nach kantischen Grundsätzen*. His Kantian rationalism and skepticism made him suspect in some circles and led to him leaving Marburg to take an appointment in Hanau as professor of philosophy in 1794. This position only lasted a year since he received an appointment as *professor ordinarius* in 1795 at the distinguished Faculty of Theology at the University of Heidelberg. It was in Heidelberg that Daub came into his own as a scholar. He was to become an institution at the Faculty, remaining there as a defining figure until his death in 1836.

In 1801 he published his catechism, or *Lehrbuch der Katechetik*, as a textbook for his lectures. A year later it appeared in a Danish translation. This was also a work animated by an enthusiasm for Kant's philosophy. Daub was particularly interested in Kant's grounding of religion in morality, and the *Lehrbuch* attempts to incorporate many of Kant's moral principles. Thus, the focus of the work is on extracting the practical, ethical content of the Bible and church dogma.

Around 1805 Daub's philosophical interests started to change, and he soon abandoned Kant for the young Schelling, who at the time was taking the German philosophical world by storm. From 1805–11 he edited together with the philologist Friedrich Creuzer (1771–1858) six volumes of a journal under the simple title, *Studien*. The articles in this work reflect a clear Schellingian orientation. Daub's contributions in this context were the lengthy essays, "Orthodoxie und Heterodoxie.

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Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von den symbolischen Büchern" and “Theologie und ihre Encyklopädie im Verhältnis zum akademischen Studium beider.”

Also during this period of his development, he penned the Theologumena, and Einleitung in das Studium der christlichen Dogmatik. In these works he attempts to carve out his own position between the poles of supernaturalism and rationalism. According to Daub, the goal is to come to knowledge of God, not through the Bible or the natural world, but through reason. While God is thus revealed in human reason itself, that reason, however, manifests itself in a number of different ways in various cultures and develops over time in historical peoples. As the culmination of this historical development, the Christian religion represents the most perfect manifestation of the divine revealed in reason. Daub thus attempts to interpret the Christian dogmas in terms of the rationality of Schelling’s philosophical principles.

According to Rosenkranz, the Theologumena represents “the true opposition to Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.” Here he presumably has in mind Daub’s criticism of the unknowability of God, which is one of the well-known results of Kant’s critical philosophy.

Daub’s two-volume Judas Ischarioth, oder das Böse im Verhältnis zum Guten from 1816–18 treats the age-old problem of evil in the Christian tradition. The difficulty of explaining how evil can arise in a world created by a benevolent and all-powerful God leads Daub to declare evil to be a kind of incomprehensible, inexplicable, false “miracle.” These evil miracles correspond to the true ones, which originate from divine goodness. While Thulstrup claims that this work was “[t]he first major result of [Daub’s] studies and reflections under Hegel’s influence,” there is nothing to substantiate this claim. On the contrary, at the time it was regarded as a reactionary throwback to “papism” and medieval “barbarism.” Moreover, as Rosenkranz points out, already in Daub’s previous work, the Theologumena, one finds a clear reflection of some aspects of Hegel’s thought.

Daub became Hegel’s colleague when the latter was appointed to the University of Heidelberg in 1816. Daub, who happened to be the rector of the university at

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10 Daub, Theologumena sive doctrinae de religione christiana ex natura Del perspecta repetendae capita potiora, Heidelberg: Mohr und Zimmer 1806.
the time, was instrumental in the appointment.17 While Hegel was in Heidelberg, he had a collegial relation to Daub but not more.18 Although Daub was actually older than Hegel, he abandoned Schelling and became one of Hegel’s most loyal followers in the years to come, especially after Hegel left Heidelberg for Berlin in 1818. Following Hegel’s departure, Daub is reported to have given lectures on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*.19 Their exchange of letters during Hegel’s Berlin period portrays a close friendship and collegiality.20 So great was Hegel’s confidence in Daub that he entrusted him with correcting the proofs of the second edition of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* in 1827.21

In the same year the Berlin theologian and right-Hegelian Philipp Marheineke published his influential *Die Grundlehre der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft*, with a dedication to Daub.22 Daub then subsequently wrote a book review of the work which appeared in the Hegelian journal, the *Jahrbiicher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* in 1827–28.23 This review was later used as the basis for an independent monograph under the title, *Die dogmatische Theologie jetziger Zeit oder die Selbstsucht in der Wissenschaft des Glaubens*.24 This work represents Daub’s undisputed main work

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18 See Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Leben*, op. cit., p. 300: “Mit Daub war die Beziehung zwar eine geistig tiefe, allein persönlich eigentlich nicht intime. Sie kamen nicht so viel zusammen, als man vielleicht hätte erwarten sollen und sahen sich mehr nur bel allgemeinen Gelegenheiten.”


21 G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, 2nd ed., Heidelberg: August Oßwald 1827. See their correspondence on this as listed among the references in the previous footnote.

22 Philipp Marheineke, *Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft*, Berlin: Dunker und Humboldt 1827 (ASKB 644): “Sr. Hochwürden dem Herrn Dr. Karl Daub, Großherzoglich Badische, Geheimen Kirchenrat, und Professor der Theologie an der Universität Heidelberg zur öffentlichen Bezeugung der gerechtesten Verehrung und Liebe und zur dankbaren Anerkennung seiner großen Verdienste um die speculative Theologie zugeeignet.”


from this Hegelian period. It shows the clear influence of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which Daub had studied meticulously.

Daub died in Heidelberg on 22 November 1836. After his death, his friends, Marheineke and Theophor Wilhelm Dittenberger (1807–71), edited a seven-volume edition of his lectures, which was published from 1838–44. This edition consists of Daub’s *Lectures on Philosophical Anthropology*, *Prolegomena to Dogmatics*, *Prolegomena to Theological Morality and Principles of Ethics*, *System of Theological Morality*, and *System of Christian Dogmatics*. During his lifetime, in 1834, there had already appeared an edition of his lectures, edited by Johann Christoph Kröger (1792–1874) under the title, *Darstellung und Beurtheilung der Hypothesen in Betreff der Willensfreiheit*. This work was reviewed by Rosenkranz in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* and subsequently reprinted in his recollections on Daub.

