

The Authenticity of Faith  
in Kierkegaard's Philosophy

Edited by

Tamar Aylat-Yaguri and Jon Stewart

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**P U B L I S H I N G**

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# CHAPTER NINE

## KIERKEGAARD AND HEGEL ON FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

JON STEWART

Hegel is well known for his claim that religion and philosophy share in some significant sense the same subject matter. Indeed, at the very beginning of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, he writes, philosophy “does, initially, have its objects in common with religion. Both of them have the *truth* in the highest sense of the word as their object, for both hold that *God* and *God alone* is the truth. Both of them also go on to deal with the realm of the finite, with *nature* and the *human spirit*, and with their relation to each other and to God as to their truth.”<sup>1</sup> At the beginning of his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, he expresses this even more radically by speaking of philosophy and religion as a unity:

Thus religion and philosophy come to be one. Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship; it is religion, for in the same way it renounces subjective notions and opinions in order to occupy itself with God. Philosophy is thus identical with religion, but the distinction is that it is so in a peculiar manner, distinct from the manner of looking at things which is commonly called religion as such.<sup>2</sup>

Hegel consistently claims that religion is a form of knowing and to this extent is continuous with philosophy. Similarly, he is consistently critical of all attempts to separate religion from philosophy and to isolate it in a sphere unto itself.

By contrast, Kierkegaard, working with an entirely different set of presuppositions, goes to great lengths to separate religion or specifically Christianity from all forms of knowledge. One of Kierkegaard’s main objections to Hegel’s philosophy is that it misunderstands the nature of religion by placing it on a par with various forms of scholarship and knowing. Through his pseudonymous authors, Kierkegaard stubbornly insists that faith is fundamentally different from knowledge, and Christianity from speculative philosophy. Kierkegaard’s famous words from his early *Journal AA*, already from the year 1835, sound like a kind of battle slogan that anticipates much of his later polemics: “*Philosophy and Christianity can never be united.*”<sup>3</sup> All attempts at such a unification, in his view, result in a dangerous distortion of Christianity and its infinitely important message. Of all the well-known aspects of Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel or Hegelianism, this is certainly one of the most central and most significant. On its own it constitutes a large part of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of religion

generally and touches in one way or another on a number of related issues that are also of great importance to him, for example, the Incarnation, Revelation, and communication.

The positions of the two thinkers are grounded in two quite different sets of fundamental intuitions about the nature of religion. In the present essay I wish to explore this issue from both sides. How did Hegel understand the relation of faith to knowledge? Why did he wish to argue for the commensurability of the two? By contrast, why was Kierkegaard so insistent on keeping the two spheres absolutely separate and distinct? My goal is to bring the two thinkers into a dialogue with one another by capturing the basic premises and presuppositions that lie behind their respective positions. I will first explore Hegel's philosophy of religion with an eye towards this issue. Then I will give an account of the criticism of this and similar views as found in the works of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authors. Finally, I will attempt to allow each to respond to the criticisms of the other on the key issues.

## I. Hegel's Account of Faith

### A. The Concept of Faith and its Relation to Knowing

Hegel addresses the issue of the relation of faith to knowledge, understood as speculative cognition, in a number of places throughout his *corpus*: "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" from the *Early Theological Writings*,<sup>4</sup> the "Faith and Knowledge" essay,<sup>5</sup> the religion chapter in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*,<sup>6</sup> the section on religion in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*,<sup>7</sup> the foreword to Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs' (1794-1861) *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft*,<sup>8</sup> the review of Karl Friedrich Göschel's (1781-1861) *Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen*,<sup>9</sup> and of course the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*.<sup>10</sup> It would be impossible to give an exhaustive overview of all these works in this context. I will instead attempt to give a general account of Hegel's position based on scattered references to these different texts.

Hegel received his philosophical and theological education at a time when Kant's philosophy was the central object of discussion. Kant attempted to demonstrate the limits of reason by critically examining the faculties of the human mind. He argued that only those things that could be given in experience were possible objects of knowledge. By contrast, those things that were not possible objects of experience could not be known and remained forever cut off from us. These included God, immortality and freedom, which could not be demonstrated since they transcend the sphere of experience.<sup>11</sup> The point of this critique of reason was then "to deny *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith*."<sup>12</sup> By knowing the limits of human reason, one could then properly identify what lay beyond its purview and was thus the proper object of faith.

With this approach Kant effectively created a dualism of phenomena and noumena (or things in themselves). The former were things that could

be objects of possible experience and could thus be known, while the latter were not objects of possible experience but only of thought. We can think things as they are in themselves, i.e., apart from our ways of perceiving them, but we can never know them as such. According to this scheme, the divine clearly falls on the side of the noumena. All attempts to gain knowledge of God are thus doomed to failure since such attempts always invoke something that transcends experience and thus what it is possible to know.

Given that God was not an object of experience, Kant argued that from a metaphysical point of view God is unknowable. However, Kant nonetheless attempted to save a belief in God by means of the so-called postulates of pure practical reason.<sup>13</sup> What was lost in the theoretical philosophy is won again in the practical philosophy. Although we cannot know God with certainty and can never demonstrate His existence metaphysically, we must nonetheless presuppose His existence in order for our moral universe to make sense. In other words, we must act on the assumption that there is a God and that we are free agents since without these assumptions our concepts of morality, responsibility, etc. would be meaningless.

This solution was problematic for many thinkers who were otherwise sympathetic to Kant's critical enterprise. To many it seemed that Kant had decisively demonstrated the limitations of reason and the fruitless nature of metaphysical speculation about the divine. However, they saw that his attempt to salvage the situation and escape the apparently agnostic conclusion by means of a postulate of practical reason was unsatisfying since it simply reduced God to a moral principle or, even worse, a presupposition for one. In other words, Kant's God seemed to be deprived of the usual characteristics attributed to him in dogmatics and to have more or less exclusively the function of guarantor of the moral world. God was no longer the loving personal deity who could be the object of prayer and adoration but rather a moral or epistemological principle.

