

Hegel and Adler in the Introduction to *The Concept of Anxiety*

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Abstract

This article argues that much of the polemic in the Introduction to *The Concept of Anxiety* is directed not, as is usually thought, at Hegel but at the Danish Hegelian, Adolph Peter Adler (1812-69). A common theme of Vigilius Haufniensis' criticism is that there has been a confusion between the abstract sphere of logic and the sphere of existence, which is concerned with religion. The paper tries to demonstrate that Kierkegaard believes Adler to be guilty of this in the latter's *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic* (1842).

Most Kierkegaard scholars are familiar with the colorful Danish priest, Adolph Peter Adler (1812-69),¹ through Kierkegaard's posthumously published work, *The Book on Adler*. Adler is generally known as an eccentric Hegelian priest, who, for Kierkegaard, embodied many of the religious confusions of the day. After his appointment as priest, Adler claimed to have experienced a revelation, and this event marked his turn away from Hegelianism. He purported to have been visited by Christ personally in December of 1842. According to the account that Adler gives in the Preface to his collection, *Some Sermons*,² Christ came to him one evening and dictated sacred verses to him. Moreover, he was commanded by Christ to destroy his writings on Hegel's philosophy. While Adler's purported revelation is

¹ For Kierkegaard's relation to Adler see: Carl Henrik Koch *En Flue på Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham*, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag 1990. Leif Bork Hansen *Søren Kierkegaards Hemmelighed og Eksistensdialektik*, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag 1994.

² Adolph Peter Adler *Nogle Prædikener*, Copenhagen 1843, pp. 3-4. Ktl. U 9. See KW XXIV, Supplement, pp. 339-340.

the central theme of *The Book on Adler*, few realize that Kierkegaard was in fact already exercised by other aspects of Adler's writings before beginning work on this manuscript in 1846.

One text in which Adler plays a central but unacknowledged role is *The Concept of Anxiety*. Adler's importance for this book has been overlooked since most scholars, unfamiliar with his works, have seen the criticisms offered there as being directed at Hegel. Thulstrup characterizes this as "the book's whole anti-Hegelian perspective."³ I want in this essay to try to re-evaluate the view that Kierkegaard was engaged in a polemic with Hegel in *The Concept of Anxiety*. Specifically, I want to argue that although at first glance Hegel seems to be the main target of criticism in this work, on closer examination in fact very little of Hegel's thought is actually present.

I will argue that the real target of Vigilius Haufniensis' purported criticism of Hegel is Adler and in particular Adler's *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*.⁴ Virtually all of the main points concerning Hegel's philosophy that Vigilius Haufniensis touches on can be found in the Introduction to this work. Moreover, Vigilius Haufniensis refers to what he calls "the slogan 'method and manifestation,'" which "Hegel and his school"⁵ have made use of. This expression or "slogan" appears as follows in Adler's Introduction: "In this the movement is already given, and since it thus does not come from without but from a difference existing in the identity, it is also self-movement, that is, it is at once matter's and thought's self-movement and objective reflection, at once manifestation and method."⁶ Moreover, in a draft of *The Concept of Anxiety*, Kierkegaard refers to the aforementioned work directly.⁷ Even though Adler's text is cited here in the draft and in the Introduction to the printed text, most commentators have generally failed to see the importance of Adler for *The Concept of Anxiety*.⁸ Kierkegaard has Vigilius Haufniensis criticize Adler under the name of Hegel and Hegelianism. Thus, the

³ Niels Thulstrup *Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel*, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980, p. 351.

⁴ Adolph Peter Adler *Populære Foredrag over Hegels objektive Logik*, Copenhagen 1842. Ktl. 383.

⁵ CA, p. 11 / SKS 4, 319.

⁶ Adolph Peter Adler *Populære Foredrag*, p. 14. See SKS K4, 355-356.

⁷ CA Supplement, p. 181 / Pap. V B 49.5.

⁸ The sole exception is Carl Henrik Koch *En Flue på Hegels udødelige næse*, pp. 189-197.

points he picks out for criticism for the most part belong to Adler and his presentation and not to Hegel himself.

In this paper I will focus on two different parts of the text. The most extended discussion of Hegel comes in the Introduction, and thus I will first discuss individually several different aspects of Hegel's philosophy which are touched upon in the opening pages. This will constitute the subject-matter for Sections I-IV. Vigilius Haufniensis gives several examples in his Introduction which illustrate his main point that the Hegelians have confused two different spheres – that of abstract thought and that of existence. In my first section the issue concerns the category of actuality which has been placed in an abstract system of pure logic. Haufniensis claims that this category has been misunderstood by the Hegelians since it cannot be adequately grasped as an abstract concept. I will examine in Section II his criticism of the claim that faith, like the first category in logic, is something immediate which must be *aufgehoben*. In Section III, the issue of mediation and reconciliation is discussed. Here Vigilius Haufniensis again accuses the Hegelians of confusing the abstract realm of thought, to which dogmatics belongs, with the concrete realm of ethics. In Section IV, I will take up the criticism of movement in logic. Section V examines a passage from Vigilius Haufniensis' third chapter in which he explores the issue of movement in logic once again. In each of these analyses I will try to demonstrate that there are clear indications that the discussion in question can be traced back to Adler's *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*.

I. Actuality and the Spheres of Logic and Existence

Vigilius Haufniensis' discussion at the beginning of the Introduction seems to focus primarily on aspects of Hegel's conception of logic. In a draft Hegel and the Hegelians are mentioned directly.⁹ The first issue to be taken up is the role of the category of actuality [*Virkelighed*] in logic. The main objection is to the use of this existential category in an abstract system of logic. In this section I will try to show that Vigilius Haufniensis' arguments are aimed more at Adler

⁹ JP 3, 3653 / Pap. V B 49.1: "Thus when an author entitles the last section of the *Logic* 'actuality' which Hegel has done and the Hegelian school did again and again the advantage is gained that it seems as if through logic the highest were already reached, or, if one prefers, the lowest."

than at Hegel himself. Moreover, while, to be sure, Kierkegaard and Hegel differ in their understanding of the concept of actuality, Kierkegaard seems to overlook the fact that Hegel's understanding accords with the standard conceptions of this notion in the German idealist tradition where it is treated precisely as an abstract category.

The category of actuality interested Kierkegaard since his dissertation and since his first stay in Berlin. One reason for his well-known disappointment with Schelling's lectures was that the German philosopher was operating with an abstract conception of the term. At first Kierkegaard was excited by Schelling's use of the category, "actuality," which he thought was meant in the existential sense. He writes from Berlin,

I am so happy to have heard Schelling's second lecture – indescribably. I have been pining and thinking mournful thoughts long enough. The embryonic child of thought leapt within me...when he mentioned the word "actuality" in connection with the relation of philosophy to actuality. I remember almost every word he said after that. Here, perhaps, clarity can be achieved. This one word recalled all my philosophical pains and sufferings.¹⁰

He later found Schelling's lectures tedious since actuality was treated merely as an abstract, logical category. Kierkegaard's disappointment is reflected in the following aphorism in *Either/Or* which was written during the time he was in Berlin attending Schelling's lectures: "What philosophers say about actuality [*Virkelighed*] is often just as disappointing as it is when one reads on a sign in a secondhand shop: Pressing Done Here. If a person were to bring his clothes to be pressed, he would be duped, for the sign is merely for sale."¹¹ In a similar fashion, Kierkegaard, who conceived of "actuality" as an existential category and not a purely logical one, felt himself duped by Schelling's use of the word.

In *The Concept of Anxiety* Kierkegaard has Vigilius Haufniensis take up an issue which had thus exercised him for a long time. His contention, as in earlier works, is that actuality is not an abstract concept that belongs in a system of logic but rather something concrete which belongs to what is conceived as the realm of ethics. Kierkegaard has Vigilius Haufniensis write:

Thus when an author entitles the last section of the *Logic* "Actuality," he thereby gains the advantage of making it appear that in logic the highest has already been achieved, or if one prefers, the lowest. In the meantime, the loss is obvious, for neither

¹⁰ JP 5, 5535 / Pap. III A 179.

¹¹ EOI, p. 32 / SKS 2, 41.

logic nor actuality is served by placing actuality in the *Logic*. Actuality is not served thereby, for contingency, which is an essential part of the actual, cannot be admitted within the realm of logic. Logic is not served thereby, for if logic has thought actuality, it has included something that it cannot assimilate, it has appropriated at the beginning what it should only *praedisponere*. The penalty is obvious. Every deliberation about the nature of actuality is rendered difficult, and for a long time perhaps made impossible, since the word "actuality" must first have time to collect itself, time to forget the mistake.¹²

The argument, which also appears in the *Postscript*,¹³ is that actuality is misunderstood when it is conceived as an abstract category of logic. Actuality involves contingency, whereas in logic everything follows of necessity. Therefore, the contingent aspect of actuality is lost when it becomes a part of the necessary system of logic. Thus, justice is not done to the notion of actuality. Likewise, justice is not done to the system of logic which cannot appropriate actuality into its system. If it attempts to do so, the result is merely a distortion and misapplication of the term "actuality."

When Hegel uses this term, he is of course working within the same tradition as Kant and Schelling who understand "actuality" as one of the categories of logic or what is today understood as metaphysics. For Hegel, actuality does not refer to everything that exists but rather to the rational aspects of the world of spirit and nature which are the objects of scientific investigation. There is an infinity of particulars that to be sure exist but which display no rational development and for this reason defy scientific analysis. According to Hegel's terminology, while these particulars exist, they do not belong to actuality. Thus, when Hegel says "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational,"¹⁴ it is in a sense a tautology. It is not a jus-

¹² CA, p. 9-10 / SKS 4, 317-318. See CA, 16fn. / SKS 4, 324fn.: "If this is considered more carefully, there will be occasions enough to notice the brilliance of heading the last section of the *Logic* 'Actuality,' inasmuch as ethics never reaches it. The actuality with which logic ends means, therefore, no more in regard to actuality than the 'being' with which it begins."