In the last years of his life, Daub came to be recognized as one of the best-known advocates of speculative theology and right-Hegelianism, that is, the view that Hegel’s philosophy of religion was consistent with orthodox Christianity. He is thus known for his attempts to reconcile speculative philosophy with theology by giving a speculative interpretation of key Christian dogmas in order to defend them against their critics. Due to his eclecticism and ability to change with the times philosophically, he was given the nickname “the Talleyrand of German philosophy,” in reference to the great survivor of French politics and diplomacy, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754–1838), who played key roles in the *ancien régime*, the Napoleonic dictatorship and the Restoration.

Kierkegaard’s interest in Daub is hardly surprising given that Daub was also a familiar figure to many Danish scholars at the time. During his trip to Germany, the Danish author and critic Peder Hjort (1793–1871) met Daub in Heidelberg in June of 1820. He secured from Daub a recommendation that he used to present to Danish scholars at the time.

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himself to Hegel in Berlin.\textsuperscript{34} Similarly, the theologian, Hans Lassen Martensen (1808–84) and the jurist, Frederik Christian Bornemann (1810–61), met Daub in Heidelberg sometime presumably in 1835 during their trip through the German states.\textsuperscript{35} It was not by accident that they met Hegel’s sons, the historian Karl Hegel (1813–1901) and the government official Immanuel Hegel (1814–91) in Daub’s home. Martensen clearly regarded Daub as a Hegelian pantheist at this late stage of his career. But there can be little doubt that Daub and Marheineke provided the models of speculative theology that Martensen would have so much success promoting when he returned to Denmark and began lecturing at the University of Copenhagen in 1837.

\textbf{II. Kierkegaard’s Use of Daub}

The only books by Daub that Kierkegaard actually owned were the aforementioned seven-volume posthumous edition of his lectures, that is, \textit{Philosophische und theologische Vorlesungen}. In addition to this work, Kierkegaard also had in his library a copy of Karl Rosenkranz’s \textit{Erinnerungen an Karl Daub},\textsuperscript{36} a work which was also available in Danish in the \textit{Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur}.\textsuperscript{37} However, there is, as we shall see, clear evidence that he made a careful study of other works by Daub. Indeed, there are several passages in both Kierkegaard’s published works and in his journals and notebooks, which give evidence of a fairly extensive study of Daub’s thought. Moreover, these passages are not limited to a particular period in Kierkegaard’s life but rather span the entire period of the authorship.

\textbf{A. Kierkegaard’s Study of Daub’s Article in the Journal DD}

The \textit{Journal DD}, which Kierkegaard started in May 1837, begins with a series of notes on articles from a number of Hegelian thinkers found in Bruno Bauer’s (1809–82) \textit{Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie}.\textsuperscript{38} One of these that particularly interested Kierkegaard was Daub’s article, “Die Form der christlichen Dogmen- und Kirchen-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Morten Borup, \textit{Peder Hjort}, Copenhagen: Rosenkilde og Bagger 1959, p. 76.
\item Karl Rosenkranz, \textit{Erinnerungen an Karl Daub}, op. cit.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
This article addresses itself to the question of the significance of history for Christian doctrine. This was at the time a topical issue due to Strauss’ *The Life of Jesus*, from 1835–36, which had argued that a critical examination of the historical Jesus calls into question key points of dogma. Daub thus wishes to revisit the issue concerning what is at stake for Christian faith in a historical account, either of the life of Jesus or the history of the Church.

In the first entry of the journal, Kierkegaard explores Karl Rosenkranz’s understanding of Jewish monotheism with the tautological statement, “God is God,” from Rosenkranz’s article, “Eine Parallele zur Religionsphilosophie.” Then in a marginal entry, perhaps added later, he makes reference to Daub’s article as follows:

Cf. Daub in the same journal vol. 2, issue 1, p. 135: “Es ist nicht der Eine, als ein dreizeitiger Gott, oder: als der welcher (erstens) ist, der er (zweitens) war, und (drittens) seyn wird, der er ist, (wie ihn das Judenthum, dem Geschichts-Glauben den jenseitsgeschichtlichen unterordenend, und mit solcher Unterordnung sich selbst corrupuirend knechtisch verehrte) etc.” [It is not the One, as a triple temporal God—he who (first) is, what he (second) was, and (third) will be, what he is—(whom Judaism slavishly worshipped by subordinating the transhistorical belief to the historical belief and by such subordination corrupting itself), etc.]

After this account of the divine in Judaism, Daub continues by contrasting this with the conception of the divine in Christianity:

but rather the *One as triune*, which the teaching of Jesus had revealed and which *Moses* and the *Prophets* had *prophesied* in relation to the founder of this faith and to the life of the founder, the *One and triune*, which the teaching of Jesus—which made the life of Jesus the condition for its historical relation to mankind—revealed to mankind in and by the names, *Father, Son* and *Holy Ghost*, for mankind’s faith and for its knowledge of faith.

Here Daub makes a case for the dogma of the Trinity in contrast to Judaism. While the God of Judaism appears in three temporal dimensions, the God of Christianity is genuinely triune and consists of three persons. It is not clear if Kierkegaard refers to

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43 Ibid.
Daub’s account here since he agrees with it or simply because he finds it interesting and wishes to note it for later use.44

In the second entry in the journal, Kierkegaard refers to and quotes from a few pages earlier in Daub’s article. He writes,

There is a highly speculative and, re[garding] Daub’s philosophical view, extremely interesting remark in the 3rd volume of Bauer’s journal, p. 127. He has prior to this discussed the relationship between the natural and the historical sense, and shown the first to be a condition of the second, but now he explains how the individual can freely subordinate the second to the first (thereby history or freedom to nature, completely) or the first to the second (and thereby freedom over nature, in part), and adduces more precisely the consequences of subordinating the historical to the natural, saying that the subject thereby comes upon the idea: an dem Vergangenen sei das anschaulich-Gewesene das Unvergängliche, am Gewesenen das Naturliche das Unverwesliche (das also nicht wie doch der Apostel lehrt “verweslich gesät wird, und unverweslich auferstehe” sondern, indem es selbst das an sich Unverwesliche sei, nur bis zu seiner Wiederveranschaulichung den Schein des Verweslichen habe). [“in what is the past the having-been for sense is the imperishable, and in what has been, the natural is the imperishable (and thus it does not hold true in this case that, as the apostle teaches, ‘What is sown is perishable, what is raised imperishable,’ but rather it has the appearance of the perishable only until it is perceived again since it is imperishable in itself).”]45