Hegel believed that Kant had a profound insight with respect to his theory of representations and the necessary structures of the human mind. However, he was critical of the conclusions that Kant drew from this with respect to religion. Hegel objected to the claim that we could only have knowledge of objects of possible experience. He argued that those objects that Kant had placed beyond experience can in fact be known as objects of consciousness. Hegel claims that we have knowledge of the divine through *faith* itself. Every country and people has traditional beliefs about the divine that can be analyzed and understood. The goal of the philosophy of religion, for Hegel, is to explore these beliefs and to discover the hidden reason in them. Given this, he regards it as absurd to claim that we cannot know the divine or that God dwells in an inaccessible sphere beyond our own. On the contrary, the collective human mind is full of stories and ideas about the divine. It is the task of the philosopher to make sense of them and to disclose the knowledge of the divine that they contain.

Some will argue that it is, on the contrary, the task of the theologian to make sense of these ideas, but Hegel notes that since religion is a part of human culture that develops throughout history, it thus overlaps with

any number of other developments in different cultural spheres, such as history, politics, and philosophy. For this reason expertise is required that goes beyond that of a theologian or specialist in religion. What is required is someone who can grasp the wider movement of Spirit in the entire cultural sphere and then understand the religious phenomena in this sphere.

Hegel's initial intuition is the idealist claim that thinking is at the heart of the different human spheres of activity. Human beings are characterized by "Spirit," and every sphere of their lives is permeated by it: "it is through thought, concrete thought, or, to put it more definitely, it is by reason of his being Spirit, that man is man; and from man as Spirit proceed all the many developments of the sciences and arts, the interests of political life, and all those conditions which have reference to man's freedom and will."<sup>14</sup> In this sense he is quick to reject the view that in religion we are concerned with some unique or special faculty, for example, feeling or immediate knowing, whereas in philosophy we are concerned with thought. In the *Encyclopedia*, he refers to "the prejudice of our day and age, which separates feeling and thinking from each other in such a way that they are supposedly opposed to each other, and are even so hostile that feeling—religious feeling in particular—is contaminated, perverted, or even totally destroyed by thinking, and that religion and religiosity essentially do not have their root and their place in thinking."<sup>15</sup> Hegel attempts to refute this view as follows:

Making a separation of this kind means forgetting that only man is capable of religion, and that the lower animals have no religion, any more than right and morality belong to them....Religion, right, and ethical life belong to man alone, and that only because he is a thinking essence. For that reason *thinking* in its broad sense has not been inactive in these spheres, even at the level of feeling and belief or of representation; the activity and productions of thinking are *present* in them and are *included* in them.<sup>16</sup>

This recalls Hegel's criticism of Schleiermacher's claim that faith is essentially a feeling, specifically the feeling of absolute dependency on God. Hegel believes that there is an element of *thought* in feeling, which must be developed and understood philosophically; faith, therefore, cannot be a matter of feeling alone. Hegel argues that the result of Schleiermacher's view would be that "a dog would be the best Christian for it possesses this [sc. feeling of dependence] in the highest degree and lives mainly in this feeling."<sup>17</sup> The point is obviously that only humans have religion; therefore, the cognitive faculty that is at work in religious belief must be one that is unique to human beings. To understand faith as mere feeling means devaluing the very concept of faith and reducing it to a base level.

Hegel further argues that the misunderstanding arises from the fact that when people hear the claim that religion, right and ethics are essentially concerned with thought, they mistakenly take it to mean that conscious reflection is always at work in these different spheres. Instead, Hegel's thesis is that the necessary *logos* or reason is always present and developing in these different contexts, regardless of how reflective particular individuals may or may not be.

Reason in religion is not, however, an abstract or formal principle; instead, it takes different specific forms in relation to different specific contents in the various descriptions of the divine provided by the different world religions. For Christianity to be a determinate religion, therefore, it must have a determinate content. If it lacks this content, then an ostensible belief in Christianity could in effect be a belief in anything at all. Hegel explains this while criticizing what he takes to be a mistaken “philosophizing” view of his own age that he associates with Jacobi and some of the German Romantics:

The Christian faith implies an authority that belongs to the church, while, on the contrary, the faith of this philosophizing standpoint is just the authority of one’s own subjective revelation. Moreover, the Christian faith is an objective content that is inwardly rich, a system of doctrine and cognition; whereas the content of this [philosophical] faith is inwardly so indeterminate that it may perhaps admit that content too—but equally it may embrace within it the belief that the Dalai-Lama, the bull, the ape, etc., is God, or it may, for its own part, restrict itself to God in general, to the “highest essence.”<sup>18</sup>

With these examples it is clear that content is not an indifferent part of a religion. The content is precisely what defines the individual religions and separates and distinguishes them from one another. Simply by saying that one believes is not enough to define one’s religion. But this content is precisely the proof that belief is a matter of knowledge. One must *know* the content of one’s belief in order to distinguish it from other beliefs.

Hegel argues that the advocates of religious feeling often make the mistake of confusing the object of belief in sense perception with that of religious belief. While one can believe in the truth of the senses, this is not what is at issue in religious faith. For the latter we are concerned with faith in God, not with some object of sense in any straightforward manner. Hegel illustrates this view by referring to Jacobi: “We *believe*, says Jacobi, that we have a *body*, we believe in the *existence* of *sensible things*. But, when we talk about faith in what is true and eternal, or about God being revealed, or given, in immediate knowing and intuition, these are not sensible things at all, but a content that is *inwardly universal*, i.e., objects that are [present] only to the *thinking* spirit.”<sup>19</sup> Thus to know the divine one needs to think and to use philosophical cognition and not the senses.

This explains Hegel’s polemic against belief based on the miracles of Jesus. These miracles are also the objects of sense. As pure particulars they do not capture the universal truth and message of Christianity. The latter is only accessible by means of thought. Hegel grants that there is an aspect of immediate knowing in Christianity, but this is not the final word and is in need of being supplemented with something higher. He writes, for example, “Although Christian baptism is a sacrament, it implies, of itself, the further responsibility of providing a Christian education. This means that, for all that religion and ethical life are a matter of believing, or immediate knowledge, they are radically conditioned by mediation, which is called development, education, and culture.”<sup>20</sup> Therefore, the immediate elements



in religion must be developed into the higher forms of cognition if they are to be understood correctly.

### B. Christian Faith as Revelation

One of the key features of Hegel's view of the Christian religion is that it must have a concrete content. As has been seen, he is critical of a merely formal conception of belief that is not related to any specific content. Moreover, this content is revealed and for this reason is known. Hegel thus refers to Christianity as "the revealed religion." He claims that this feature of Christianity renders absurd those views that claim that humans cannot know the divine. God revealed Himself to humanity so that He could be known. Thus Revelation itself is a proof that faith is in fact a kind of knowing. It would be absurd to imagine that God revealed Himself and yet failed to reveal anything. If He revealed Himself, then there must be some content in that revelation.