¹³ CUP1, pp. 122-123 / SVI VII, 101.

¹⁴ Hegel PR Preface, p. 20 / RP, p. 33. See also EL, § 6 / Enz. I, p. 48. (PR = *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, tr. by H. B. Nisbet, ed. by Allen Wood, Cambridge University Press 1991. RP = *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, Jub. vol. 7. Jub. = *Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe* in 20 Bänden, ed. by Hermann Glockner, Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1927-40. EL = *The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, tr. by T. F. Gerats, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett 1991. Enz. I-III = *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, Jub. vols. 8-10.)

tification of oppressive institutions or states simply by virtue of the fact that they exist.¹⁵ Hegel's logic thus treats the category of actuality, but it is not, as Vigilius Haufniensis asserts, the last category or of any special significance.

The real target of this criticism is not so much Hegel as Adler. Of particular importance for *The Concept of Anxiety* is Adler's aforementioned *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*. Kierkegaard gives his reader a hint that Adler is the true target when in the passage quoted above he has Vigilius Haufniensis allude to an author who "entitles the last section of the *Logic* 'Actuality.'" This is the main point upon which the entire passage turns since by making "actuality" the last section, the unnamed author bestows upon it a special importance. The usual response in the secondary literature is to take this as an allusion to Hegel. In both the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, Hegel treats the concept of actuality as a category in "The Doctrine of Essence," the second of the three main divisions of both works. But in neither case is it the final category or paragraph even of "The Doctrine of Essence," let alone of the work as a whole. Thus, the author referred to by Vigilius Haufniensis cannot be Hegel. By contrast, Adler's work on logic covers material that corresponds to only the first two parts of Hegel's system of logic, i.e. "The Doctrine of Being" and "The Doctrine of Essence." The titles of the last three paragraphs of Adler's work are as follows: "§ 28 The Whole and the Parts – Force and Expression – Actuality," "§ 29 Formal Actuality – Possibility – Accident," and "§ 30 Real Actuality – Real Possibility – Absolute Necessity." Thus, it is Adler who treats the concept of actuality in the last paragraphs of his logic. Although Adler roughly follows Hegel's organization, he differs from Hegel's presentation in many details. The most obvious difference is that Adler's account lacks the final division or "The Doctrine of the Concept." The result is that the category of actuality accidentally takes on a more important role in Adler's account than in Hegel's since it forms the final culminating category in Adler, whereas it occupies an undistinguished position some two-thirds of the

¹⁵ Rudolf Haym *Hegel und seine Zeit. Vorlesungen über Entstehung und Entwicklung, Wesen und Werth der hegel'schen Philosophie*, Berlin 1857, (Hildesheim: Olms 1962), pp. 357ff. See also Karl R. Popper "What is Dialectic?" *Mind*, 49, 1940, pp. 413ff. Bertrand Russell *History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1961, p. 702: "Nevertheless, the identification of the real and the rational leads unavoidably to some of the complacency inseparable from the belief that 'whatever is, is right.'"

way through Hegel's *Logic*. Thus, if one is to take Vigilius Haufniensis' comments about "actuality" here as a criticism, then they can only refer to Adler and not to Hegel.

Though Kierkegaard does not have Vigilius Haufniensis criticize Hegel directly on the issue of the concept of actuality, this is not to say that the two are ultimately in agreement. They clearly have very different conceptions of the category. Hegel understands actuality as one of the abstract categories of modality in line with the German philosophical tradition. By contrast, Kierkegaard interprets it as part of the immediately experienced existential sphere. Hegel and Kierkegaard are at cross purposes since they do not share the same understanding of this important term. This is clear from the fact that in Kierkegaard's attempts to justify his interpretation of actuality he does not acknowledge the use of the modal categories in the philosophical tradition within which Hegel is working. In any case, this analysis provides an illustrative example of how commentators have failed to see that although Kierkegaard's view is by no means consistent with Hegel's, this does not necessarily mean that his criticism of the opposite view is in fact a criticism of Hegel.

II. Immediacy and Faith

The next issue that Vigilius Haufniensis takes up in his Introduction is that of immediacy, and again there is, he claims, a confusion between the sphere of logic and that of existence. Specifically, the claim is that the notion of immediacy is appropriate in the sphere of logic, whereas it leads to misunderstandings when it is applied to faith. In this section I wish to show that the criticism is directed at Adler and is only indirectly relevant for Hegel. Vigilius Haufniensis responds specifically to claims made by Adler in the Introduction to his *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*, where the issue of immediacy in Christian faith is discussed at length.

Vigilius Haufniensis' argument is aimed against the understanding of faith as something immediate in the field of dogmatics. This conception of faith involves an unreflective understanding of the scriptures or of the person of Christ as divine without any further interpretation or analysis. The opposite conception would be of faith as the result of, for example, a philosophical or theological analysis either of the historical events themselves or of the scriptures. For Vigilius Haufniensis, when faith is regarded as immediate, what is im-

plied thereby is that this immediacy should be overcome: "Thus when in dogmatics *faith* is called the *immediate* without any further qualification, there is gained the advantage of the necessity of not stopping with faith."¹⁶ Immediacy is always conceived to be a lower form of knowing which must give way to reflection and conceptual thought. Thus, if faith is conceived as immediacy, then it is relegated to being something finite and imperfect which must ultimately be abandoned for a more satisfactory understanding.

Vigilius Haufniensis does not want to insist on immediacy as such against conceptual knowing and thus adds the caveat "without any further qualification." His own view seems to be that faith is a return to immediacy after a conceptual understanding. This is what is called in other works "the new immediacy."¹⁷ Along these same lines, in *Fear and Trembling*, Johannes de silentio writes, "faith is not the first immediacy but a later immediacy."¹⁸ Similarly, in the *Papirer*, Kierkegaard explains that some people believe on the basis of immediacy and others on the basis of reflection, but true faith comes after both of these stages:

most men never reach faith at all. They live a long time in immediacy or spontaneity. Finally they advance to some reflection, and then they die. The exceptions begin the other way around; dialectical from childhood, that is, without immediacy, they begin with the dialectical, with reflection, and they go on living this way year after year....and then, at a more mature age, faith's possibility presents itself to them. For faith is immediacy or spontaneity after reflection.¹⁹

The conception of the stages of faith sketched there – first as immediacy, then as reflection and then finally as a new immediacy – is profoundly Hegelian in character. Hegel's dialectic runs through the movement of what he calls immediacy, mediation and then mediated immediacy, which is a return to immediacy at a higher level. Thus, Kierkegaard's conception of faith on this point in fact follows a Hegelian scheme and could very well be derived from it.

In the passage in question from *The Concept of Anxiety*, Vigilius Haufniensis' argument is purely negative. His claim is that conceiving faith as something to be superseded does justice neither to faith nor to dogmatics. His first argument is as follows: "The loss is quite obvi-

¹⁶ CA, p. 10 / SKS 4, 318. See FT, p. 69 / SKS 4, 161.

¹⁷ See CUP1, p. 374fn. / SV1 VII, 301fn. SL, p. 162-163 / SKS 6, 151-152. SL, p. 483-484 / SKS 6, 444-445. JP 2, 1123 / Pap. VIII 1 A 469.

¹⁸ FT, p. 82 / SKS 4, 172.

¹⁹ JP 2, 1123 / Pap. VIII 1 A 649.

ous. Faith loses by being regarded as the immediate, since it has been deprived of what lawfully belongs to it, namely its historical presupposition. Dogmatics loses thereby, because it does not begin where it properly should begin, namely, within the scope of an earlier beginning.”²⁰ The historical basis for faith is the incarnation: the divine becoming finite or temporal at a specific historical point in time. This is not something that anyone can have an immediate relation to since no one was an immediate witness to it. But if faith is conceived as something immediate, then Haufniensis believes that this “historical presupposition” is neglected since the immediate relation must always be something else, e.g. feeling, direct revelation, etc., and not the all-decisive historical event.

The main point is that there is a conflation of dogmatics and logic in that, by conceiving of faith as something immediate and thus ignoring the historical background, dogmatics begins like logic with the immediate. The argument Vigilius Haufniensis gives is as follows:

Instead of presupposing an earlier beginning, it [dogmatics] ignores this and begins without ceremony, just as if it were logic. Logic does indeed begin with something produced by the subtlest abstraction, namely, what is most elusive: the immediate. What is quite proper in logic, namely, that immediacy is *eo ipso* cancelled, becomes in dogmatics idle talk. Could it ever occur to anyone to stop with the immediate (with no further qualification), since the immediate is annulled at the very moment it is mentioned, just as a somnambulist wakes up at the very moment his name is mentioned.²¹

Surprisingly, this is a positive assessment of the attempt to begin logic and thus philosophy with immediacy or pure being. Elsewhere Kierkegaard is critical of attempts of the Danish Hegelians to make a presuppositionless beginning in philosophy.²² Here, by contrast, logic is praised and distinguished from dogmatics and faith. In logic it makes sense to begin with the immediate or specifically with pure being as a point of departure which is then surpassed by ever more sophisticated categories. But it is a mistake to conceive of faith in this fashion since faith is something autonomous which is not continuous with knowing. To surpass it with conceptual knowing would amount to eliminating faith altogether. Thus, there is a disanalogy between logic and faith since the category of immediacy, i.e. being, in logic is continuous with the other categories, whereas faith is not continuous with forms of knowing.

²⁰ CA, p. 10 / SKS 4, 318.

²¹ CA, p. 10 / SKS 4, 318.

²² CUP1, p. 109 / SVI VII, 88. JC, 149 / Pap. IV B 1, p. 131.