Here by “the natural and the historical sense,” Kierkegaard refers to Daub’s foregoing discussion. In this article Daub begins by distinguishing the development of nature from that of history. While history displays a mechanical development of objects, history is the work of the freedom of the human subject in their actions and their interpretations. Later in his analysis, Daub treats these two terms in a dialectical fashion, which seems to be a part of what attracted Kierkegaard’s attention to this passage. In other words, first, the historical is subordinated to the natural, and the results of this subordination are drawn out; and then, with an inversion, the natural is subordinated to the historical, and the results of this are drawn out.

In the passage immediately before the one quoted by Kierkegaard, Daub explains the dependence of the will on nature and history as follows:

In this limitation the volition is reduced—since in it, in a mistaken manner, the historical sense conditions and serves the natural sense—to the desire of the past, if this volition in its remembrance is one that is pleasurable to sensation and imagination—and the desire is reduced to a longing for the past, which is in this way appreciated and popular, whereas in this limitation the longing is reduced to a demand for its return and temporal- and spatial-preserving presence. This demand, which is a volition, though in the form of a longing, has thus the equally necessary consequence that the intelligent subject substitutes

44 Here Hirsch takes Kierkegaard to be in agreement with Daub, interpreting this passage as an anticipation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the God in time. See Emanuel Hirsch, “Die Einführung in die Frage Glaube und Geschichte durch Karl Daub,” in his Kierkegaard-Studien, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 102 [p. 548].

an act of imagination for an act of retrograde intuition since it can neither become nor be a directly intuitive one and merely conditions the representation of the past. Furthermore, this demand falls within the intelligent subject, which is only capable of mimicking the already formed principles of free movement and these movements themselves.\textsuperscript{46}

The idea here seems to be that from our sense of history we obtain a desire or longing for the past. This natural emotion or desire is thus dependent on the fact that there was a past, which is continually the object of our thought and cognition. This longing then produces the desire to hold the past firmly for cognition by giving it a fixed form of thought so that it can be preserved. The importance of this idea for Kierkegaard becomes clear when one considers the account of the Incarnation in \textit{Philosophical Fragments}. The individual believer relates to this event with feeling and emotion. This event of the past is constantly the object of reflection for the Christian. Its universal significance must be kept ever present in the mind of the believer.

Kierkegaard continues his reading of Daub’s article in June of 1837. This time, he quotes from a passage considerably earlier in the article. Here he writes, “Daub (in Bauer’s Journal, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 103) quite rightly observes that unbelief as well as doubt would be very well served by getting involved in a proof of the truth of biblical miracles.”\textsuperscript{47} Kierkegaard refers to the following passage in Daub’s text:

“Show me only,” the doubter or unbeliever would like to say, “that any one fact, known as certain and true from good sources, would have been entirely impossible without a miracle happening previously or simultaneous with it—or let me myself only see or experience one miracle, then I would be prepared to believe everything that the Holy Scriptures report about prophesies and miracles.”\textsuperscript{48}

Here Daub presumably has in mind the then topical criticisms from skeptics like Strauss, who called into question the status of the reports of miracles in the gospels. Kierkegaard then quotes the following long passage in German from Daub’s article, where “this demand” from the doubter is taken up:

However, with this demand freedom in history is ignored—for if the miracle is to be believed, the certain and true fact shall necessarily be conditioned by it, as well as necessity in nature—for the miracle, a free act should be seen as if it were an event of nature, that is, it should be experienced; those present at the Ascension of the savior of the world saw only his removal from earth, but not the unconditional freedom, that is, the power of his removal. The truth which this miracle is, realizes itself and has its reality in the power but not in the fleeting and past sight of this movement. Thus, as long as they do not abandon the demand for a proof of the truth of miracles to be given from the standpoint of history or nature, both the doubter and the unbeliever prove that in miracles unconditional freedom has placed itself either under the law of causality (as in a \textit{pragmatizing} theory of


\textsuperscript{47} \textit{SKS} 17, 222, DD:12.

The main point of the response to the skeptic is that the true essence of miracles is the fact that they occur with freedom. However, this freedom is never something that can be straightforwardly seen or observed empirically either in the case of miracles or in any other event. It is thus absurd of the skeptic to demand empirical proof of something which by its very nature cannot be proven by empirical observation. Moreover, if a miracle could be explained in this way, then it would be subordinate to the normal laws of nature and thus would not be a free act. This recalls Kierkegaard’s claim about the Incarnation in the *Fragments*, namely, that the fact of the Incarnation was not in itself an object of experience even for Christ’s contemporaries. What they actually saw or witnessed was a humble man and not the Incarnation itself. Moreover, despite the topical claims about necessity in history, the Incarnation was a free act, which supersedes the laws of nature.

In the following entry in the *Journal DD*, dated 16 June 1837, Kierkegaard refers to yet another passage in Daub’s article. Here he writes,

Surely it’s true what Daub says (Bauer’s jour[nal]), that Christ’s 3 statements contain his whole life story (Do you not know that I must be in my Father’s house; I must work the works of him who sent me while it is day: the night is coming when no man can work; It is accomplished). Yet one must also not forget 3 others: He grew and waxed strong in spirit filled with wisdom Lk 2:40; He is tempted; My God, why hast thou forsaken me?50

Here Kierkegaard refers to the very beginning of the third installment of Daub’s treatise, where he writes:

The statement of Jesus to his parents: (in his first statement in the gospel) “Do you not know that I must be in my Father’s house?” (Luke 2, v. 49), the other statement to his disciples: “We must work the works of him who sent me while it is day; night is coming when no one can work.” (John 9, v. 4; cf. chap. 5, v. 17), and his statement to all humanity: “It is accomplished,” (John 19, v. 30)—these three statements are just as many data, to which all the other data in the teachings he revealed refer, i.e., in the deeds he does, in the suffering he endures, and in the accounts of the gospel writers about him; and if only the relation of any of these other data to these aforementioned three statements as well as the relation of every fact that is either only indicated by every datum, or of every fact (concerning prophecy and miracles) that is described by every datum, is explored, then the form in its sublime unity with its content, undisturbed by any conflict, is recognized and the object (the life of Jesus, as the only one which is just as divine as human) of the history of the age is grasped.51

Kierkegaard refers to this account in Daub with approval, although he finds the list of statements incomplete and wishes to supplement it. Daub’s point here is in part to indicate how at the time of the earliest Christianity, the most complex theological

49 Ibid., pp. 103f.
50 SKS 17, 223, DD:13.
notions were expressed with the simplest of formulations. The task of current theological research is to get back to these simple original meanings.