Since religion is a kind of knowing, it follows the same structural form as the different kinds of knowing in other fields. As we know from Hegel's idealist metaphysics, the Concept (*Begriff*) constitutes the basic structure of the world and the human mind. The Concept consists of the dialectical movement from universality (*Allgemeinheit*) to particularity (*Besonderheit*) and then to their unity in individuality (*Einzelheit*).<sup>21</sup> This is the basic structure of all human thinking and thus of the different conceptions of the divine as well. While other religions capture this truth only partially or inadequately, Christianity fulfills and completes it. It is by virtue of this doctrine that Christianity is continuous with speculative philosophy and philosophical knowing. The Trinity represents a speculative triad of thought and is thus not just the object of mere sense or feeling. In the Christian Trinity, the metaphysical Concept is embodied in one of its highest forms. Hegel writes in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*,

the Absolute Spirit exhibits itself ( $\alpha$ ) as eternal content, abiding self-centered, even in its manifestation; ( $\beta$ ) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation, which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world into which the content enters; ( $\gamma$ ) as infinite return, and reconciliation with the eternal being, of the world it gave away—the withdrawal of the eternal from the phenomenal into the unity of its fullness.<sup>22</sup>

(A) God the Father, dwelling in the beyond, represents the universal aspect. (B) This universality must become particular and enter into actuality with Christ, the Son. (C) Finally, with the death of the particular, the Son is reunited with the Father in the unity of the Holy Spirit. Thus in this key Christian doctrine, when understood conceptually, one finds the necessary features of the metaphysical Concept.

A. God as universality: the Father.<sup>23</sup> God is initially conceived as an abstract idea or other in the beyond. The human mind abstracts from itself and posits another in opposition to itself. Self-consciousness is then

externalized and placed in a sphere that is beyond the known realm of actuality. In time this other comes to take on an independent reality of its own. In the *Phenomenology* Hegel writes, "The element of pure thought, because it is an abstract element, is itself rather the 'other' of its simple, unitary nature, and therefore passes over into the element proper to picture-thinking—the element in which the moments of the pure Concept obtain a *substantial* existence relatively to one another."<sup>24</sup> This conception of God is entirely abstract; the divine is merely conceived as a self-conscious other that dwells in the beyond. Due to this abstract nature, this first stage represents that of universality, for if the divine were in any way concrete, then this universality would give way to particularity.

According to Hegel's view, this purely universal conception cannot remain abstract and static for long. It is the nature of the Concept to develop and to be a part of a dynamic process: "Spirit...is movement, life; its nature is to differentiate itself, to give itself a definite character, to determine itself."<sup>25</sup> The universal seeks to determine itself and make itself particular. The initial idea of God is that of a spirit "outside of or before the creation of the world."<sup>26</sup> Here God is indeterminate since there is no other by means of which He can distinguish Himself. He dwells, as it were, in a universe with only one object. For this reason He remains abstract. Hegel describes this as follows in the *Encyclopaedia*: "Under the 'moment' of *Universality*—the sphere of pure thought or the abstract medium of essence—it is therefore the Absolute Spirit, which is at first the presupposed principle, not, however, staying aloof and inert, but (as underlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth."<sup>27</sup> Thus, God's first attempt to externalize and particularize Himself is understood to be in the act of creation. By creating the world, God creates an other to Himself. But this distinction does not adequately reflect and thus determine the nature of God:

When we say, God has created a world, we imply that there has been a transition from the Concept to objectivity, only when the world is here characterized as essentially God's Other, and as being the negation of God, outside of God, without God, godless. In so far as the world is defined as this Other, the difference does not present itself to us as being in the Concept itself or as contained in the Concept; i.e., being, objectivity must be shown to be in the Concept, must be shown to exist in the form of activity, consequence, determination of the Concept itself.<sup>28</sup>

The problem is that God is Spirit, but Spirit is not reflected in the world that He created. Thus in the dialectic of recognition and mutual determination, God stands opposite a thing and not another Spirit. The world itself is considered "godless," a sterile thing. Another form of externalization and particularization is required for God to be genuinely determined as Spirit.

B. God as Particularity: the Son.<sup>29</sup> What is required is for God to externalize Himself not as an object but rather as Spirit. Thus, at the second stage God is understood to make Himself particular in the form of His Son, Jesus Christ. Through the Son God enters the world of actuality in the

form most appropriate to Him, Spirit. In this manner, an opposition arises between Father and Son, which mutually reflect and determine each other. God the Father is reflected in the Son in a way that He is not reflected in nature. Hegel explains, the divine “is, in fact, the negative in its own self and, moreover, the negativity of thought or negativity as it is in itself in essence; i.e. simple essence is absolute *difference* from itself, or its pure othering of itself.”<sup>30</sup> At this stage God by means of Christ is understood to become “the self-opposed or ‘other’ of itself.”<sup>31</sup> Universality then stands opposed to particularity and abstraction to concretion, with each term being the other of its opposite: the “*actuality* or self-consciousness [sc. Christ], and the *in-itself* as substance [sc. God, the Father], are its two moments through whose reciprocal externalization, each becoming the other, Spirit comes into existence as this their unity.”<sup>32</sup>

The revelation of God in Christ is a key characteristic of the Christian religion for Hegel, and it is for this reason that he designates it “the revealed religion.” The revelation is significant since it represents God showing Himself, revealing Himself or making Himself known to humanity. In the long story of the development of conceptions of the divine that Hegel has traced, he has shown that there is a movement from obscurity to clarity. It is only in earlier religions, where there is an alienation of humanity from nature and the world that the gods are conceived as unknown, obscure and impenetrable. By contrast, in Christianity the divine is revealed and humanity is thereby to be reconciled with it.