While Hegel uses the term “immediacy” in his logic and epistemology, this is not his usual way of talking about faith. In fact, he criticizes the conception of faith as immediate in other authors.²³ In Hegel the distinction is rather between, on the one hand, picture thinking [*Vorstellung*], which characterizes religious knowing, and, on the other hand, conceptual thought, which is the mark of philosophical knowing. To be sure, Hegel talks about going beyond the conception of the divine, understood as “picture thinking,” but he does not equate this conception with faith. On the contrary, Hegel sees no incompatibility between, on the one hand, faith, properly understood, i.e. as “mediated immediacy,” and, on the other hand, philosophical knowing. The problem is when the immediacy of picture thinking is associated with faith since this leads to the conclusion that faith must be overcome in reflection and philosophical knowing. This is what Vigilius Haufniensis rejects. But Hegel does not claim that true faith is overcome by philosophical knowing but only the conception of immediacy in picture thinking. Vigilius Haufniensis seems to recognize this by pointing out that in epistemology and logic, it makes sense to talk of immediacy, as Hegel does, but this does not apply to faith. Therefore, it is not Hegel who is the target of this criticism but rather the theologians who apply the notion of immediacy from logic to an understanding of faith and religion. In the margin of a draft Kierkegaard adds, “and this happens every day before our eyes,”²⁴ which seems to imply that his focus is on his contemporaries and not on Hegel.

The criticism is specifically of the Introduction to *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic* where Adler blends together logic and religion (as he continues to do in the rest of the work). Adler protests against empty conceptions of Christianity and against abstract conceptions of the divine: “Being only becomes *result* when it is derived from thought's observations, that is, when, for example, I derive Christianity from observations about the necessity of having an ethical institution for the instruction and improvement of man.”²⁵ Adler rejects this view as follows:

Thus, the Christianity which is given to me as result of the aforementioned observation is only an abstract conception of Christianity, which does not contain more than reflection, that is only the abstract instruction and improvement. The specific, substantial essence is given to me only when Christianity is conceived not merely as the result

²³ E.g. Hegel *EL*, § 63 / *Enz.* I, pp. 166-169.

²⁴ *CA* Supplement, p. 180 / *Pap.* V B 49.2.

²⁵ Adolph Peter Adler *Populaire Foredrag*, pp. 7-8.

of a series of thoughts, but as the unity of thought itself and immediacy, as the Word in the flesh....We only receive the truth when it is conceived as thought in immediacy, the ethical spirit and will in reality and life.²⁶

Adler goes on to underscore the importance of immediacy. He interprets the significance of Christ as giving the possibility of an immediate relation to the believers. This is, he claims, the true meaning of the words, "the Word became flesh." Adler's position is that immediate faith requires conceptual knowing to be understood adequately, but the immediate element is essential on its own terms if faith is not to dissolve into abstract ideas. Thus, faith must ultimately be *aufgehoben* by knowing, yet immediacy is necessary. This seems to fit well with the position that Vigilius Haufniensis finds objectionable. It is thus no accident that Haufniensis makes the comparison of dogmatics with *logic* since he wants to criticize the way in which Adler incorporates key religious concepts and doctrines in his account of Hegel's logic.

In any case, the criticism here cannot rightly be conceived as a criticism either of Hegel's logic or of his conception of religion. Hegel is himself one of the most outspoken critics of the conception of faith as immediacy. That Hegel is not the intended target is evidenced by the fact that Vigilius Haufniensis goes out of his way to praise Hegel's use of immediacy in logic; the criticism is of those who wish to conceive of immediacy in faith and of those who confuse dogmatics and logic. Moreover, Kierkegaard's conception of faith as a second immediacy in fact has much in common with Hegel's concept of mediated immediacy. According to Kierkegaard's own account, faith is not supposed to stop at the first immediacy but is only the result of a movement through reflection and to something else. Thus, he too in a sense thinks that the first immediacy must be *aufgehoben* to the advantage of a later stage. Given these similarities to Hegel's own view of faith, it is not clear why Kierkegaard would have reason to want to have Vigilius Haufniensis criticize this view in the first place.

III. Reconciliation and Mediation

Next Vigilius Haufniensis discusses the related terms "reconciliation" and "mediation." These words are often used to describe different aspects of Hegel's thought, and indeed both were employed as techni-

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

cal terms by Hegel himself. However, the context of the discussion in the Introduction to *The Concept of Anxiety* once again points to Adler, for whom they are key concepts in the Introduction to *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*. Moreover, I wish to argue that the way in which Vigilius Haufniensis uses them indicates that his understanding of Hegel was largely derived from Adler and other secondary sources.

(1) The first key term that is taken up is "reconciliation" [*Forsoning*]. This is a concept which, for Hegel, constitutes a point of contact between philosophy and Christianity. In terms of religious thinking, Christianity offers a reconciliation of God and humanity and the possibility of redemption. For Hegel, philosophical knowing is the reconciliation of the manifold dualisms, such as subject-object, mind-body, etc. As spirit comes to know itself in the course of history and in the different conceptions of the divine, it overcomes its alienation from the world since it sees its own reflection in it. By grasping the Concept in the various spheres, the subject recognizes those spheres as its own thought. In this way a reconciliation is effected since the phenomena in the various spheres cease to be something alien and other and become instead an expression of the thought of the subject himself. When one regards something as ultimately transcendent or other, then, according to Hegel, one views the matter from an incomplete and partial perspective which should be transcended. In the *Philosophy of History* lectures, Hegel refers to his philosophy explicitly as a theodicy: "Our mode of treating the subject is, in this aspect, a theodicy – a justification of the ways of God...so that the ill that is found in the world may be comprehended, and the thinking spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil."²⁷ Spirit is thus reconciled with the external world in all of its manifold forms. The corollary to the doctrine in Hegel's account of Christianity or the revealed religion is that the individual believer sees himself in Christ and is reconciled with the divine.

Hegel's philosophy employs a Christian metaphor in speaking of the result of a speculative understanding of history as reconciliation.

²⁷ Hegel *Phil. of Hist.*, p. 15 / *VPG*, p. 42. See *Phil of Hist.*, p. 457 / *VPG*, p. 569: "That the history of the world, with all the changing scenes which its annals present, is this process of development and the realization of spirit – this is the true theodicy, the justification of God in history. Only *this* insight can reconcile spirit with the history of the world." (*Phil. of Hist* = *The Philosophy of History*, tr. by J. Sibree, New York: Willey Book Co. 1944. *VPG* = *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Jub. vol. 11.)

In the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel employs an interesting image to describe the task of philosophy: "To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to delight in the present – this rational insight is the *reconciliation* with actuality which philosophy grants to those who have received the inner call to *comprehend*."²⁸ Common sense is struck by the injustice and evil in the world. Christ came to the world, preached love and forgiveness, and was crucified by a wicked humanity. Yet this was necessary for Christ to bring about the reconciliation of man and God. Thus, for Hegel, in the cross, there is a rose, or something positive. The sacrifice of Christ was necessary for human beings to be saved and to be reconciled. The key to Christian thinking is to recognize this positive aspect and thus to grasp the true significance of Christ's mission. According to Hegel, philosophical knowing functions in much the same way. It allows one to see beyond the surface of an apparently foreign or alien reality and to reach a true understanding of one's unity with it. The goal of Hegel's philosophy is to understand this reconciliation and unity in the various spheres and to overcome all alienation and dualism. Hegel has thus been seen as expanding on a fundamentally Christian concept in philosophy. Although he makes use of the concept of reconciliation in a metaphorical fashion, it is clear that Hegel does not mean to imply that in this context the term is to be taken in its deeper Christian meaning. He of course makes no claims for the ability of philosophy to offer salvation to human beings in the religious sense. Salvation has been made possible through Christ; the goal of philosophy is merely to understand it.

In the Introduction of *The Concept of Anxiety*, Vigilius Haufniensis discusses the notion of reconciliation in recent philosophy and argues that there is a conflation of the two spheres at work here. One can speak of "mediation" in the abstract realm of logic but not of "reconciliation," which belongs to the concrete sphere of ethics and religion. Vigilius Haufniensis holds to the theological principle that there can be no reconciliation without Christ. Thus, any purely human reconciliation such as that presented in secular philosophy must necessarily fail. Human beings are not capable of achieving reconciliation on the basis of their own strength alone. Contrary to Martensen's view that

²⁸ Hegel *PR* Preface, p. 22 / *RP*, p. 35. See Adriaan Peperzak *Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1987, pp. 105ff.

philosophy and religion are one,²⁹ Kierkegaard consistently claims that philosophy and Christianity cannot in principle be united.³⁰ In *The Concept of Anxiety*, Vigilius Haufniensis notes that the word “reconciliation” is understood traditionally in its theological context and complains about its use in Hegelian philosophy: “Thus when one sometimes finds, and almost solely in propaedeutic investigations, the word ‘reconciliation’ used to designate speculative knowledge, or to designate the identity of the perceiving subject and the object perceived, or to designate the subjective-objective, etc., it is obvious that the author is brilliant and that by means of this brilliance he has explained every riddle.”³¹ By saying that the Hegelian thinker “has explained every riddle,” Vigilius Haufniensis clearly sees the use of the term “reconciliation” as doing explanatory work in the argument. His point, however, is that in fact nothing is explained: “If it is now assumed that Hegelian philosophy has actually grasped Kant’s skepticism...and now has reconstructed the earlier in a higher form and in such a way that thought does not possess reality by virtue of a presupposition – does it therefore also follow that this reality, which is consciously brought forth by thought, is a reconciliation?”³² Vigilius Haufniensis draws into question the claim that the dialectical *Aufhebung* of specific forms of consciousness necessarily leads to a reconciliation. This might be some abstract kind of reconciliation, but it is certainly not reconciliation in the religious sense. Philosophy as a purely human undertaking can never achieve reconciliation, which is the task of the divine. Human reconciliation must remain empty and illusory.