It is difficult to discern a single thread that runs through all of these references. Thus, it is not easy to say in a word what exactly it was about Daub’s article that Kierkegaard found so interesting. However, there can be no doubt that the general complex of issues that Daub addresses is one that would come to exercise Kierkegaard over the next several years, for example, the question of to what extent Christian faith depends on a veridical account of history. This recalls the main issue of Philosophical Fragments. Moreover, this article contains many methodological considerations relevant for the philosophy of history, which could potentially have been useful to Kierkegaard for studies such as The Concept of Irony.

B. Other References to Daub in the Journals and Notebooks

Apart from the references to Daub’s article in the Journal DD, there are also numerous other scattered references to his works in several of Kierkegaard’s journals and notebooks. These references have no recognizable thematic unity and thus will be treated in a straightforward chronological fashion.

In June 1837, in the Journal FF, Kierkegaard writes in a journal entry: “Daub’s sentences are true labyrinths; one needs Ariadne’s thread to read them—that is, love and inspiration.”52 As the commentators of Soren Kierkegaard’s Skrifter point out,53 the dating of this comment clearly fits with Kierkegaard’s reading of Daub’s article “Die Form der christlichen Dogmen- und Kirchen-Historie” in May and June of 1837. As the foregoing section has indicated, there can be no doubt that Kierkegaard found a great degree of “inspiration” from the article. But it is clear that, like many readers, he found Daub’s text rough going. In Strauss’ account in his book Charakteristiken und Kritiken, he notes the difficulties that Marheineke had reading Daub’s review of his book: he “had to read each sentence three times. The first time he understood nothing at all. The second time he understood a little. The third time he had still not understood it.”54 Thus, Kierkegaard was not alone with his complaint.

Kierkegaard was exposed to Daub in the lectures that he attended at the University of Copenhagen in Winter Semester of 1837–38,55 given by Hans Lassen Martensen under the title “Prolegomena ad dogmaticam speculativam” or “Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics.”56 Martensen had only recently returned from his journey to Germany and Prussia and thus from his meeting with Daub. His lectures were

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52 SKS 18, 87, FF:61 / JP 1, 619.
53 SKS K18, 133.
56 A complete list of Martensen’s lectures can be found in Skat Arildsen, Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen. Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde, Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag 1932, pp. 156–8.
tremendously popular and created an instant sensation for Hegel’s philosophy. Among his auditors was Søren Kierkegaard, who took notes to the lectures in his Notebook 4.\[57\] Kierkegaard’s notes cover the first half of the course, in all ten lectures, from 15 November to 23 December 1837.\[58\] In the third lecture, from 22 November, Martensen refers twice to “Daub’s last work,”\[59\] that is, Die dogmatische Theologie jetziger Zeit oder die Selbstsucht in der Wissenschaft des Glaubens,\[60\] which Rosenkranz had purportedly designated as a “phenomenology.”\[61\] Here Martensen traces three stages of a phenomenology of Christian consciousness, the first of which is Catholicism and the second of which is the Reformation.

Daub also appears several times in the fourth lecture from 24 November. Here one reads,

The spirit which we have in its first form in the apostolic inspiration (whereby it is strange that while the truth was only objective for the apostles, was, so to speak, palpable, they did not understand it; but only when it with spirit was subjectively carried over into consciousness—*Daub—Grundtvig*), later was the inspiration in the Church, in the Pope, in the Councils, etc.…\[62\]

In a marginal note to this passage, one reads, “Therefore dogmatics assumes a wholly different relation in Catholicism than in Protestantism[;] there were several dogmaticians just as there were several popes and yet only one papacy, that is, *per successionem* (Daub) in Protestantism every new system had a new horizon.”\[63\] Martensen continues, “(In the Middle Ages, the Church did not have spirit [Aand], but spirituality [Geistlighed]. *Daub.*)”\[64\] In these passages Martensen refers to the text by Daub that he mentioned in his previous lecture, Die dogmatische Theologie jetziger Zeit oder die Selbstsucht in der Wissenschaft des Glaubens.\[65\] The general point of these references to Daub seems to revolve around the issue of the way in which the individual consciousness appropriates divine inspiration and the way in which that inspiration is handed down from one person to another.

Some months later, in 1838, Kierkegaard writes in a marginal addition to the Journal DD: “I see that Daub in his now-published lectures on anthropology quite briefly makes a similar observation on why the anc.[ients] didn’t have humor. Cf. p. 482.”\[66\] This observation comes in the context of a number of entries in which Kierkegaard explores the concept of humor. Here Kierkegaard refers to Daub’s


\[58\] See Kim Ravn and Steen Tullberg, “Tekstredegørelse” to Notesbog 4, in SKS K19, pp. 177–83.

\[59\] SKS 19, 127, Not4:4 and 129, Not4:5.

\[60\] Daub, *Die dogmatische Theologie jetziger Zeit*, op. cit.

\[61\] This reference in Rosenkranz is unidentified in SKS.


\[63\] SKS 19, 130, Not4:6a.

\[64\] SKS 19, 130, Not4:6.

\[65\] See SKS K19, 191, where the commentators refer to *Die dogmatische Theologie jetziger Zeit*, op. cit., p. 428.

\[66\] SKS 17, 216, DD:6a.
lectures on philosophical anthropology in Marheineke’s and Dittenberger’s edition.67 In these lectures humor is defined as follows: “The principle of humor is not a tendency, not to mention a passion, but rather it is the energy of reason and freedom in its independence from all passion, united with thoroughgoing understanding, acute power of judgment, lively fantasy, striking wit. The humorist has great knowledge of people...”68 Daub explores how the humorist is able to rid himself of passions. Then comes the passage that Kierkegaard refers to, where Daub writes,

Not every people has its humorists. In the literature of the Greeks and the Romans there are none; for satirists are not humorists. In the works of the satirists the finite is merely placed in opposition to the relative. The question of why the ancient world did not have the aesthetic way of thinking which we call humor could be the object of a scholarly investigation. Does it perhaps have its reason in the fact that the eternal light had still not risen then, as it has now in Christianity?69

It is unclear whether Kierkegaard agrees or disagrees with this statement. Given his interest in humor, he may well have simply been interested in noting different accounts and definitions of it for more careful consideration later.