The other important dimension of the revelation is that God reveals Himself as a man, i.e., as Spirit. Human beings can thus immediately relate to the divine in human form. Hegel writes in “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate,” “Faith in Jesus means more than knowing his real personality, feeling one’s own reality as inferior to his in might and strength, and being his servant. Faith is a knowledge of spirit through spirit, and only like spirits can know and understand one another; unlike ones can know only that they are not what the other is.”<sup>33</sup> In this way, earlier forms of religious alienation—such as, for example, the revelation of the divine in Hinduism in the form of different animals—are overcome. Thus, the culmination of the story of different forms of revelation is Christianity in which God makes Himself known as a human being. Only in this way does the alien element of the divine disappear: “Spirit is known as self-consciousness and to this self-consciousness it is immediately revealed, for Spirit is this self-consciousness itself. The divine nature is the same as the human, and it is this unity that is beheld.”<sup>34</sup>

According to the development of the Concept, Christ is the particular that has emerged from the universal. As a concrete particular, he has thus overcome the abstraction of the divine in the beyond of the previous stage. However, the particular, although being an advance in the development of the Concept, is still inadequate. The particular is empirical and transitory. Christ as a particular is not present to humanity forever. It is a mistake to think that one’s faith should be fixed on the particular as such. This leads to a kind of fetishism, whereby the believer is fixated on the concrete and empirical: one collects bones of the saint, or splinters of the cross; one

searches for the Holy Grail or the funeral shroud of Jesus. It is, according to Hegel, a mistake to understand the meaning of Christ solely as a particular in this way. Christ rebukes those who believe only because they have seen miracles. The particular points beyond itself to something higher. But in order to reach this, the particular must perish. Only when the particular has disappeared can the new principle emerge.

C. God as Individuality: the Holy Spirit.<sup>35</sup> The third step in the development of the Christian Concept is the Holy Spirit, in which the universal God in the beyond is known to be united with the particular revealed God. The Holy Spirit is the spirit of the divine as it lives on in the community of religious believers. Hegel writes, "Spirit is thus posited in the third element in *universal self-consciousness*; it is its *community*."<sup>36</sup> The importance of this third and final stage is that the shortcomings of abstract universality and concrete particularity are overcome. With the death of Christ it is no longer possible to hang on fixedly to the particular; now one is compelled to contemplate the universal nature of the message, which is not some empirical thing but an idea. But it is no longer an abstract and empty idea as at the first stage of pure universality. Now in the Holy Spirit the Christian idea is full of content by virtue of the life and teachings of Christ that it contains. This is embodied in the spirit of the Christian community that is constantly contemplating and appropriating it in their specific context.

The particular, Christ, must therefore perish in order to establish an enduring truth for the religious community. In this way the sphere of nature is overcome and the revelation is completed as an idea. Only with his death is the idea of Christ truly realized: "The movement of the community as self-consciousness that has distinguished itself from its picture-thought is to make explicit what has been implicitly established. The dead divine man or human God is *in himself* the universal self-consciousness."<sup>37</sup> In the Holy Spirit the abstract God in the beyond and the particular incarnate God are unified, and the dualism ceases. Universal and particular are sublated in the individual. The individual believer is united with Spirit. Thus, Hegel regards the idea of the Holy Spirit as reconciling any number of key dualisms and forms of alienation that have plagued earlier religions. Therefore, only in Christianity is the truth known and is humanity reconciled with the world and the divine.

According to Hegel, the Christian account of the movement from the abstract God in the beyond to the concrete God with the Incarnation and finally to the resurrected God in the Holy Spirit is religion's way of expressing the speculative truth of the Concept. As has been noted at the outset, Hegel's central claim is that philosophy and religion express the same truth or the same content but in different ways. Philosophical knowing is in a sense the same as religious knowing.<sup>38</sup> Speculative philosophy attempts to demonstrate the necessity of the Concept in the different spheres of thought. In so doing, it shows that certain phenomena originally thought to be separate and distinct are in fact necessarily related and constitute a single conceptual unit. In this way philosophy overcomes various forms of dualism that are stuck at subordinate levels of knowing. The speculative history of the forms of religions that Hegel traces performs a similar function. It shows

the conception of the divine developing in such a way as to overcome the dualism of human and divine, and thus the alienation that humans feel from the divine. This dualism is just one of many forms of dualism that speculative philosophy attempts to sublate.

Despite these similarities, there is also a key difference in the way in which religious thinking and philosophical thinking understand their objects. Religious thinking sees the story of the Incarnation and the Resurrection as grounded in divine freedom, just as it saw the Fall as the result of human willfulness. Thus, these events might or might not have happened, and in that sense are “contingent.” By contrast, speculative philosophical thinking discerns the *necessity* of this development since it embodies the development of the Concept. If there is a universal, it is necessary that there be a particular. If there are both a universal and a particular, it is necessary that they be united in an individual. This is a necessary movement of thought. It is no mere contingency, but a necessary ontological movement found in all spheres of human thought. The Christian Trinity thus mirrors the three parts of the speculative Concept. But the Christian believer fails to see the necessary conceptual structure that lies at bottom in the Trinity. This is what constitutes the difference between religious thinking and philosophical thinking. The speculative philosopher can see the Concept as Concept, i.e., in its pure conceptual form, whereas the religious thinker sees it only in its specific religious forms. The externalization of the universal in the particular is grasped in anthropomorphic terms as the birth of the Son of God in the world. Instead of speaking of the universal and the particular, the religious believer speaks of the Father and the Son.

In Hegel’s hierarchy of knowing, religious thinking thus represents the penultimate form of thought, second only to philosophy. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, he explains as follows that religion is still inadequate in its grasp of the truth:

This form is not yet Spirit’s self-consciousness that has advanced to its Concept *qua* Concept: the mediation is still incomplete. This combination of being and thought is, therefore, defective in that....the *content* is the true content, but all its moments, when placed in the medium of picture-thinking, have the character of being uncomprehended [in terms of the Concept], of appearing as completely independent sides which are externally connected with each other.<sup>39</sup>

This is Hegel’s way of saying that the different conceptions of the divine are considered separate and in their essence unrelated. Their relation is only contingent. Picture-thinking is thus limited and falls short of being a completely adequate and satisfying form of knowing.<sup>40</sup> It requires philosophy to discern the conceptual truth in religion and thus to distinguish it from the contingent.

## II. Kierkegaard's Criticism: The Separation of Faith and Knowledge

Just as Hegel's statements about religious faith are strewn through a number of different texts, so also Kierkegaard's accounts of Christian faith encompass virtually his entire *corpus*. Thus, I will focus my analysis on what I take to be particularly significant accounts that he gives through his pseudonym Johannes Climacus in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*.