The context of Vigilius Haufniensis’ discussion of this term unambiguously leads back to Adler. Reconciliation is perhaps the most important theme of the Introduction to Adler’s *Popular Lectures on*

²⁹ Hans Lassen Martensen *De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae in theologiam dogmaticam nostri temporis introducta*, Copenhagen 1837, § 1, p. 3. Ktl. 648. Danish translation: *Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie*, tr. by L.V. Petersen, Copenhagen 1841, § 1, pp. 3-4. Ktl. 651. (English translation: *The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology*, in *Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen’s Philosophy of Religion*, tr. by Curtis L. Thompson and David J. Kangas, Atlanta: Scholars Press, § 1, p. 77.) In his lectures Martensen claims, “*The task of the age* is thus the reconciliation of religion and philosophy; and therefore theology must enter into philosophy, i.e. become speculative.” “Lectures on Speculative Dogmatics,” in *Pap. II C* 26-27, in vol. XIII, p. 4.

³⁰ E.g. *Pap. I A* 94-95.

³¹ *CA*, p. 10-11 / *SKS* 4, 318. Translation slightly modified.

³² *CA*, p. 11 / *SKS* 4, 319.

Hegel's Objective Logic. Adler declares in the very first lines that the goal of philosophy is reconciliation:

[Philosophy's] goal is...to negate the opposition between thought and being, between subjectivity and objectivity, the I and the external world, thought and the reality of thought, thought and the works of thought, the universal λογος and the manifestations of λογος and its concrete forms in the world....To bring reconciliation between these forms of thought here in life and thought itself is philosophy's goal.³³

Vigilius Haufniensis comments on this passage as follows: "two sciences, ethics and dogmatics, become radically confused, especially when after the introduction of the term 'reconciliation' it is further pointed out that logic and logos correspond to each other, and that logic is the proper doctrine of logos."³⁴ The main theme of all of the criticisms in Haufniensis' Introduction is that there is a confusion between the sphere of abstract logic and that of ethics.

Although there were other Hegelians such as Martensen, who interpreted the term "logos" along Hegelian lines,³⁵ the immediate source for Vigilius Haufniensis' discussion is clearly Adler. In connection with the term "reconciliation," Adler uses the Greek word logos with its associations from the opening lines of the Gospel of John.³⁶ As has been seen in the previous section, Adler refers to just this passage in his Introduction: "The specific, substantial essence is given to me only when Christianity is conceived not merely as the result of a series of thoughts, but as the unity of thought itself and immediacy, as the Word in the flesh."³⁷ The incarnation is conceived in terms of the category of immediacy. In the body of the text, Adler uses the same allusion to illustrate the concept of abstract, absolute beginning: "The same duality also lies in the use of the '*Ding an sich*,' 'the highest being,' 'the thing's

³³ Adolph Peter Adler *Populaire Foredrag*, p. 1.

³⁴ CA, p. 12 / SKS 4, 319.

³⁵ See Martensen: "And yet the *Word* alone can enable the human's individuality to be fulfilled and be permeated by the true universality, because 'the Word,' which is the utterance of God or the most universal Essence, only expresses the universal or such *individualia* which are also *universalia*. Therefore only by entering into human nature can the eternal Word, ὁ λογος, ground the true Christ and liberate his knowledge from every particularity. For this reason only, that λογος is in Christ and constitutes his nature, can he with justice demand faith in *his person*." *De autonomia*, § 32, p. 124. *Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie*, § 32, p. 124. *The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness*, § 32, p. 141.

³⁶ "In the beginning was the Word [λογος]....And the Word [λογος] became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth." John 1.1 and 1.14. Revised Standard Version translation.

³⁷ Adolph Peter Adler *Populaire Foredrag*, pp. 8-9.

first ground' and 'final cause' which is at once called the first and the last, just as the Gospel's 'word' and 'logos' is at once alpha and omega, whereby it is designated as that which exists before everything and returns when everything is abstracted away."³⁸ Vigilius Haufniensis objects to the use of the terms "logos" and "reconciliation" in logic since for him they belong primarily to the realms of ethics and faith. This passage illustrates how Adler is quick to explain concepts from logic with concepts from Christian dogmatics.

Further evidence for the claim that Vigilius Haufniensis has in mind Adler and not Hegel is the reference in the passage quoted above to accounts of reconciliation "in propaedeutic investigations."³⁹ If the target were Hegel, then presumably reference would have been made to one of his works. Here, by contrast, the reference is to "propaedeutic investigations," like Adler's *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*. It is hard to imagine how this reference can be taken as an allusion to Hegel himself. Moreover, in this passage Haufniensis is concerned with the author of these speculative investigations; he says it is obvious that by appealing to the word "reconciliation," "the author is brilliant and that by means of this brilliance he has explained every riddle."⁴⁰ The satirical tone here is clearly characteristic of the many criticisms of Hegel's imitators that Kierkegaard issues elsewhere. Here Haufniensis reproaches Adler for attempting to look brilliant for his application of the concepts from dogmatics in an account of Hegel's logic. Finally, it is clearly Adler who confuses the Christian category of reconciliation with secular philosophy. Throughout his paraphrase of Hegel's logic, Adler repeatedly invokes key concepts from dogmatics. Needless to say, in this respect his account of logic differs decidedly from Hegel's. It is precisely this confusion of categories that is under attack in the Introduction to *The Concept of Anxiety*.

(2) The second term from Hegel's philosophy that Vigilius Haufniensis takes up in his discussion is "mediation." Hegel's notion of mediation was the cause of much discussion in Denmark at the time and one which Kierkegaard himself was keenly interested in. The allusion to "mediation" here can then be regarded as a part of Kierkegaard's ongoing discussion of it. In the following passage from the Introduction, Vigilius Haufniensis claims that this concept is mistakenly conflated with the notion of reconciliation:

³⁸ Ibid., p. 26.

³⁹ CA, p. 10 / SKS 4, 318.

⁴⁰ CA, p. 10-11 / SKS 4, 318.

One rejects synthesis and says “mediation.” Very well. Brilliance, however, demands more – one says “reconciliation,” and what is the result? The propaedeutic investigations are not served by it, for naturally they gain as little in clarity as does the truth, as little as a man’s soul gains in salvation by having a title conferred upon him. On the contrary, two sciences, ethics and dogmatics, become radically confused.⁴¹

The idea here is much the same as before: dogmatics belongs to the abstract realm of thought or logic, whereas ethics is a distinct sphere. True reconciliation belongs to the latter, whereas abstract mediation belongs to the former. Therefore, since the two terms belong to separate spheres, one ought not use them as synonyms. Moreover, Haufniensis objects, “‘Mediation’ is equivocal, for it suggests simultaneously the relation between the two and the result of the relation, that in which the two relate themselves to each other as well as the two that related themselves to each other.”⁴² The term “mediation” is thus thought to be ambiguous, whereas the term “synthesis” is presumably more precise.

Again the source of Vigilius Haufniensis’ discussion is the Introduction to Adler’s *Popular Lectures on Hegel’s Objective Logic*. In his § 2, Adler outlines the elder Fichte’s position of subjective idealism. This is opposed to a form of objectivism that gives being priority over thought, which Adler outlines in § 3. He introduces Hegel’s philosophy as the position which will mediate the two. Moreover, in this context he explicitly uses the term “mediation” several times: “But the dialectical movement, by which the Hegelian system is characterized, does not lie merely in the negation. Dialectic for Hegel...includes both negation and mediation. We have said that negation is immediacy’s transition into the opposite; mediation is the reconciliation of the opposites into a higher unity.”⁴³ Here one finds all of the key terms from Vigilius Haufniensis’ Introduction: negation, movement, mediation, reconciliation. (Moreover, one finds here one of the sources of Kierkegaard’s famous phrase about Hegel’s philosophy reconciling opposites not in “a higher unity,” as Adler writes, but in “a higher madness.”⁴⁴)

There can be no doubt that the immediate source for the use of the terms “reconciliation” and “mediation” is Adler. Thus, the weight of most of Vigilius Haufniensis’ critical remarks clearly falls on him and

⁴¹ CA, p. 11-12 / SKS 4, 319.

⁴² CA, p. 11 / SKS 4, 319.

⁴³ Adolph Peter Adler *Populaire Foredrag*, p. 19.

⁴⁴ See Darío González “On Kierkegaard’s Concept of Madness” in *Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook 1996*, pp. 277-292.

not on Hegel. It might be argued that one nevertheless can still construe the discussion of these terms as a criticism of Hegel himself, who uses both terms in a technical sense in his philosophy. This is of course true, but many of Vigilius Haufniensis' criticisms do not apply to Hegel himself but rather seem to be aimed at Hegel's imitators. Moreover, to insist on these criticisms as somehow aimed in some general sense against the general tenor of Hegel's philosophy is to miss the very concrete criticism of Adler, who is clearly the intended target.

IV. Movement in Logic

The next issue to be explored is Vigilius Haufniensis' discussion of movement in Hegel's logic. There are two passages in which this comes up: a brief one in the Introduction⁴⁵ and another later at the beginning of Chapter 3.⁴⁶ The former will be the subject of this section and the latter of the next. The issue of movement in logic is one that Kierkegaard returns to many times; variations of it can be found in a number of forms in his other works, e.g. in the *Postscript*.⁴⁷ Moreover, this criticism is related to the general issue of mediation and the *Aufhebung* of the law of excluded middle, which can be found throughout the authorship. I will first examine the way in which Hegel conceives movement to be generated from the dialectical relation of concepts. I will then explore the criticisms offered by Vigilius Haufniensis in order to determine whether or not they can be said to apply to Hegel's view. I wish to argue that while these criticisms can indeed be conceived as directed against Hegel at some level, the intended target is nonetheless Adler.

A. Hegel's Conception of Dialectical Movement

The key to understanding Hegel's conception of dialectical movement is an appreciation of his reinterpretation of the laws of classical logic. The *locus classicus* for this reinterpretation is in the "Doctrine of Essence" from the *Science of Logic* where Hegel explicates his

⁴⁵ CA, pp. 12-14 / SKS 4, 320-322.