In Summer Semester 1838 Martensen covered the first 59 paragraphs of his course on “Speculative Dogmatics,” which would be continued the next semester (covering §§ 60–99).70 Kierkegaard attended this course and took notes to the first 23 paragraphs in his Journal KK.71 Another more detailed set of notes (covering both semesters) from a foreign hand is printed in the Papirer edition.72 Daub appears here in § 2, where Martensen refers to his main works under the rubric: “The Literature of Speculative Dogmatics.”73 Here one reads, “Daub’s Theologumena 1806 made an epoch, renewed speculation, set forth, among other things, speculative proofs for the existence of God. Daub Einleitung in [das Studium] der Dogmatik 1809, and Die dogmat.[ische] Theologie jetziger Zeit, criticism of the dogmatic systems 1833.”74 This passage only appears in the more detailed set of notes from the anonymous author and not in Kierkegaard’s notes in KK. Daub is mentioned here simply as a part of a kind of narrative bibliography of the main works of the leading speculative theologians of the day. He is thus named along with Marheineke, the younger Fichte (1797–1879), Karl Philipp Fischer (1807–85), Franz von Baader (1765–1841), Anton Günther (1783–1863) and Franz Anton Staudenmaier (1800–56).

Daub appears again in § 4 in the anonymous set of notes: “Schleiermacher strictly distinguished between philosophy and religion: [this is] correct, but he overlooked

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67 Daub, Vorlesungen über die philosophische Anthropologie, op. cit.
68 Ibid., p. 481.
69 Ibid., p. 482.
71 SKS 18, 374–86, KK:11.
74 Ibid.
that there is a knowledge in religion prior to philosophy, that is, cognition of religion. Daub, Marheineke, Hegel are here served. The point here, as is clear from what follows, is that the divine makes all knowledge possible by a kind of revelation. This knowledge precedes all other kinds of knowing, including philosophical knowing, and indeed makes it possible. Here again Daub is simply listed as an example of the speculative theologians who are known to defend this view (in contrast to Schleiermacher’s position).

Daub also appears in Martensen’s lecture course, “The History of More Recent Philosophy from Kant to Hegel,” from Winter Semester 1838–39. While it is uncertain whether Kierkegaard attended these lectures in person, he was in possession of a set of lecture notes, written in a foreign hand, to this course; these notes were subsequently printed in the edition of Kierkegaard’s Papirer. In these lectures Martensen mentions Daub’s Theologumena, once in his account of Schelling’s system, and once in his account of philosophy’s relation to theology. At the end of his lectures Martensen declares, “With the Hegelian philosophy, the history of dogma especially has won, especially with Daub. Before people treated the history of dogma as an aggregate of opinions.” With Hegel and Daub the goal is to see the idea developing in the dogmas over the course of time. Dogma is thus more than a simple “aggregate of opinions” but rather a manifestation of the Idea in history.

While he was in Berlin in 1841–42, Kierkegaard had the opportunity to hear the lectures of Daub’s friend and editor Philipp Marheineke. His notes to these lectures appear in Notebook 9 and Notebook 10. The title of Marheineke’s lectures was “Dogmatic Theology with Particular Reference to Daub’s System.” In his discussion on the doctrine of the two states of Christ, Marheineke refers to Daub as follows: “According to Daub, the miracle is the unity of the historical and the dogmatic. The form of the miracle is human actions, its content is divine action.” In the posthumous edition of his System der christlichen Dogmatik, which in part reproduces these lectures, Marheineke refers to Daub’s Einleitung in das Studium der christlichen Dogmatik in this context. This point takes up Daub’s defense of miracles in his article treated in the previous section. As was seen there, Kierkegaard found his account sympathetic, and thus he was doubtless interested to hear Marheineke’s view of it.

Daub also appears in the NB journals, which, as is well known, Kierkegaard kept during the second half of his authorship. In the Journal NB from 1846 one finds evidence of a study of Daub’s posthumously published lectures with the title,
Daub: Kierkegaard's Paradoxical Appropriation of a Hegelian Sentry

System of Theological Morality. Here he simply quotes the following passage with a reference to Daub's text:

...If freedom consisted in this wanting everything, then it would be impossible to think of any duty, any right, and obligation. If this is the opinion of the liberals of our day, then the definition is fitting for them as the ones who would rather want everything for themselves, while the servile only want very much.


This comes from a discussion in Daub of the concept of obligation. His main point is that for wanting or desiring to make sense, they must have a determinate object. The idea of someone who wants everything is not just impracticable but straightforwardly incoherent. This would imply wanting contradictory things or things that are simply impossible. For Daub, the concept only makes sense when it is accompanied by a form of negation or limitation so that there is a finite sphere of things that are wanted. The political point here is that it is a mistaken conception of freedom to claim that it consists in the ability to want everything. Since this passage appears in his journal without any further commentary, it is impossible to know why Kierkegaard was interested in it. Given his interests in ethical and psychological questions of freedom, responsibility and desire, it is hardly surprising that considerations of this kind would capture his interest. It may well be that he simply wanted to note this passage for himself so that he could find it again when he returned to write on these topics.