At the beginning of the *Postscript*, Kierkegaard has his pseudonym make a key distinction that will inform both the content and the structure of the work. He speaks of "the objective issue," which he defines as the issue "about the truth of Christianity."<sup>41</sup> By contrast, he continues, "The subjective issue is about the individual's relation to Christianity."<sup>42</sup> The work itself is then divided into two parts reflecting this distinction. Right away here one can see the knowledge/faith dichotomy reflected. The objective issue concerns the knowledge that one can have about Christianity, while the subjective issue concerns the individual's faith. Climacus clearly takes Hegel's philosophy to belong to the objective side, which is evidenced by the fact that it is the second main standpoint treated in the Part One of the book, which is dedicated to exploring the different forms of the objective approach to Christianity. In that short section, "The Speculative Point of View," he begins his polemic against those who confuse the objective and the subjective approach, and he makes his initial attempt to demonstrate that the objective approach has nothing to do with Christian faith. However, his polemic is by no means limited to this section. In fact, it appears repeatedly in the second part of the book, dedicated to "the subjective issue," as he attempts to develop his view of the subjective approach to Christianity. This view is worked out and defined in explicit contrast to the objective view.

In the Introduction to the work Kierkegaard's pseudonym gives a useful preliminary sketch of the distinction that he will come to work out in the course of the next several hundred pages. He explains that "the issue is not about the truth of Christianity but about the individual's relation to Christianity, consequently not about the indifferent individual's systematic eagerness to arrange the truths of Christianity in paragraphs but rather about the concern of the infinitely interested individual with regard to his own relation to such a doctrine."<sup>43</sup> He then goes on to explain what the subjective approach means to him, specifically as an individual: "I, Johannes Climacus, born and bred in this city and now thirty years old, an ordinary human being like most folk, assume that a highest good, called an eternal happiness, awaits me just as it awaits a housemaid and a professor. I have heard that Christianity is one's prerequisite for this good. I now ask how I may enter into relation to this doctrine."<sup>44</sup> By "eternal happiness" here Climacus clearly makes reference to the doctrine of immortality or the resurrection of souls in Christianity. This is the guiding motivation for Climacus and, he argues, for everyone else since every individual has an infinite personal interest in his or her own eternal happiness or salvation. (Given the centrality of this claim, it is odd that the Christian doctrine of immortality fills so little space in Kierkegaard's authorship as a whole.<sup>45</sup>)

In any case, this is a key point of difference between the subjective and the objective approach. It is connected to the epistemological question of the degree of certainty that can be achieved by the objective approach. According to Climacus, even the best, most rigorous scholarly approaches to Christianity, whether historical, philological or philosophical, will always fall short of certainty. There will always be something in them that can be called into doubt. For the objective approach this does not matter too much, since it lies in the nature of science to continually approach the truth as it gains new data and refines its own methods. This approach is always a kind of "approximation" of the truth that never reaches absolute certainty.<sup>46</sup> However, for the subjective approach this is a decisive shortcoming. Since what is at stake is one's eternal happiness, nothing less than absolute certainty will do. Thus, even the very best results of the scientific, objective approach will fall far short of what is required for one to risk one's eternal happiness.

Based on this point of departure, Climacus gives us several defining characteristics of the subjective approach. Among these one finds the following: passion, freedom and decision, becoming and striving, subjectivity, inwardness, absurdity and paradox, and indirect communication. Since these concepts are familiar to most Kierkegaard readers, I will touch on them only briefly.

(A) Passion. True Christian faith involves passion due to the fact that what is at issue is one's own eternal happiness. By contrast, the historian or the philologist who approaches Christianity in an objective manner may well have a certain limited passion that derives from an intellectual curiosity about the material, but this can in no way be compared to the infinite passion of Christian faith.

(B) Freedom and Decision. Unlike science, according to Climacus, Christian faith requires a free decision on the part of the believer. By contrast, the goal in science is to construct discursive theories and proofs such that there are no gaps and every conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. The objective approach thus works with necessity and requires no decision as such; one merely needs to follow each step in the argument in order to reach the conclusion. By contrast, there is no such discursive way to Christian faith. The believer must simply make a conscious and free decision to believe. Necessity plays no role in faith.

(C) Becoming and Striving. While the objective thinker reaches a definitive result, the subjective thinker is always in the process of becoming and thus never comes to a final solution. Faith is not a resting place but a fluid movement.<sup>47</sup> The subjective thinker is always striving, without reaching a goal.<sup>48</sup>

(D) Subjectivity and Inwardness. While the objective thinker is oriented outwards towards his or her subject matter, the subjective thinker is oriented inwards towards his own subjective relation to the divine: "Whereas objective thinking is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective thinker as existing is essentially interested in his own thinking, is existing in it."<sup>49</sup> This then leads to the concept of inwardness. "Therefore,



his thinking has another kind of reflection, specifically, that of inwardness, of possession, whereby it belongs to the subject and no one else.”<sup>50</sup>

(E) Absurdity and Paradox. Kierkegaard’s pseudonym invokes Tertullian’s famous claim “*credo, quia absurdum est*.”<sup>51</sup> He argues that only objective thinking can build on reasons, evidence and plausible arguments. By contrast, Christian faith requires one to believe in the absurd, specifically, what Kierkegaard sketches as the contradiction of the Incarnation, namely, that God, the eternal, became temporal. This is a contradiction that no amount of argument or reasoning can get around. This is “the ultimate paradox of thought,” which “thought itself cannot think.”<sup>52</sup>

(F) Indirect Communication. While objective thinking can use direct communication, subjective thinking can only be communicated indirectly.<sup>53</sup> Since the content of faith is paradoxical and absurd, it cannot be communicated in a straightforward manner. Any attempt to do so will only result in distortions. The best one can do is attempt a form of indirect communication which enjoins one’s interlocutors to look into themselves and examine their own faith.

### III. Critical Evaluation

How might Hegel respond to the criticism of the union of faith and knowledge and the model of faith that Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author presents? Perhaps the most obvious objection is the charge of formalism: four of the five sets of characteristics of Kierkegaardian faith outlined in the previous section—passion, freedom and decision, becoming and striving, inwardness—fail to determine any specific content.