⁴⁶ CA, pp. 81-85 / SKS 4, 384-388.

⁴⁷ CUP1, p. 109-110 / SVI VII, 88-89. CUP1, p. 113 / SVI VII, 92. CUP1, p. 308-309 / SVI VII, 364-365.

doctrine of difference [*Unterschied*]. He distinguishes among three different concepts of difference, (1) absolute difference [*der absolute Unterschied*], (2) diversity [*Verschiedenheit*], and (3) opposition [*Gegensatz*]. I will briefly examine each of these in order to show their relevance for Hegel's conception of movement in logic and for his criticism of the laws of classical logic.

The first concept of difference is what Hegel refers to as "absolute difference." This involves simply the abstract negation of a given term, i.e. A and not-A. Hegel refers to this difference as self-related because the first term is not negated by something else or other, but is simply repeated and negated abstractly: "Difference in itself is self-related difference; as such, it is the negativity of itself, the difference not of an other but *of itself from itself*."⁴⁸ There is no relation to any second term. Thus, according to this conception of difference, the negation of, for example, blue is not-blue; it is not any determinate color, e.g. red, white, or green, but simply the abstract indeterminate other of blue. Therefore, this relation is ultimately not one of determinate difference between blue and something else but rather a relation of identity of blue with itself. Hegel writes, "Difference as thus unity of itself and identity, is *in its own self* determinate difference. It is not transition into an other, not relation to an other outside it."⁴⁹ This demonstrates, for Hegel, that the notion of difference contains the notion of identity within itself, just as identity contains an aspect of difference. This notion of absolute difference is, for Hegel, ultimately uninteresting since it has no determinate other. It leads back to the original subject, and the dialectic comes to a halt. It will be noted that this is Aristotle's conception of contradiction. By rejecting this notion of difference, Hegel implicitly says that the Aristotelian concept of contradiction is empty and uninteresting.

Hegel's second notion of difference is that of diversity. According to this concept, the difference is posited by the subject making the contrast and is, strictly speaking, external to the two things being contrasted. Each term can exist on its own and is indifferent to the other. Thus, diversity involves examples such as, "an elephant is different from a chair." In this case there is nothing intrinsic to the two terms that invites the contrast in the first place. Moreover, both an elephant

⁴⁸ Hegel *SL*, p. 417 / *WL* I, p. 516. (*SL* = *Hegel's Science of Logic*, tr. by A.V. Miller, London: George Allen and Unwin 1989. *WL* I-II = *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Jub. vols. 4-5.)

⁴⁹ Hegel *SL*, p. 418 / *WL* I, p. 517.

and a chair can exist independently of each other, and the one does not stand in any special relation *vis-à-vis* the other. The platitude of common sense which this notion captures is that everything is different from everything else. This notion of difference is also inadequate according to Hegel since it too is indeterminate in the sense that the two terms at issue have nothing to do with one another. An elephant is different from a chair, but so also is a loaf of bread, a photon and a tree. Everything simply exists indifferently to everything else. Each term is, to be sure, determinate in itself, but this determination has nothing to do with the other.

The final notion of difference is that of opposition or contrariety. Hegel considers this the true notion of difference which constitutes the *Aufhebung* of identity and difference in contradiction. According to this notion, the first term is negated neither abstractly nor by an indifferent other as in the first two stages, but rather by its own determinate other, i.e. its opposite. Here the negation of north is south, and the negation of right is left, of positive is negative, of up is down, etc. Each of the terms stands in a necessary relation to the other; indeed, they mutually condition one another and cannot exist on their own in the way an elephant and a chair can. According to this conception, a given term does not merely have *an* other as in diversity but has specifically *its* other.

It is from this third conception of difference that movement in logic is possible. Hegel's criticism of the Aristotelian law of contradiction is that it does not lead anywhere and is simply a non-starter. By contrast, when contradiction is conceived as opposition or contrariety [*Gegensatz*], then the negation of the first term produces a determinate other, and this is then a movement from one category to another. For example, the negation of substance produces accident; the negation of being produces nothing, etc. In each case the determinate other allows the dialectical movement to go forward. Thus, everything turns on the reinterpretation of the classical notion of contradiction.

Given that speculative philosophy sees the conceptual unity behind apparently contradictory pairs, it moves beyond the static opposition of one term *vis-à-vis* another. Thus, contradiction, understood in this fashion, is a dynamic principle for Hegel, who writes,

Generally speaking, it is contradiction that moves the world, and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction cannot be thought. What is correct in this assertion is just that contradiction is not all there is to it, and that contradiction sublates itself by its own doing. Sublated contradiction, however, is not abstract identity, for that is itself only one side of the opposition [*Gegensatz*]. The proximate result of opposition posited as con-

tradition is the ground, which contains within itself both identity and distinction as sublated and reduced to merely ideal moments.⁵⁰

Hegel's doctrine of contradiction is the source of movement in logic. Its guiding intuition is that no concept is atomic or isolated, but rather all concepts are what they are only by the fact that they are the opposites of other determinate concepts and thus stand in a necessary relation to those concepts. An individual concept posits its own negation since it presupposes its opposite. Thus, movement arises from the original concept to its opposite or its negation. These two contrary concepts are then conceived to form a single organic concept since each element necessarily presupposes the other. Thus, there is movement again from the second concept or the negation to the new higher concept, conceived as the unity of the two.

One of Hegel's theses in his early work, *On the Orbits of the Planets*, was the following: "Contradiction is the rule of the true, non-contradiction is the rule of the false."⁵¹ While the thought of common sense comes to a halt when a contradiction, understood in Aristotle's sense, is reached, speculative philosophy uses contradictions in Hegel's sense to propel it forward to higher forms of thought beyond the original contradictory claims. Plato's dialectic is static and ends in ἀπορία since negation is simply negation. A view is refuted as a result of the Socratic ἐλεγχος, and that is the end of the matter. By contrast, Hegel's dialectic moves beyond a simple negation to find something positive in the negation, i.e. contrariety. The two opposite terms then form a higher conceptual unity than either of the individual elements on their own. Truth thus results not from the static opposition of contradictory pairs but from their dialectical interaction.

B. Vigilius Haufniensis' Criticism

From Vigilius Haufniensis' description of Hegel's doctrine it is clear that he is familiar with Hegel's reinterpretation of the concept of contradiction. Indeed, he describes precisely Hegel's doctrine of de-

⁵⁰ Hegel *EL*, § 119, Addition 2 / *Enz.* I, p. 280. Translation slightly modified.

⁵¹ Hegel *Dissertatio*, p. 76 / *Phil. Diss.*, p. 276. (*Dissertatio* = *Dissertatio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum/Philosophische Erörterung über die Planetbahnen*, ed. by Wolfgang Neuser, Weinheim: Acta Humaniora 1986. *Phil. Diss* = "*Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets* (1801). Preceded by the 12 Theses defended on August 27, 1801," tr. by Pierre Adler, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 12, 1987, pp. 269-309.)

terminate negation according to which the negative produces its opposite and thus not only negates but sublates it:

The negative, then, is immanent in the movement, is something vanishing, is that which is annulled. If everything comes about in this manner, nothing comes about at all, and the negative becomes an illusion. Nevertheless, precisely in order to make something come about in logic, the negative becomes something more; it becomes that which brings forth the opposition, not a negation but a contraposition. And thus the negative is not the stillness of the immanent movement: it is "*the necessary other*," indeed, something that may be very necessary for logic in order to bring about movement, but it is something that the negative is not.⁵²

When Haufniensis says that negation "brings forth the opposition, not a negation but a contraposition," he explicitly states the difference between Hegel's concept of contradiction as opposition or "contraposition" and the Aristotelian notion of contradiction as pure "negation." Moreover, he shows his familiarity with the Hegelian view with his use of the expression, "the necessary other." This is of course Hegel's way of referring to negation as opposition, i.e. a thing is negated not by some random other as in diversity [*Verschiedenheit*] but rather by its own necessary other, namely its opposite. Thus, there can be no question here of Haufniensis failing to understand Hegel's view.⁵³

Two criticisms of the notion of movement in logic are issued in the passage in question. The main one seems to be that introducing movement into logic is simply a category mistake. The abstract realm of logic is fixed and eternal. Thus, there can be no movement here. By contrast, the immediate existential sphere features movement and change. Vigilius Haufniensis expresses this as follows: "In logic, no movement can *come about*, for logic is, and whatever is logical only *is*. This impotence of the logical consists in the transition of logic into becoming, where existence and actuality come forth. So when logic becomes deeply absorbed in the concretion of the categories, that

⁵² CA, p. 13 / SKS 4, 321. See SKS K4, 366.

⁵³ Kierkegaard's understanding of this point may well have come from Trendelenburg: Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg *Die logische Frage in Hegels System. Zwei Streitschriften*, Leipzig 1843, p. 15. Ktl. 846. Trendelenburg is almost certainly one of the main sources for Vigilius Haufniensis' discussion. In a draft of *The Concept of Anxiety*, Kierkegaard refers directly to the text by Trendelenburg that he makes use of: "Note. Should anyone want further explication of the unwarranted use of the negative in logic, I simply refer him to Adolf Trendelenburg, *Die logische Frage in Hegels System. Zwei Streitschriften*, Berlin 1843. Trendelenburg is well-schooled in Greek philosophy and is unimpressed by humbug." CA Supplement, p. 181 / Pap. V B 49.6. See CUP1, p. 110 / SVI VII, 90.

which was from the beginning is ever the same.”⁵⁴ The idea seems to be that logic is concerned with the necessary and the eternal, whereas change or movement is the characteristic of existence or actuality. The abstract categories, which are the subject-matter of logic, remain unchanged and do not evince the same movement as concrete objects in the sphere of existence. This criticism is in accord with the others which have been examined in that in each case Vigilius Haufniensis insists on a strict separation between two spheres.