In the next journal NB2 from August 1847, Daub appears again. This time the reference is to his posthumously published lectures on philosophical anthropology. Kierkegaard writes,

Daub speaks the truth and expresses it very well (in his Philosophische Anthropologie, Berlin: 1838; I, p. 25) when he says of the mob, "dem Alles zur Lebensfrage wird, am Leben Alles und deswegen am Rechte Nichts liegt." [for whom everything is a life-question, only life is of consequence and right is of no consequence.]

In the passage in question, which Kierkegaard references directly here, Daub discusses the Enlightenment conception of natural rights. In this context, he talks about how people have grown accustomed to thinking that they have an inherent right to life, property, and so on. He analyzes this concept in a dialectical fashion. At first, there is the view that life is higher than law and rights. According to this opinion, rights and laws only exist to serve the end of life, or specifically, to make communal life possible. Laws must exist to prevent people from acting on immediate desires, which would be destructive to all social existence. In contrast to this is the view that these rights and laws stand higher than life itself and condition it. A person is only wholly human when he or she lives in harmony with a society governed by rules and laws. These laws thus constitute what it is to be a fully developed human
being at all. According to this view, the loss of life is not as unfortunate as the loss of one’s rights since this is what makes us human and makes life worth living.

In the passage quoted, Daub simply notes that the masses are not particularly interested in such abstract concepts like law and right. Thus, they advocate the first view, according to which life is higher than law. His point is that jurisprudence needs to make use of a certain insight into human psychology. It must realize that, for the mob, nothing is more important than life. However, for Daub, psychology, by contrast, must recognize that rights constitute a fully human life and must thus be incorporated into a complete psychological investigation of human beings.

Kierkegaard’s quotation is confined to the account of the “mob” which only recognizes the validity of life and not rights or law. This can perhaps be understood in the context of his considerations of society and the social order, which appeared a year earlier in his A Literary Review of Thomasine Gyllembourg’s (1773–1856) novel, Two Ages. He was, of course, also interested in the dynamic of “the mob” in connection with his journal polemic with The Corsair.

In the Journal NB8 from 1848 Kierkegaard demonstrates a study of yet another text by Daub, namely, Judas Ischariot. He writes,

> One will get a deep insight into the state of Christianity in each age by seeing how it interprets Judas. Abraham of Santa Clara is naively convinced that he was the most villainous of all scoundrels, about whom one is to say only every conceivable evil—but does not have to explain him. Daub becomes too profoundly metaphysical.87

Here Kierkegaard seems not to have in mind any specific passage but rather to refer to Daub’s general method of analysis. Here one can detect a slightly critical note. The idea seems to be that each generation interprets Judas in a way typical or characteristic of the age. Daub then interprets Judas metaphysically in a way that, for Kierkegaard, is typical of the overly metaphysical emphasis of the day. The implied criticism is then that this metaphysical approach misses the key point of this and other phenomena relevant for Christianity, which can only be properly understood existentially by the individual.

These various journal entries show a variety of different interests in and uses of Daub’s texts. First, they show that Kierkegaard was exposed to different works by Daub in a number of different lecture courses that he attended by Martensen and Marheineke, two scholars closely related to Daub intellectually. Second, they also evidence an independent study of some of Daub’s works long after his years as a student. This study shows that he returned to Daub’s texts frequently and in different contexts. Thus, Daub was clearly not simply a passing intellectual phase for Kierkegaard. He seems to have had a genuine and enduring interest in Daub’s theology.

Daub appears again in the Journal NB15 from 1850. Here he is mentioned along with Hegel and Julius Müller (1801–78) in the context of the then topical issue of subjectivism or relativism, which Kierkegaard refers to with a term borrowed from Adolph Peter Adler (1812–69): “isolated subjectivity.” He writes,

In this respect, too, I have not been understood at all. All the more profound thinkers (Hegel, Daub—and to name a less famous but very estimable one: Julius Müller et al.) are unanimous in locating evil in isolated subjectivity—objectivity is the saving factor. For a long time now this has been a catch-phrase; and every student knows, after all, that I am an isolated individuality—ergo, I am practically evil, “pure negativity, lacking earnestness, etc.” O, abyssmal confusion. No, the whole concept of objectivity, which has been made into the way of deliverance, is merely a feeding of the sickness, and the fact that it is lauded as restoration to health shows precisely how fundamentally irreligious the period is, for the way of deliverance is really a turning back to paganism.

Kierkegaard refers to Hegel’s criticism of the Romantics’ various interpretations of subjectivism and relativism. With respect to Daub in this context, Kierkegaard seems to refer to Judas Ischariot, which, as noted, has the problem of evil as its main subject matter.

Daub appears again in the Journal NB15. Here reference is made to both Daub’s Judas Ischariot and his Darstellung und Beurtheilung der Hypothesen in Betreff der Willensfreiheit. Kierkegaard writes,

There is an excellent little section on evil, on sin as the incomprehensible, the impenetrable, the world’s secret—precisely because it is the groundless, an arbitrary discontinuity. I am also happy to see that he quotes Daub, who also explains it in Judas Ischariot this way and is not disinclined to place evil under a special definition of the miraculous, although he later abandoned this view and conceived of evil as the negative, for example in his book, Hypotheser om den menneskelige Frihed.

Here Kierkegaard quotes from a note in Julius Müller’s Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, where Müller refers to Daub. From his earlier reading, Kierkegaard is clearly already familiar with Daub’s understanding of evil as something inconceivable and miraculous. This passage demonstrates an independent study of two of Daub’s texts, which treat this issue.