There are a number of passages in Kierkegaard’s *corpus* where he, or one of his pseudonyms, seems to confirm that he is guilty of this charge of formalism. For example, Climacus’ criticism of the historical point of view in the *Postscript* seems to point in this direction. Climacus invites his reader to assume first that “with regard to the Bible there has been a successful demonstration of whatever any theological scholar in his happiest moment could ever have wished to demonstrate.”<sup>54</sup> Even if one imagines that this was the best possible demonstration, Climacus insists that this is wholly irrelevant for the faith of the individual. Such an iron-clad demonstration can in no way help the believer to faith. By contrast, he continues,

I assume the opposite, that the enemies [sc. of Christianity] have succeeded in demonstrating what they desire regarding the Scriptures, with a certainty surpassing the most vehement desire of the most spiteful enemy—what then? Has the enemy thereby abolished Christianity? Not at all. Has he harmed the believer? No at all, not in the least.... That is, because these books are not by these authors, are not authentic, are not *integri* [complete], are not inspired (this cannot be disproved, since it is an object of faith), it does not follow that these authors have not existed and, above all, that Christ has not existed. To that extent, the believer is still equally free to accept it.<sup>55</sup>



One can raise doubts and even definitively refute key points about Christianity, but as long as the existence of Christ is not disproved, there is no danger to faith. The point is clear: no truths that can be established by scholarship can ever have any relevance for Christian faith. The problem here is that this seems to deprive Christianity of almost all of its doctrinal content since (with the exception of the idea of the Incarnation) no such content is needed for genuine faith.

The relative emptiness of Christian faith is shown even more clearly in the *Philosophical Fragments*, where Climacus states quite straightforwardly that all that is needed for Christian faith is to know that Christ is God incarnate or, indeed, that some people believed he was:

Even if the contemporary generation had not left anything behind except these words: We have believed that in such and such a year the god appeared in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, and then died—this is more than enough. The contemporary generation would have done what is needful, for this little announcement, this world-historical *nota bene*, is enough to become an occasion for someone who comes later, and the most prolix report can never in all eternity become more for the person who comes later.<sup>56</sup>

If only this minimal information is required, then it is clear that there is little of what we usually understand by way of Christian doctrine and dogma. If this statement is all that is needed for faith, then most all of the key questions of dogmatics remain open.

Another good example of this is Johannes Climacus' famous distinction between "what is said," which characterizes the objective approach, and "how it is said" which characterizes the subjective approach.<sup>57</sup> Climacus clearly places the focus on the "how" of faith. This would seem to imply that the key to faith is not its object or its content but rather the way in which one believes.

This seems to be confirmed in the striking passage that compares the purported Christian believer with the worshiper of idols:

If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of the true idea of God, the house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but prays in untruth, and if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the passion of infinity, although his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol—where, then, is there more truth? The one prays in truth to God although he is worshipping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in truth worshipping an idol.<sup>58</sup>

This seems to imply that one can nonetheless be a Christian, although one worships an idol, provided that one does so correctly. For Hegel, this would of course involve a complete distortion and indeed destruction of Christianity, which has a necessary content, which it cannot do without.

Finally, in a draft of a response to what Kierkegaard regarded as the misappropriation of his works by his one-time friend and associate, the

philosopher Rasmus Nielsen (1809-84), he gives the following retrospective consideration of his intentions with his works: "In the pseudonymous writings the content of Christianity has been compressed to its least possible minimum simply in order to give all the more powerful momentum toward becoming a Christian and to keep the nervous energy all the more intensively concentrated so as to be able to master the confusion and prevent the intrusion of 'the parenthetical.'"<sup>59</sup> Here he states explicitly that it was the conscious goal, at least in the pseudonymous writings, to avoid entering into detailed points of dogmatics (as Nielsen had done). Kierkegaard seems to think that such discussions lead away from the true goal, which is to become a Christian. The idea is that such considerations, so to speak, introduce a parenthesis in the deeply personal process that is involved in the individual's consideration of his or her relation to Christianity. This seems again to be a clear indication that Kierkegaard intentionally avoids discussions about the concrete content of Christianity in favor of a focus on the form of belief.

One might argue on Kierkegaard's behalf that he does claim that the infinite passion of faith can have only one correct object, i.e., God or the Incarnation. One cannot have infinite passion for finite things. But this response would not be enough to satisfy Hegel since the doctrine of the Incarnation *alone* is not enough to qualify faith as *fully* Christian and so to distinguish it properly from the faith of other religions. While Kierkegaard likes to return to the absolute demand that Christianity places upon each individual believer by enjoining them to make a decision and believe, he seems to neglect the fact that other religions make a similar demand on their believers. How then is one properly to distinguish correct belief from incorrect belief if there is no fully articulated difference in content?

One might also argue that while Kierkegaard might appear to be a victim of formalism from Hegel's point of view, by the same token Hegel fails to do justice to Kierkegaard's unwavering demand for the recognition of the subjective dimension of faith. This question opens up the larger issue of whether or not Hegel and Kierkegaard are ultimately compatible in their general approaches. Since Kierkegaard's goal is the inward religious reform of the individual believer, he is not interested in understanding or knowing as such. Instead, his focus is on the irreducibly private and individual nature of faith. Given this goal, it is hardly surprising that he would find this aspect lacking in Hegel's account. By contrast, Hegel's goal is not individual religious reform but rather a philosophical, i.e., speculative, conceptual, understanding of religion. From this perspective the personal faith of the individual is not a relevant issue. The goal of speculative philosophy is to grasp the Concept in the different spheres of human thought and activity. But in these spheres there are also an infinite number of particular empirical entities that have nothing to do with the Concept. This is what Hegel refers to as the bad infinity of particularity. The irreducible, personal particular of the faith of the individual is not the object of philosophical inquiry for Hegel. Kierkegaard would be in perfect agreement with him on this point. Kierkegaard's objection would be that while Hegel rejects this sphere of private faith as irrelevant (from a philosophical perspective), it is, however, what is the most important thing from the truly religious perspective.

Here one can easily see that the two thinkers are simply at cross purposes. Although they can be brought into a dialogue, as I have attempted to do here, their goals are so completely different that this largely undermines a fair comparison since most of the criticisms on the one side or the other end up begging the question.