In his second criticism Vigilius Haufniensis argues that the notion of an immanent movement in logic is illusory. The claim seems to be that all movement necessarily involves transcendence, and therefore an immanent movement is a misnomer: “Every movement, if for the moment one wishes to use this expression, is an immanent movement, which in a profound sense is no movement at all. One can easily convince oneself of this by considering that the concept of movement is itself a transcendence that has no place in logic.”⁵⁵ There is really no movement in the realm of logic since all of the categories are immanently related to each other. Thus, what counts as movement for Hegel is simply a tautology. True movement, by contrast, involves a transcendent aspect. This is the same argument that Constantin Constantius gives in *Repetition* when he contrasts the concept of repetition, which is transcendent, with that of mediation, which is immanent.⁵⁶

While Hegel’s logic clearly constitutes the general context of the discussion in the passage in question, there are indications that this criticism is aimed primarily at other targets. In a draft of the passage in question, Kierkegaard begins by saying, “Even in our little Denmark men have come to the rescue of movement in logic.”⁵⁷ This indicates that he is concerned here not merely with the general issue in Hegel’s logic but also with the use of it in the works of his Danish contemporaries. In this draft Kierkegaard eliminates all ambiguity by naming specifically the figures he has in mind. He mentions both the Hegelian, Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791-1860), and Adler by name, re-

⁵⁴ CA, p. 12-13 / SKS 4, 320. Translation slightly modified.

⁵⁵ CA, p. 13 / SKS 4, 320-321.

⁵⁶ R, p. 148 / SKS 4, 25. R, p. 186 / SKS 4, 56-57.

⁵⁷ CA Supplement, p. 180 / Pap. V B 49.5. Translation slightly modified. See also Pap. V C 4, p. 373.

ferring to Heiberg's "The System of Logic"⁵⁸ and Adler's *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*.⁵⁹

But even without the draft there are indications in the text itself which associate these criticisms with Adler, who uses the word, "movement," almost as a slogan in the Introduction to his *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*.⁶⁰ Adler speaks of the concept of movement in Hegel's logic as follows:

The system does not give itself either self-movement or movement in some arbitrary manner. The movement consists in the fact that a one-sided moment sublates itself and passes over into its opposite, in other words, in the necessity with which thought with its right to self-determination shows that a one-sided moment is something other than what it seems to be, i.e. is its own negation, passes over into its opposite.⁶¹

Despite the addition of some technical jargon, this is a fairly straightforward account of Hegel's doctrine of contradiction. But it will be noted that this account makes the feature of movement central in a way that deviates from Hegel's own account in the *Science of Logic*. Moreover, Adler goes on to discuss the important role of negation in this movement.⁶² This is, of course, what is at issue in the discussion in the Introduction to *The Concept of Anxiety*. Perhaps most importantly, Adler, in referring to a work on speculative logic by Peter Michael Stilling (1812-69),⁶³ makes the claim that "movement runs through all of life."⁶⁴ It is in particular this association of movement in logic with life and actuality which Vigilius Haufniensis finds objectionable. His constant plea is to keep the two spheres separate.

In the passage under examination, one can find hidden references to Adler in the criticism of the Hegelian play on words with "*Wesen*" and "*gewesen*." In a key footnote Vigilius Haufniensis reproaches Hegelians for using fatuous plays on words to support their claims in logic:

⁵⁸ Johan Ludvig Heiberg "Det logiske System" in *Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee*, no. 2, 1838, ktl. 569, pp. 1-45. (Reprinted in Heiberg's *Prosaiske Skrifter*, vols. 1-11, Copenhagen 1861-62, vol. 2, pp. 113-166.)

⁵⁹ CA Supplement, p. 181 / *Pap.* V B 49.5. See also *Pap.* V C 4, p. 373.

⁶⁰ Adolph Peter Adler *Populaire Foredrag*, pp. 3, 8, 14, 17-19.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, § 7, p. 18.

⁶² *Ibid.*, § 8, p. 19: "In this movement negation has its significance. When we are supposed to define what we understand by 'negation,' then it is the completely expressed other, the opposite."

⁶³ Peter Michael Stilling *Philosophiske Betragtninger over den speculative Logiks Betydning for Videnskaben*, Copenhagen 1842. Stilling writes, "It [the dialectic] is the principle for all of life and movement and is the soul in all processes in the objective world of nature." *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁶⁴ Adolph Peter Adler *Populaire Foredrag*, § 7, p. 18.

Wesen ist was ist gewesen; ist gewesen is a *tempus praeteritum* of *Seyn*, ergo, *Wesen ist das aufgehobene Seyn*, the *Seyn* that has been. This is a logical movement! If anyone would take the trouble to collect and put together all the strange pixies and goblins who like busy clerks bring about movement in Hegelian logic (such as this is in itself and as it has been improved by the school), a later age would perhaps be surprised to see that what are regarded as discarded witticisms once played an important role in logic.⁶⁵

Here Vigilius Haufniensis seems to refer to passages which appear in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*⁶⁶ and the *Science of Logic*⁶⁷ in which Hegel notes that the past participle, “*gewesen*,” of the German verb for “to be” or “*sein*” is etymologically related to the word for essence, “*We-sen*.” Hegel, like many philosophers, uses etymologies occasionally to illustrate how language captures what he takes to be some speculative truth.

Adler refers to the play on words with *Wesen* and *gewesen* several times in his work. For example, he explains, “But since the higher being is thus mediation, since it has sublated the immediate moments of being, they *are* no longer – immediately; in other words, they have been, are surpassed, have fallen out of immediacy, are no longer immediately present, ‘*sie sind gewesen*’; therefore their higher being is called essence [*Væsenet*].”⁶⁸ At the beginning of the large section “Essence” in Adler’s logic, he explains the transition from being to essence as follows: “The entire immediate being is also, so to speak, dead....It has been, ‘*ist aufgehobenes Seyn*,’ ‘*die Negation der Sphäre des Seyns*.’”⁶⁹ Here one finds the expression “*aufgehobenes Seyn*” or “sublated being” which appears in the passage quoted above from Vigilius Haufniensis’ Introduction. This is of course a quotation from Hegel’s *Science of Logic*,⁷⁰ but it is no accident that it appears in Adler, who brings it to Kierkegaard’s attention. Given these references to Adler’s text, there can be no doubt about the immediate source.

⁶⁵ CA, p. 12fn. / SKS 4, 320fn. See SKS K4, 363.

⁶⁶ Hegel *EL*, § 112, Addition / *Enz*. I, p. 263: “As for the further significance and use of the category of essence, we can recall first at this point how the term ‘*Wesen*’ is employed to designate the past for the German auxiliary verb ‘*sein*’; for we designate the being that is past as ‘*gewesen*.’”

⁶⁷ Hegel *SL*, p. 389 / *WL* I, p. 481: “The German language has preserved essence [*Wesen*] in the past participle [*gewesen*] of the verb to be; for essence is past – but timelessly past – being.”

⁶⁸ Adolph Peter Adler *Populaire Foredrag*, § 21, p. 102. See also p. 103.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, § 22, p. 104.

⁷⁰ Hegel *SL*, p. 394 / *WL* I, p. 486: “Essence is *sublated being*.”

The tone of these passages is no doubt polemical, and thus *The Concept of Anxiety* must clearly be categorized with the texts which display an ostensible anti-Hegel polemic. The sense of satire or even hostility towards Hegel's philosophy is similar to the negative tone in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. This tone in *The Concept of Anxiety* can perhaps be explained by the fact that Kierkegaard has in mind Adler. There is no obvious reason why Kierkegaard would be interested in a polemic against Adler. It was, however, in December of 1842 that Adler claimed to have his revelation, which he announced in 1843 in his *Some Sermons*. Thus, it is conceivable that Adler had already attracted Kierkegaard's attention by this time. In a letter to his brother Peter Christian Kierkegaard dated on June 29, 1843, Kierkegaard mentions Adler as "a phenomenon worth paying attention to."⁷¹ Thus, it is conceivable that Kierkegaard was already disturbed by the way in which Adler conflated Hegel's logic and key terms and concepts from Christian dogmatics. This confusion of categories is also at the heart of Kierkegaard's criticism of Adler in the later unpublished *Book on Adler*. The fact that Kierkegaard never published any direct criticism of Adler, although he was clearly exercised by Adler's works and person for many years, attests to the fact that he was interested in a more indirect critique. Such an indirect critique could well be carried out under the name of a critique of Hegel. Thus, although it is Hegel's name which appears in the text, it is Adler's work which is constantly referred to. All of this seems to indicate that the polemical, anti-Hegel tone of the criticisms in *The Concept of Anxiety* can be understood in terms of Kierkegaard's incipient criticism of Adler.

These criticisms indicate Kierkegaard's familiarity with some of the fundamental principles of Hegel's logic. Regardless of whether it is derived from Hegel's primary texts or from other sources such as Adler, Heiberg or Trendelenburg, Kierkegaard's grasp of these points in Hegel's logic seems quite sound. But although Hegel is referred to by name here, the criticisms of movement in logic seem unambiguously to point to other targets. Moreover, these criticisms clearly belong to Kierkegaard's ongoing considerations of the notion of mediation and the criticism of Aristotle's law of excluded middle. The issue is discussed here under various catchwords, i.e. "movement in logic," "negation," "transition," and "mediation." This points back to the

⁷¹ LD, p. 83 / B&A, 122.

Danish context where these matters were at the center of the contemporary discussion.