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88 Adolph Peter Adler, Den isolerede Subjectivitet i dens vigtigste Skikelser, Copenhagen: Berlingske Bogtrykkeri 1840.
90 Des Herrn Geheimen Kirchenraths und Professors, Dr. C. Daub Darstellung und Beurtheilung der Hypothesen in Betreff der Willensfreiheit, op. cit.
92 Julius Müller, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, vols. 1–2, Breslau: Josef Max 1849, vol. 1, Vom Wesen und Grunde der Sünde, p. 460 (ASKB 689–690): “This inconceivability of evil is indicated with thorough earnestness especially in Daub’s Judas Ischariot.”
Daub appears less frequently in Kierkegaard’s published works than in his journals and notebooks. The first time Daub is directly mentioned by name in the published writings is in the “Preliminary Expectoration” in *Fear and Trembling*. There Johannes de silentio makes use of the image of a sentry at his post that he borrows from Daub. Kierkegaard continues to work with this image for many years to come. In *Fear and Trembling* it appears as follows:

If everyone in my generation who does not wish to stop with faith is actually a person who has grasped the horror of life, has grasped the meaning of Daub’s statement that a soldier standing alone with a loaded rifle at his post near a powder magazine on a stormy night thinks strange thoughts; if everyone who does not wish to stop with faith is actually a person who has the spiritual power to comprehend that the wish was an impossibility and then to take time to be alone with the thought...then what I am writing is the loftiest eulogy upon the generation by its most inferior member, who could make only the movement of resignation.\(^{93}\)

In this passage Johannes de silentio critically examines what he takes to be a tendency typical of his age and typical of Hegelianism, namely, to regard faith as a transitional stage to something higher. Thus, according to Hegel’s hierarchy, one should not stop with faith but rather proceed to speculation or philosophical cognition. Here, somewhat paradoxically, an image is borrowed from the Hegelian Daub in order to support the criticism. Johannes de silentio here explores the reasons why people are not satisfied with faith and want to go beyond it. In this context, Daub’s image is mentioned in a positive manner as a reflection of a profound view of life which is consistent with Christian faith.

This passage has a forerunner in the *Journal JJ* from 1843 (the same year as the publication of *Fear and Trembling*), where Kierkegaard makes use of this same image from Daub, where he writes:

One ought to be so developed esthetically that he is able to grasp ethical problems esthetically—otherwise it goes badly with the ethical. How many are able to do this? Daub says somewhere that when a soldier stands alone with a loaded rifle at his post near a powder magazine on a stormy night turbulent with thunder and lighting, he thinks thoughts others do not think. Quite possibly—if he is developed enough esthetically; quite possibly, if he is esthetically developed enough not to forget. How many people could be told about the ascetic who lived in solitude and drank only dew and rain and who, the moment he forsook solitude, got a taste of wine and took to drink—how many could hear this but find nothing more in it than curiosity? How many are there who feel the anxiety and trembling, who comprehend the ethical problem?\(^{94}\)

This entry is entirely consistent with the passage from *Fear and Trembling*. Here Kierkegaard makes it explicit that he is using this image from Daub as an example of someone who has grasped the gravity of life or truly comprehended the ethical

\(^{93}\) SKS 4, 145 / FT, 50f.

\(^{94}\) SKS 19, 172, JJ:102 / JP 1, 899.
problem of existence. If this sort of person wishes to go beyond faith, then it is, for Kierkegaard, far less problematic and disdainful than the person who has not grasped this problem and wishes to go beyond faith for some trivial reason, such as to appear in fashion.

Finally, a closely related thought appears again in the first part of Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits from 1847, where Kierkegaard writes in the occasional discourse, known as “Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing”:

Recollection will be unable to remind him of the time when he sneaked along a devious path in order to avoid a decision, of the time when he gave the matter another turn in order to please people, of the time when he deserted his post in order to let the storm pass over, of the time when he yielded in order to find some relief in his awkward situation; of the time when he sought support and alliance with others—perhaps, as it is called, to work all the more for the victory of the good, that is to make his situation a bit less difficult in comparison with standing alone somewhat apprehensively, as in a midnight hour “with musket loaded at his dangerous post.”

While Daub’s name does not appear here, it is clear that this passage builds on the two previous ones just quoted. Here the person is praised who does not shirk the difficulties of existence. The stormy night is thus understood as a metaphor for dealing with the existential challenges of life. Standing at one’s post is then the symbol of the reflective individual who confronts these challenges in an authentic manner. While these three passages are all slightly different, it is clear that they belong to the same family or constellation of thought in Kierkegaard’s mind.

At first glance, these allusions seem rather enigmatic since they do not actually refer to any of Daub’s texts. Rather this image comes from an anecdote told by Karl Rosenkranz in his aforementioned memoirs about Daub, which Kierkegaard had in his library. Kierkegaard could also have read this anecdote in the Danish translation of Rosenkranz’s text in the Danish periodical, Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, to which he had a subscription. Rosenkranz recounts a conversation he had with Daub, when Rosenkranz was complaining about the prospect of his future military service in Prussia. Then, Daub said to Rosenkranz that he should not complain about it, since it might have some unexpected advantages: “like a sentry at his lonely post at night, perhaps at a gunpowder magazine, one has thoughts that otherwise are altogether impossible.” There is no larger religious context to this passage in its original form. It seems simply to have caught Kierkegaard’s eye, and he then proceeded to embroider it and develop it as a metaphor for authentic existence.

95 SKS 8, 202 / UD, 98.


E. Daub and Understanding Life Backwards

At around the same time that Kierkegaard was reading Daub’s article, he was writing his first book, *From the Papers of One Still Living*, which was ultimately published on 7 September 1838. In that work he refers directly to Daub as follows:

There must come a moment, I say, when as Daub observes, life is understood backward through the idea....In analogy to this, individuals appear whose actual task lies behind them, but this does not help them to come into the right “backward” position for viewing life, since this task is placed rather like a hump on their own backs, and therefore they never actually come to see it or could never possibly become conscious of it in a spiritual sense....

This is intended as part of Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hans Christian Andersen for lacking a “life-view.” The editors of *Soren Kierkegaard’s Skrifter* argue that this is not a reference to Daub at all but instead to Franz von Baader’s *Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik*. Indeed, in some sense the notion of understanding life or history “backward through the idea” is common to much of the thinking on the philosophy of history during the period of hegemony of German idealism. The idea is, however, found in Daub’s aforementioned essay, “Die Form der christlichen Dogmen- und kirchen-Historie.” Daub’s analysis there concerns the nature of historical actions. These actions are only correctly comprehended when they can be understood in terms of the goal which they serve. Thus, the task of the historian is then to determine or find the idea by means of which the past is understood. It is only grasped retrospectively by the historian, who has the opportunity to observe the various effects of the historical actions. Daub frequently refers to this grasping of the idea as an “act of divination” on the part of the historian. Through this grasping of the idea, one makes the events of the past present.