A couple of somewhat surprising or counterintuitive conclusions seem to follow from these considerations: (1) There is some irony here in Kierkegaard's repeated criticism of the abstraction of Hegel's philosophical system. Through his pseudonyms, he repeatedly charges Hegel with losing himself in vapid abstractions that have no connection to actuality and existence. Hegel is purportedly not interested in the burning truth for the individual. But here it is clear that the situation is just the reverse. It is Kierkegaard's view of faith that is overly abstract and lacking in real content, whereas Hegel has a clear view of what the content of Christianity is and should be in distinction from other religions. It is Kierkegaard who escapes to abstractions in his attempt to define Christian faith.

(2) A second counterintuitive point can be seen in the following observation. At least one branch of Kierkegaard studies sees the Danish thinker as a great Christian apologist, defending the faith against its detractors. He represents a great spokesman for the Christian religion in today's otherwise secular world. This same branch invariably sees him as the grand critic of Hegel's thought, which is regarded precisely as the epitome of modern secular reason in opposition to Christianity. However, when one looks at the matter more closely, one sees that Kierkegaard's statements about Christianity can hardly be taken as a defense or recommendation of the faith to non-Christians. Indeed, what he says about the impossibly high demands of Christianity almost seems designed to scare away potential new believers and alienate those who consider themselves old ones. Ironically, Hegel seems much better to fit the description of Christian apologist. He explicitly defends Christianity as the one true religion and indeed at times does so in a way that can be interpreted as offensive to modern sensibilities about ecumenism and religious tolerance.

<sup>36</sup> SKS 4, 207 / FT, 120: "But there was no one who could understand Abraham." See also SKS 25, 248f., NB28:41 / JP 2, 2223.

<sup>37</sup> SKS 12, 97 / PC, 89.

<sup>38</sup> SKS 25, 348, NB29:90 / JP 2, 2224.

<sup>39</sup> SKS 18, 77, FF:14 / KJN 2, 71. The parody that Judaism has become is in its distortion of true religiosity.

<sup>40</sup> SKS 7, 39 / CUP1, 33.

<sup>41</sup> SKS 7, 195 / CUP1, 213.

## CHAPTER NINE

### JON STEWART: KIERKEGAARD AND HEGEL ON FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

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<sup>1</sup> Hegel, *EL*, § 1; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 41. (*EL* = *The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, H.S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett 1991. *Jub.* = *Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe*, vols. 1-20, ed. by Hermann Glockner, Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1928-41.) *PhS*, p. 479; *Jub.*, vol. 2, p. 602: "Spirit itself as a whole, and the self-differentiated moments within it, fall within the sphere of picture-thinking and in the form of objectivity. The content of this picture-thinking is Absolute Spirit." (*PhS* = *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1977.) *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. by H.B. Nisbet, ed. by Allen Wood, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1991, § 270; *Jub.*, vol. 7, p. 349: "The content of religion is absolute truth, and it is associated with a disposition of the most exalted kind." *EL*, § 45, Addition; *Jub.*, vol. 8, pp. 135-136: "absolute idealism can hardly be regarded as the private property of philosophy in actual fact, because, on the contrary, it forms the basis of all religious consciousness. This is because religion, too regards the sum total of everything that is there in short, the world before us, as created and governed by God." See *PhS*, p. 488; *Jub.*, vol. 2, p. 614: "The content of religion proclaims earlier in time than does Science, what *Spirit* is, but only Science is its true knowledge of itself."

<sup>2</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Religion*, vol. 1, p. 20; *Jub.*, vol. 15, p. 37. (*Phil. of Religion* I-III = *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vols. 1-3, translated by E.B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: The Humanities Press 1962.) See also *Phil. of Mind*, § 573; *Jub.*, vol. 10, pp. 458-474. (*Phil. of Mind* = *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. by William Wallace and A.V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1971.)

<sup>3</sup> SKS 17, 30, AA:13 / KJN 1, 25. See also SKS 17, 34, AA:17 / KJN 1, 29. SKS 17, 34-36, AA:18 / KJN 1, 29-31. See Hermann Deuser, " 'Philosophie und Christentum lassen sich doch niemals vereinen'—Kierkegaards theologische Ambivalenzen im *Journal AA/BB* (1835-37)," *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook*, 2003, pp. 1-19. Andreas Krichbaum, *Kierkegaard und Schleiermacher. Eine historisch-systematische Studie zum Religionsbegriff*, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter 2008, pp. 46-52.

<sup>4</sup> *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. by Herman Nohl, Tübingen 1907. (In English as *Early Theological Writings*, trans. by T.M. Knox, Fragments trans. by Richard Kroner, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1975.)

<sup>5</sup> "Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität, in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie,"

*Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1802, pp. 1-188. (Reprinted in *Vermischte Schriften*, vols. 1-2, ed. by Friedrich Förster and Ludwig Boumann, vols. 16-17 (1834-35) in *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe*, vols. 1-18, ed. by Ludwig Boumann, Friedrich Förster, Eduard Gans, Karl Hegel, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Philipp Marheineke, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Karl Rosenkranz, Johannes Schulze, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1832-45, vol. 16, pp. 3-157. (In *Jub.*, vol. 1, pp. 277-433.)

<sup>6</sup> Hegel, *System der Wissenschaft. Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Bamberg und Würzburg, bey Joseph Anton Goebhardt 1807.

<sup>7</sup> Hegel, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and Critical Writings*, ed. by Ernst Behler, New York: Continuum 1990, §§ 465-471; *Jub.*, vol. 6, pp. 305-307. Hegel, *EL*, §§ 564-571; *Jub.*, vol. 10, pp. 453-458.

<sup>8</sup> Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs, *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft*, Heidelberg: Neue akademische Buchhandlung von Karl Groos 1822. Hegel's foreword appears on pp. i-xxviii of Hinrichs' text.

<sup>9</sup> Hegel, "Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntniß.—Ein Beitrag zum Verständnisse der Philosophie unserer Zeit. Von Carl Friederich G.....I.—Berlin, bei E. Franklin. 1829," *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, 1829, vol. I, (May-June) nos. 99-102, pp. 789-816; (June) nos. 105-106, pp. 833-835.

<sup>10</sup> *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, I-II, ed. by Philipp Marheineke, vols. 11-12 [1832], in *Hegel's Werke*.

<sup>11</sup> Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch 1781, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1787, B xxix and f. *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998, pp. 116f.