5 V. Quantity, Quality and the Leap

In his introductory remarks to Chapter 3, entitled "Anxiety as the Consequence of that Sin which is Absence of the Consciousness of Sin,"⁷² Vigilius Haufniensis briefly returns to the issue of movement in logic, and again Hegel is named explicitly. In this context two criticisms are issued: first that movement in logic is a methodological presupposition which is inconsistent with the pretension of the lack of all presuppositions, and second that there must be a qualitative gap between the two terms for movement to take place, and this gap is absent in the sphere of thought and immanence. In this second criticism, Vigilius Haufniensis uses the famous image of the leap to characterize movement. In this section I would like to explore both of these criticisms. I will argue that Kierkegaard's immediate source for both discussions is Adler. The first criticism was originally issued by Schelling and is referred to by Adler. The second discussion is ultimately more interesting due to its use of the image of the leap. I will argue that the immediate source for this image is Adler who derives it from Hegel himself.

(1) Vigilius Haufniensis' first criticism is concerned with the notion of movement in logic and the claim that Hegel's philosophy begins without presuppositions. He begins by singling out three terms, "negation," "transition," and "mediation." The first and the last he has already treated in the Introduction, and thus here he focuses on the term "transition." He writes,

In recent philosophy there is a category that is continually used in logical no less than in historical-philosophical inquiries. It is the category of transition. However, no further explanation is given. The term is freely used without any ado, and while Hegel and the Hegelian school startled the world with the great insight of the presuppositionless beginning of philosophy, or the thought that before philosophy there must be nothing but the most complete absence of presuppositions, there is no embarrassment at all over the use in Hegelian thought of the terms "transition," "negation," and "mediation," i.e., the principles of motion, in such a way that they do not find their place in the systematic progression. If this is not a presupposition, I do not know what a presupposition is.⁷³

⁷² CA, pp. 81-85 / SKS 4, 384-388.

⁷³ CA, p. 81 / SKS 4, 384. See SKS K4, 449f.

The criticism here is quite straightforward: Hegel's philosophy claims to be free of presuppositions, yet it nevertheless makes the methodological presupposition that there is movement of mediation. This is betrayed by the fact that the terms in question, "negation," "transition," and "mediation," already imply a conception of movement which to Haufniensis' mind is illegitimate in logic.

The criticism that Vigilius Haufniensis raises is derived straightforwardly from Adler. In the Introduction to his *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*, Adler writes, "It is furthermore a common criticism of Hegel that it is a mere illusion that he begins without presuppositions."⁷⁴ One of these common criticisms, he continues, is "that even if he does not presuppose anything else, he nonetheless presupposes movement, something for which Schelling reproaches him in the Preface to Cousin's *French and German Philosophy*."⁷⁵ Adler here refers to the famous Preface to the German translation of a work by the French philosopher Victor Cousin (1792-1867), with the title, *Über französische und deutsche Philosophie* (1834).⁷⁶ This Preface was the object of much contemporary discussion since it was the first thing that Schelling had published on philosophy since 1815. In this Preface Schelling writes, "The *first* presupposition of the philosophy which purportedly presupposes nothing, was that the pure logical Concept as such has the property or the nature that it *of itself*...passes over into its opposite...in order then again to return back into itself."⁷⁷ Here Schelling describes the Concept in Hegel and claims that it presupposes movement by its very nature. From all this it seems clear that Adler is Kierkegaard's immediate source for this criticism, which is hardly surprising given how much he uses Adler's *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic* throughout *The Concept of Anxiety* (and particularly in the Introduction). Moreover, Schelling is the original source of the criticism, a fact which Adler alludes to in his Introduction.

⁷⁴ Adolph Peter Adler *Populaire Foredrag*, § 7, p. 17.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, § 7, p. 17.

⁷⁶ The Preface to Victor Cousin's *Über französische und deutsche Philosophie*. Aus dem Französischen von Dr. Hubert Beckers, nebst einer beurtheilenden Vorrede des Herrn von Schelling, Stuttgart, Tübingen 1834, pp. iii-xxviii. Ktl. 471. Reprinted as "Vorrede zu einer philosophischen Schrift des Herrn Victor Cousin," in Schelling's *Ausgewählte Schriften*, vols. 1-6, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1985, vol. 4, pp. 617-640.

⁷⁷ Victor Cousin *Über französische und deutsche Philosophie*, *ibid.*, p. xv. Schelling's *Ausgewählte Schriften*, vol. 4, p. 629.

(2) Vigilius Haufniensis then goes on in the second criticism to illustrate what he conceives to be the true notion of transition which takes place in the realm of freedom. The criticism is continuous with what was written in Part Two of *Either/Or*.⁷⁸ It will be recalled that there the distinction was drawn between the realm of thought and the realm of freedom – a distinction which was introduced to try to resolve the issue of the *Aufhebung* of the law of contradiction and excluded middle. Now Kierkegaard has Vigilius Haufniensis employ the related notion of “the sphere of historical freedom.”⁷⁹ The claim about movement requiring transcendence is made clear here. Vigilius Haufniensis argues that real movement or transition must be transcendent. The two points which the transition links must be discontinuous. In Hegel’s logic there is no leap in this sense because the movement is immanent. This can be regarded as a development of the criticism in the Introduction (treated in the previous section), that movement within an immanent sphere is no movement at all.

Vigilius Haufniensis portrays the discontinuity in the realm of freedom as a leap, and this reference to the leap is important for his understanding and use of Hegel’s thought. Most commentators take the image of the leap to have been derived exclusively from Lessing as seems to be indicated in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*.⁸⁰ Another possible source is Röscher, whom Kierkegaard also mentions in connection with the concept.⁸¹ The context of the notion of the leap is of course that of the traditional philosophical problem of change or movement. It is clear that Kierkegaard also has in mind Aristotle’s various discussions of this issue⁸² as is evidenced by his frequent use of the Aristotelian phrase *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. While it is thus clear that the concept of the leap is a broad issue which has several sources, I wish to argue that the immediate source of the concept here in the context of *The Concept of Anxiety* is Hegel. This claim stands in sharp contrast to the view of many commentators who see the leap as a crucial point where Kierkegaard departs from Hegel.⁸³ But surprisingly,

⁷⁸ EO2, pp. 170-176 / SKS 3, 166-172. See CUP1, pp. 189-198 / SVI VII, 157-166.

⁷⁹ CA, p. 82 / SKS 4, 385.

⁸⁰ CUP1, pp. 93-106 / SVI VII, 74-85. See also JP 3, 2342 / Pap. V B 1.3.

⁸¹ JP 3, 2350 / Pap. V C 8.

⁸² E.g. *Categoriae* 15a 13ff., 15b 12; *Physica* 226b 2ff.; *De Caelo* 270a 27; *De Generatione et Corruptione* 314b 15; *De Anima* 417b 15-16; *Metaphysica* 1069b 12.

⁸³ E.g. Nelly Viallaneix “Kierkegaard, lecteur de Leibniz” in *Critique*, 1968, p. 900. Udo Johansen “Hegel und Kierkegaard” in *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*, 7, 1953, p. 22, pp. 44-46.

this notion can be traced back to Hegel himself via Adler and is already present at this period two years prior to the *Postscript*. All of this requires some explanation of its context in Hegel's thought.

The relevant issue in Hegel's logic is the relationship between quantity and quality. Common sense conceives of these two categories as separate and independent of one another, but Hegel's philosophy attempts to demonstrate the necessary dialectical relationship between them. Hegel points out that increasing or decreasing specific quantities has more or less definite limits at which point a change in quality must occur as a result. One example is the quantitative increase or decrease in the temperature of water: "the temperature of water is, up to a point, indifferent in relation to its liquid state; but there comes a point in the increasing or decreasing of the temperature of liquid water where this state of cohesion changes qualitatively, and the water is transformed into steam, on the one hand, and ice, on the other."⁸⁴ Quality is indifferent to quantity only within fixed limits. At some point a quantitative change results in a qualitative one.

The gradual increase or decrease of particular quantities, e.g. degrees of heat or cold, constitutes a continuous spectrum; by contrast, the change in quality is of a more radical nature. In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel characterizes this kind of change in terms of a leap: "On the qualitative side, therefore, the gradual, merely quantitative progress which is not in itself a limit, is absolutely interrupted; the new quality in its merely quantitative relationship is, relatively to the vanishing quality, an indifferent, indeterminate other, and the transition is therefore a *leap*."⁸⁵ According to Hegel, there is only gradual progress in quantitative change, but in qualitative change there is a leap.⁸⁶

While the source of his information is not yet clear, Kierkegaard seems to have been familiar with Hegel's example since he refers to it in the *Papirer* from this period. There one reads,

How does a new quality emerge from a continuous quantitative determination?....A leap....Thus, every quality emerges with a leap. Are these leaps then entirely homogeneous. The leap by which water turns to ice, the leap by which I understand an author,

⁸⁴ Hegel *EL*, § 108, Addition / *Enz.* I, p. 255.

⁸⁵ Hegel *SL*, p. 368 / *WL* I, p. 458. See also *SL*, p. 370 / *WL* I, p. 460. *PhS*, p. 6 / *PhG*, p. 18. Hegel *EL*, § 37, Addition / *Enz.* I, p. 117.

⁸⁶ In the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, Hegel defines the "leap" as follows: "'Leap' here means qualitative distinction and qualitative alteration, which appear to take place without mediation, whilst, on the contrary, what is (quantitatively) gradual presents itself as something mediated." Hegel *EL*, § 35, Addition / *Enz.* I, p. 110.

and the leap which is the transition from good to evil. More sudden, Lessing's Faust, the evil spirit, who is as hasty as the transition from good to evil.⁸⁷

Here Kierkegaard repeats Hegel's example of the qualitative change from water to ice in his list of instances of the leap. Moreover, later in the same entry Hegel is referred to by name. Thus, it seems quite likely that Kierkegaard was familiar with this concept from Hegel's text.