In Kierkegaard’s journals we also find allusions to the wider constellation of ideas of which this constitutes a part. For example, on 15 April 1838 he writes in the *Journal FF*, “Life can be interpreted only after it has been experienced, just as Christ did not begin to expound the Scriptures and show how they taught of him until his Resurrection.” Here Kierkegaard refers to the account in Luke 24 of how Jesus appears on the third day after the crucifixion and explains how what had taken place was in accordance with what the prophets had declared: “Then beginning with Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted to them the things about himself in all the scriptures.” The idea here obviously seems to be that the true meaning of these events is only clear after the fact. With this passage Kierkegaard seems to advocate a
retrospective understanding of history in line with Hegel’s famous image of the Owl of Minerva. However, it is clear that this is not his final word on the matter.

Five years later in a journal entry, Kierkegaard takes up this thought in the Journal JJ, where he writes,

Philosophy is perfectly right in saying that life must be understood backwards. But then one forgets the other claim—that it must be lived forwards. The more one thinks through this claim, the more one concludes that life in temporality never becomes properly understandable, simply because never at any time does one get perfect repose to take a stance: backwards.

With this famous passage Kierkegaard contrasts the purely philosophical approach to life, which puts a high premium on understanding, and the existential approach. The point is clearly that the “backwards” understanding, whatever its merits may be in philosophy, is not adequate for the existential demands of existence.

Daub is also mentioned by name in Philosophical Fragments, which is an understandable connection given the importance of the philosophy of history for both Daub and Johannes Climacus. The reference concerns precisely the question of understanding history retrospectively. It is an issue that will prove to be significant for Kierkegaard in different respects. In the difficult “Interlude” in the Fragments, Climacus writes,

One who apprehends the past, a historico-philosophus, is therefore a prophet in reverse (Daub). That he is a prophet simply indicates that the basis of the certainty of the past is the uncertainty regarding it in the same sense as there is uncertainty regarding the future, the possibility (Leibniz—possible worlds), out of which it could not possibly come forth with necessity, nam necessarium se ipso prius sit, necesse est [for it is necessary that necessity precede itself].

Here Climacus refers to the beginning of “Die Form der christlichen Dogmen- und Kirchen-Historie,” where Daub describes in a Hegelian fashion the task of the historian as “recognizing in a divinatory manner the intransitory in the transitory, freedom in necessity, the eternal in the temporal.” Here one can see many echoes

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104 PR, Preface, p. 23; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 36f.: “As the thought of the world, it [sc. philosophy] appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative process and attained its completed state. This lesson of the concept is necessarily also apparent from history, namely that it is only when actuality has reached maturity that the ideal appears opposite the real and reconstructs this real world, which it has grasped in its substance, in the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its gray in gray, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the gray in gray of philosophy; the Owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.” PR = Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H.B. Nisbet, ed. by Allen Wood, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1991. Jub. = Hegel’s Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe, vols. 1–20, ed. by Hermann Glockner, Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1928–41.

105 SKS 18, 194, JJ:167 / JP 1, 1030.

106 SKS 4, 279 / PF, 80.

of Kierkegaard’s favorite paradoxical formulations to describe both human beings and the divine. Daub continues, “The act of looking backward [Nachschauen] is, like that of looking forward [Vorausschauen] an act of divination—thus it is equally, if not more, correct to say of the historian that he is a prophet of the past—the historical.”

Kierkegaard here seems to be attracted to Daub’s paradoxical idea that the historian, in the understanding and interpretation of the past, can be regarded as a prophet. This positive use of Daub can be taken as paradoxical at another level when one considers the general context of this passage in the *Fragments*. One of the main points of the “Interlude” is to refute the Hegelian idea of necessity in history. Here, however, reference is made to the Hegelian Daub to support the idea that the past is not necessary but contingent, and thus the historian can be regarded as a prophet of it.

### III. Kierkegaard’s Paradoxical Reception of Daub

In his foreword to Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs’ (1794–1861) *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft*, from 1822, Hegel attempts to comfort the author regarding what he fears will be a hostile reception to the work given previous attempts to establish a speculative philosophy of religion. After criticizing what he takes to be the sorry state of philosophy, Hegel laments the fact that “the writings of Christian theologians like Daub and Marheineke, which still preserve Christian doctrine and the right and glory of thought,...suffer the meanest disparagement at the hands of shallow and ill-disposed critics.”

Hegel refers to the incipient debates about the philosophy of religion, which would, after his death, lead to the split of the Hegelian schools into the right and left factions. The philosophy of religion was the primary battleground where the rights to the Hegelian heritage were contested.

While it cannot with justice be designated as either right or left Hegelian, Kierkegaard’s thought belongs part and parcel to this intellectual world. He followed these debates closely and was well versed in the writings of most of its main representatives of both schools. While he was critical of left Hegelianism for rejecting Christianity, he saved his most violent criticism for the right Hegelians. In the Danish context he was locked in a virtually lifelong debate with Hans Lassen Martensen’s version of speculative theology, which has often been identified as a straightforward right-Hegelian position. While there are clear signs that Martensen ultimately rejected some of the fundamental tenets of Hegel’s speculative approach to religion, there can be no doubt that he was highly sympathetic to the overall project of a speculative interpretation of Christian dogma.

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108 Ibid.
What is striking in this general context is the fact that Kierkegaard nourished an unbending hatred for Martensen and constantly criticized what he regarded as Martensen's distortion and perversion of Christianity, while at the same time he showed a great openness and receptivity to Martensen's intellectual forerunners, the right Hegelians, Marheineke and Daub. This is especially odd given that Kierkegaard was a first-hand witness to the way in which Martensen, in his lectures, actively tried to promote Daub's theology. This discrepancy is not easy to explain.

The image of the sentry at his post on a stormy night is poignant. While Martensen is consistently represented as a hypocrite and an inauthentic person who has compromised Christianity beyond repair by making it consistent with "objective thinking," Daub, by contrast, is hailed as an authentic person who stands like the sentry on a lonely night and confronts the deep problems of existence. While Martensen abandons his station as an individual confronted by these existential issues, Daub stands firm.

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II. Works in The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Daub


### III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaards Relation to Daub