<sup>12</sup> Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B xxx. *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 117.

<sup>13</sup> Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch 1788, pp. 219ff. *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1956, pp. 126ff.

<sup>14</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Religion* I, pp. 1f.; *Jub.*, vol. 15, p. 19.

<sup>15</sup> Hegel, *EL*, § 2; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 42.

<sup>16</sup> Hegel, *EL*, § 2; *Jub.*, vol. 8, pp. 42f.

<sup>17</sup> Hegel, *Miscellaneous Writings of G.W.F. Hegel*, ed. by Jon Stewart, Evanston: Northwestern University Press 2002, pp. 347f.; *Jub.*, vol. 20, p. 19.

<sup>18</sup> Hegel, *EL*, § 63; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 168.

<sup>19</sup> Hegel, *EL*, § 63; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 167.

<sup>20</sup> Hegel, *EL*, § 67; *Jub.*, vol. 8, p. 173.

<sup>21</sup> Hegel, *EL*, § 163; *Jub.*, vol. 8, pp. 358-361.

<sup>22</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Mind*, § 566; *Jub.*, vol. 10, p. 455.

<sup>23</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Religion* III, pp. 7-33; *Jub.*, vol. 16, pp. 223-247. *PhS*, pp. 466-469; *Jub.*, vol. 2, pp. 586-590.

<sup>24</sup> Hegel, *PhS*, p. 467; *Jub.*, vol. 2, p. 587.

<sup>25</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Religion* III, p. 10; *Jub.*, vol. 16, p. 226.

<sup>26</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Religion* III, p. 7; *Jub.*, vol. 16, p. 223.

<sup>27</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Mind*, § 567; *Jub.*, vol. 10, p. 455.

<sup>28</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Religion* III, p. 16; *Jub.*, vol. 16, pp. 231.

<sup>29</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Religion* III, pp. 33-100; *Jub.*, vol. 16, pp. 247-308. *PhS*, pp. 469-471; *Jub.*, vol. 2, pp. 590-592.

<sup>30</sup> Hegel, *PhS*, p. 465; *Jub.*, vol. 2, p. 584.

<sup>31</sup> Hegel, *PhS*, p. 467; *Jub.*, vol. 2, p. 587.

<sup>32</sup> Hegel, *PhS*, p. 457; *Jub.*, vol. 2, p. 575.

<sup>33</sup> Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. by T.M. Knox, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1975, p. 239;

*Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. by Herman Nohl, Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr 1907, p. 289.

<sup>34</sup> Hegel, *PhS*, p. 460; *Jub.*, vol. 2, p. 578.

<sup>35</sup> Hegel, *Phil. of Religion* III, pp. 100-151; *Jub.*, vol. 16, pp. 308-356. *PhS*, pp. 471-478; *Jub.*, vol. 2, pp. 592-601.

<sup>36</sup> Hegel, *PhS*, p. 473; *Jub.*, vol. 2, p. 594.

<sup>37</sup> Hegel, *PhS*, p. 473; *Jub.*, vol. 2, pp. 594f.

<sup>38</sup> See "The Position of the Philosophy of Religion Relatively to Philosophy and Religion," *Phil. of Religion* I, pp. 18-35; *Jub.*, vol. 15, pp. 36-52. See Quentin Lauer, "Hegel on the Identity of Content in Religion and Philosophy," in *Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. by Darrel E. Christensen, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1970, pp. 261-278.

<sup>39</sup> Hegel, *PhS*, p. 463; *Jub.*, vol. 2, pp. 581-582. Translation slightly modified. See also *PhS*, pp. 465-466; *Jub.*, vol. 2, pp. 585-586. *PhS*, pp. 477-478; *Jub.*, vol. 2, pp. 599-601.

<sup>40</sup> Hegel, *PhS*, p. 412; *Jub.*, vol. 2, p. 520: "So far as Spirit in religion *pictures* itself to itself, it is indeed consciousness, and the reality enclosed within religion is the shape and the guise of its picture-thinking. But, in this picture-thinking, reality does not receive its perfect due, viz. to be not merely a guise but an independent free existence; and conversely, because it lacks perfection within itself it is a *specific* shape which does not attain to what it ought to show forth, viz. Spirit that is conscious of itself."

<sup>41</sup> *SKS* 7, 26 / *CUP* 1, 17.

<sup>42</sup> *SKS* 7, 26 / *CUP* 1, 17.

<sup>43</sup> *SKS* 7, 24f. / *CUP* 1, 15.

<sup>44</sup> *SKS* 7, 25 / *CUP* 1, 15f.

<sup>45</sup> *SKS* 4, 439-443, 451-453 / *CA*, 139-141, 151-154. *SKS* 7, 153-173 / *CUP* 1, 165-188. *SKS* 10, 211-221 / *CD*, 202-213. See Gregor Malantschuk, "The Problems of the Self and Immortality," in his *Kierkegaard's Way to the Truth*, trans. by Mary Michelsen, Montreal: Inter Editions 1987, pp. 79-96.

<sup>46</sup> *SKS* 7, 36 / *CUP* 1, 30.

<sup>47</sup> *SKS* 7, 73 / *CUP* 1, 73.

<sup>48</sup> *SKS* 7, 90 / *CUP* 1, 91.

<sup>49</sup> *SKS* 7, 73 / *CUP* 1, 72f.

<sup>50</sup> *SKS* 7, 73 / *CUP* 1, 73.

<sup>51</sup> See Pierre Buchler, "Tertullian: The Teacher of the *credo quia absurdum*," in *Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions*, ed. by Jon Stewart, Aldershot: Ashgate 2008 (*Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources*, vol. 4), pp. 131-142.

<sup>52</sup> *SKS* 4, 243 / *PF*, 37.

<sup>53</sup> *SKS* 7, 74ff. / *CUP* 1, 74ff.

<sup>54</sup> *SKS* 7, 35 / *CUP* 1, 28.

<sup>55</sup> *SKS* 7, 36f. / *CUP* 1, 30.

<sup>56</sup> *SKS* 4, 300 / *PF*, 104.

<sup>57</sup> *SKS* 7, 185 / *CUP* 1, 202.

<sup>58</sup> *SKS* 7, 184 / *CUP* 1, 201.

<sup>59</sup> *Pap.* X-6 B 121 / *JP* 6, 6574.