Even if Kierkegaard did not read this passage in the *Science of Logic*, he certainly read about it in Adler's *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*. Adler uses it several times and makes considerably more of the concept than Hegel: "Instead of coming to us according to *ratio* and *connection*, the qualities come to us as if by a *leap*."⁸⁸ Moreover, Adler goes on to make the larger claim: "Thus in the sphere of spirit: every human revelation stands as a qualitative leap in the human process of development, sublating the old measure and putting in a new one."⁸⁹ It is clear that Kierkegaard was familiar with this aspect of Hegel's logic from Adler since he refers to it directly in the *Papirer*. He writes the following of the transition from quality to quantity: "Magister Adler (in his *Popular Lectures on Hegel's Objective Logic*, Copenhagen 1842) makes the movement even better. He says (p. 48), 'when the quality is indifferent, quantity appears as the qualifying factor.'"⁹⁰ One could hardly wish for a clearer statement of a source.

In the published text of *The Concept of Anxiety* itself, Vigilius Haufniensis associates Hegel with the leap: "It is an unforgivable reticence when one makes no secret of the fact that things indeed do not happen quite that way in the world and yet conceals the consequence of this for the whole of logical immanence by permitting it to drift into logical movement as does Hegel. The new quality appears quickly, with the leap, with the suddenness of the enigmatic."⁹¹ In the footnote to this passage, he continues: "Hegel made use of the leap, but in logic.... However, Hegel's misfortune is exactly that he wants to maintain the new quality and yet does not want to do it, since he wants to do it in logic, which, as soon as this is recognized, must acquire a different consciousness of itself and of its significance."⁹² Thus, Vigilius Haufniensis makes no attempt to hide the fact that Hegel is one of the sources of

⁸⁷ JP 3, 2345 / *Pap*. V C 1. Translation slightly modified.

⁸⁸ Adolph Peter Adler *Populaire Foredrag*, § 21, p. 97.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, § 21, p. 98.

⁹⁰ CA Supplement, p. 181 / *Pap*. V B 49.5. Translation modified. See also *Pap*. V C 4.

⁹¹ CA, p. 30 / SKS 4, 336-337.

⁹² CA, p. 30 fn. / SKS 4, 337 fn.

the notion of the leap (which makes it all the more enigmatic that this has not been recognized in the secondary literature). When one looks at the *Papirer*, one finds that this is the first time that Kierkegaard in fact makes use of this concept in this context. This seems to confirm the fact that Hegel via Adler is his source.

Vigilius Haufniensis makes use of this analysis in many different ways and contexts. In his analysis of the original sin, for example, one of his main claims is that there is a radical qualitative difference which is introduced into the world with sin: "Thus sin comes into the world suddenly, i.e., by a leap; but this leap also posits the quality, and since the quality is posited, the leap in that very moment is turned into the quality and is presupposed by the quality and the quality by the leap."⁹³ Here Vigilius Haufniensis retains Hegel's image of a leap, and again the issue of quality is essential. Thus, even though the discussion is different, Vigilius Haufniensis applies a Hegelian principle to an issue in dogmatics. He does the same thing later to refute the notion that sin concerns the human race generally and not each individual. He interprets the expression "by Adam's sin, sinfulness came into the world" as follows:

If all this is kept in mind, the above expression will have limited truth. The first posits the quality. Adam, then, posits sin in himself, but also for the race. However, the concept of race is too abstract to allow the positing of so concrete a category as sin, which is posited precisely in that the single individual himself, as the single individual, posits it. Thus sinfulness in the race becomes only a quantitative approximation.⁹⁴

Vigilius Haufniensis' use of the categories of quality and quantity is what is essential here. Sin, conceived as a characteristic of the human race generally, is a "quantitative" relation, i.e. a gradual spectrum of more or less sinfulness among everyone. Vigilius Haufniensis, by contrast, wants to conceive of sin as a qualitative matter for each individual.

All of this constitutes the background for Vigilius Haufniensis' criticism here. The important point is that he describes "the sphere of historical freedom" in terms of a quantitative leap: "In the sphere of historical freedom, transition is a state. However, in order to understand this correctly, one must not forget that the new is brought about through the leap. If this is not maintained, the transition will have a quantitative preponderance over the elasticity of the leap."⁹⁵ The sphere of historical freedom is presumably introduced to consti-

⁹³ CA, p. 32 / SKS 4, 338. Translation slightly modified.

⁹⁴ CA, p. 57 / SKS 4, 362.

⁹⁵ CA, p. 85 / SKS 4, 388.

tute a contrast to the sphere of logic. In the former, transition and movement take place in terms of radical qualitative leaps from one state to another. By contrast, in logic there is only a gradual quantitative increase or decrease but no real radical change in kind and thus no real movement.

The concept of the leap has become the very trademark of Kierkegaard's philosophy in introductory texts and reference works. It is all the more surprising to learn that one of its original sources is his purported enemy Hegel. Thus, it is not the typical Kierkegaardian concept that it has been conceived to be, and, moreover, it cannot be taken straightforwardly as a part of his polemic with Hegel given that he has borrowed the concept from Hegel (among others) in the first place. To be sure, Kierkegaard develops this concept in his own way and puts it into a different context, but nevertheless the basic Hegelian meaning is still present as is evinced by Kierkegaard's constant reference to the qualitative and the quantitative. This represents a very surprising point of contact between Hegel and Kierkegaard and provides another example of Kierkegaard's appropriation of something from Hegel's thought. It is noteworthy that he makes no attempt to hide the fact that Hegel is the original source of this notion and even refers to Hegel by name. He takes a Hegelian concept – the leap – and uses it in an argument against the Hegelian conception of movement in logic.

This provides a good illustration of the eclectic nature of Kierkegaard's thought. He does not hesitate to borrow key terms and concepts from other thinkers for his own purposes. He takes the term out of its original context and develops it in a new one, giving it his own original twist. Moreover, he sees no contradiction in borrowing one concept from Hegel, e.g. the leap, in order to criticize another concept in Hegel, e.g. movement in logic. This is clear indication of the extremely differentiated nature of his relation to Hegel, which defies any simple, one-sided characterization. Finally, he has no problem borrowing a concept from Hegel during a period when he is in open conflict with the Hegelians, Martensen, Heiberg and Adler. This is evidence for the fact that Kierkegaard's relation to his contemporary Danish Hegelians is not identical to his relation to Hegel himself.

Given this analysis, it seems clear that the bulk of Kierkegaard's criticism in *The Concept of Anxiety* falls on Adler and not on Hegel. This fact raises some difficult questions. Why does Kierkegaard have Vigilius Haufniensis mention Hegel and give the impression of criti-

cizing him? Did Kierkegaard think he was criticizing Hegel by criticizing a Hegelian? If this is the case, then he could not have known much about Hegel's own philosophy from the primary texts since then he could not help but be aware of the difference between the primary texts and the account presented by Adler. This is the interpretation that Koch gives, namely, that Kierkegaard's knowledge of Hegel was largely derived from secondhand accounts.⁹⁶ Similarly, Thulstrup tries to argue that Kierkegaard could not have been positively influenced by Hegel since he was not familiar with Hegel's primary texts.⁹⁷ But this position has a condescending tone about it since in order to make a case for Kierkegaard's originality and independence from Hegel, Thulstrup must ultimately argue that Kierkegaard was ignorant of his works, i.e. ignorant of the one of the most important intellectual figures of the day.

To avoid this somewhat condescending view, I prefer the interpretation that Kierkegaard knew exactly what he was doing and intended to criticize Adler and not Hegel all along. But why then does he use Hegel's name explicitly and frequently in the text if Hegel is not the real object of criticism? The answer is that Kierkegaard uses Hegel as a kind of decoy or disguise in order to veil the true objects of his criticism. It must be recalled that Kierkegaard knew Adler personally. The intellectual world of Copenhagen at the time was small, and Kierkegaard was anxious to avoid needless animosities. Two years later in 1846 Kierkegaard wrote an entire book dedicated to Adler and his purported revelation, but never published it. *The Concept of Anxiety* can be seen as a second *Book on Adler* in the sense that it contains an extended polemic with Adler's Hegelianism and its application to problems of religion. But Kierkegaard wanted to keep the target of his criticism more or less anonymous so that he could publish the work with impunity. Thus, the strategy he came up with was to appear to be in a polemic with Hegel by using Hegel's name explicitly and then in fact to criticize Adler's confusion of Christian concepts and categories with Hegelian philosophy. On this interpretation, Kierkegaard knew precisely what he was doing, and he knew full well that he was criticizing Adler whose position deviated from Hegel's in significant respects. On this interpretation, although Kierkegaard can be seen as criticizing specific results of Hegel's philosophy, his criticism is not of Hegel's primary texts but of a specific

⁹⁶ Carl Henrik Koch *En Flue på Hegels udødelige næse*, p. 195.

⁹⁷ Niels Thulstrup *Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel*, for example, p. 168.

Danish Hegelian and the use to which he puts some of Hegel's concepts and doctrines.

Virtually all of the criticisms mentioned here turn on a confusion of, on the one hand, the realm of abstract logic and thinking and, on the other hand, that of existence. These criticisms are consistent with the solution to the problem of the *Aufhebung* of the law of excluded middle which was proposed in *Either/Or*, Part Two. There Judge Wilhelm carved out two distinct realms which must be held apart. The criticisms in the Introduction to *The Concept of Anxiety* all return to the same point, namely, that the two spheres have been confused. This is the upshot of *The Book on Adler* as well.

Although there is no doubt that Adler is the immediate occasion for Kierkegaard's criticisms in *The Concept of Anxiety*, there are still some significant points which could be conceived as criticisms of Hegel. It is clear that Hegel and Kierkegaard have different definitions of the concepts of existence and actuality. It is also clear that Hegel and Kierkegaard see differently the relation of philosophy to religion and knowing to faith. Finally, it is abundantly clear that they are in disagreement about the issue of movement in logic and the question of immanence and transcendence. I have tried to underscore these points and to indicate their basis in the different projects and investments of the two thinkers. But yet, while it is doubtless important to keep these very general differences in mind, nonetheless it would be a mistake to focus on them so exclusively that one misses the point of the actual intended criticism which is of Adler and not of Hegel.